concurring.
The majority relies heavily on the case State v. Palmateer, 179 N.C. App. 579, 634 S.E.2d 592 (2006), in its analysis of defendant’s stipulations to out-of-state convictions. While I believe the majority’s analysis is correct because we are bound by Palmateer,21 believe the analysis in Palmateer was incorrect and write separately to so note.
In Palmateer, the defendant and the State stipulated to the accuracy of the contents of the defendant’s prior record level worksheet, which contained several of the defendant’s “out-of-state convictions, the date of these convictions, and their classification”; the stipulation included “ ‘the classification and points assigned to any out-of-state convictions[.]’ ” Palmateer, 179 N.C. App. at 581, 634 S.E.2d at 593.
However, our Court recently held in State v. Blanton [“Hanton II”], 175 N.C. App. 250, 623 S.E.2d 600 (2006), that “the question of whether a conviction under an out-of-state statute is substantially similar to an offense under North Carolina statutes is a question of law to be resolved by the trial court.” Our Court further stated that “ ‘[stipulations as to questions of law are generally held invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the *429courts, either trial or appellate.’ ” Although this Court did not explicitly state that a defendant could not stipulate to the substantial similarity of out-of-state convictions, the Court did conclude that this Court’s prior statement in State v. Hanton, 140 N.C. App. 679, 690, 540 S.E.2d 376, 383 (2000) [“Hanton I”], that a defendant might stipulate to this question, was “non-binding dicta.” We are bound by prior decisions of a panel of this Court. Thus, we conclude that the stipulation in the worksheet regarding Defendant’s out-of-state convictions was ineffective. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing.
Palmateer, 179 N.C. App. at 581-82, 634 S.E.2d at 593-94 (citations omitted).
In Hanton I, the defendant argued that his stipulation to his guilt of the out-of-state crimes on the prosecutor’s sentencing worksheet did not include a stipulation that those crimes were substantially similar to certain felonies in this state. Hanton I, 140 N.C. App. at 690, 540 S.E.2d at 383. This Court held that, since no such stipulation was validly made by the defendant and the State had presented no evidence on the point, the record contained no evidence to support a conclusion that the crimes were substantially similar. Id. at 690-91, 540 S.E.2d at 383. In the defendant’s next appeal, Hanton II, stipulations were no longer at issue; the defendant argued that the Court’s statement in Hanton I that “a defendant might stipulate that out-of-state offenses are substantially similar to corresponding North Carolina felony offenses” proved that the question of substantial similarity was a question of fact, which must be submitted to the jury per Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). See Hanton I, 140 N.C. App. at 690, 540 S.E.2d at 383; Hanton II, 175 N.C. App. at 254, 623 S.E.2d at 603. It was in response to that argument that this Court held that the language in Hanton I was dicta and concluded that “the question of whether a conviction under an out-of-state statute is substantially similar to an offense under North Carolina statutes is a question of law to be resolved by the trial court.” Id. at 254-55, 623 S.E.2d at 603-04. Thus, Blakely did not apply. The Court also stated that “ ‘[stipulations as to questions of law are generally held invalid and ineffective, and not binding upon the courts[.]’ ” Id. at 253, 623 S.E.2d at 603. However, nowhere in Hanton I or Hanton II did this Court suggest that the trial court must entirely disregard stipulations by a defendant to the similarity of his prior out-of-state convictions to offenses in North Carolina. While such admissions are not binding, the Court may certainly refer to them and take *430the statements into account when resolving the question of law before it; indeed, a valid stipulation could standing alone provide a valid basis for the court’s conclusion of law that certain offenses are substantially similar. The conclusion in Palmateer is that a defendant’s stipulation to these facts must be considered ineffective, and thus any conclusion drawn by the trial court that takes into account those stipulations must be reversed. This misinterprets the holding of Hanton II to the extent that it forbids the trial court from taking into account any admissions by a defendant.
As Palmateer is binding on this Court, I concur.
. See In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36-37 (1989) (“where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court”).