dissenting.
I dissent and join in the dissent of Chief Justice RAPER.
In addition to the views expressed by Chief Justice Raper in his dissenting opinion in which I have joined, I have some views of my own with respect to this case and similar cases of which this case is an example. The limited question the majority order resolves is whether there is an appealable order. I would rule that this order is a final order within the definition found in Rule 1.05, W.R.A.P. It is “an order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.”
*667There can be no question that this order is dispositive of the review proceeding which had been instituted in the district court, and the order in effect determines that action. It does prevent a judgment in favor of the Public Service Commission, to which it might otherwise be entitled. I would rule that in addition it does affect a substantial right of the Public Service Commission, and I would add that I can find no basis to distinguish this case from Big Horn County Commissioners v. Hinckley, Wyo., 593 P.2d 573 (1979). Were we to look at the merits, I have an abiding belief that a majority of the court would conclude that the additional evidence alluded to in the district court remand order, as quoted in the majority order of this court, is not material to the proceeding before the Public Service Commission. In my judgment the district court has directed the Public Service Commission to receive evidence which the Public Service Commission can then ignore in performing its statutory responsibilities, and the district court will have to affirm the Public Service Commission in that regard. Consequently the effect of the district court order is that it inhibits the right of the Public Service Commission to pursue its work in accordance with the statute, its rules and regulations, and even its agreement with Lower Valley Power and Light, that a limited one-year period would be used for the data necessary to establish the need for an appropriate rate increase. The Public Service Commission, as any other litigant, is entitled to some prospect of finality, and yet that substantial right is denied by the district court’s ruling. In a very real sense the Public Service Commission has been denied due process of law.
This case stands for me as additional evidence of a need to develop a procedure for granting discretionary interlocutory review by this court.1 The court then could in its discretion review orders which otherwise must be regarded as interlocutory in nature, but which need to be reviewed in order to correct an egregious mistake of law and maintain a rational proceeding for the parties. I concede that there will be perhaps a temptation to pursue such a procedure in a number of instances in which, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, review will be denied. I do not, however, conceive that to be an insurmountable obstacle to the wise use of appropriate interlocutory review by this court. In an instance such as this the court then, could proceed to review in its discretion, and would not be inhibited by any lack of a judgment or final order.
. There have been before this Court in recent years several matters in which the necessity for correcting a mistake of law was obvious, but review was denied because of the absence of a judgment or a final order.