(dissenting).
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s interpretation of depraved mind murder and consequently with the reversal of Defendant’s conviction under NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(A)(3). Although it is possible that the jury could have found that the struggle that ensued after Defendant ceased firing at the victim and Baker was an independent action, completely separate and apart from Defendant’s dangerous act of firing a weapon at persons on a public street, our task on appeal is solely to determine “whether any rational jury could have found each element of the crime to be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274, 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992). The application of this standard, however, “does not involve substituting the appellate court’s judgment for that of the jury in deciding the reasonable-doubt question.” Id. The court must still view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, resolving all conflicts and indulging all permissible inferences in favor of a verdict of conviction, but must also “ensure that, indeed, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” Id. This standard does not require that we consider the “merit of evidence that may have supported a verdict to the contrary.” State v. Vigil, 110 N.M. 254, 256, 794 P.2d 728, 730 (1990).
Depraved mind murder is defined as “the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused ... by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life.” NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(3). This statute requires proof that the defendant had subjective knowledge that his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985). It does not, however, require a specific intent to kill a specific person. State v. Johnson, 103 N.M. 364, 368, 707 P.2d 1174 (Ct.App.1985). “Even if the perpetrator had no specific intent to kill anyone, he would be guilty of depraved mind murder in the event someone dies as a result of his actions, because he acted in a manner greatly dangerous to others.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, a rational jury could have found that Defendant’s action of chasing his neighbors up the street while firing a rifle was “greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind without regard for human life,” and, under the circumstances, the jury could have concluded that Defendant was aware that these acts were “greatly dangerous to the lives of others.” A rational jury could also have determined that Defendant’s act caused the death of the victim. The victim attempted to wrestle the rifle away from Defendant because Defendant chased the victim and others up the street while firing the rifle at them. The cause of death, here, occurred due to a natural and continuous chain of events. This chain of events would not have occurred had Defendant not fired his rifle at his neighbors as they fled from his property. Applying our standard of review, there was substantial evidence to support Defendant’s conviction even though the evidence may have also supported a verdict to the contrary.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
FROST, J., concurs.