dissenting. The rule brought by J. W. Walker, Solicitor-General of the Waycross Circuit, against the defendant in this case alleges in substance that the said J. W. Walker was serving in his official capacity in the grand-jury room, and that the defendant used the profane and opprobrious words set out in the majority opinion “in the presence of the regular, duly qualified, acting, and sworn grand jury while in attendance of and in session in the grand-jury room.”
The power of the court to punish for contempt extends to the conduct of persons before the grand jury. See Wheatley v. State, 114 Ga. 175 (39 S. E. 877); Burge v. State, 38 Ga. App. 690 (145 S. E. 463). The weight of authority in this country is that con-tempts occurring in the presence of a grand jury are treated as taking place in the presence of the court or so near thereto as to obstruct justice. 38 C. J. S. 1056, § 41. See also Morgan v. *884State, 26 Ga. App. 83 (105 S. E. 449). In my opinion this rule is sufficient as against the demurrers, and the trial court did not err in overruling them.
Nichols, J., concurs in this dissent.