DISSENTING OPINION OF
ABE, J., WITH WHOM LEVINSON, J., JOINSAs to this court’s holding that HRS § 727-24 preempts Section 13-5.1 of the Revised Ordinances of Hono*92lulu, I believe that issue was correctly decided. I do not agree, however, with its disposition of the case, nor the reasoning supporting the affirmance of the circuit court’s decision.
There are two aspects to the first sentence of HRS § 727-24.1 First, it makes it an offense for any person to intrude, or loiter, or loaf, or idle, without proper authority upon the premises of any school, public or private. Secondly, HRS § 727-24 grants authority to a police officer to arrest without a warrant. In order for the arrest without a warrant to be valid, however, it must be predicated “on the complaint of the principal or other person in charge.”
This court in Territory v. Hoo Koon, 22 Haw. 597, 602 (1915) held that under the provisions now codified in HRS Ch. 708 “jTJhe right of a policeman to arrest without a warrant is not limited to felonies.” It cannot be presumed that the authority to arrest without a warrant granted in HRS § 727-24 is surplusage and merely restates the authority bestowed upon police officers in HRS Ch. 708. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended to enact an unnecessary law. In re Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Haw. 45, 60-61, 487 P.2d 1070, 1080 (1971); Levy v. Kimball, 51 Haw. 540, 545, 465 P.2d 580, 583 (1970); Cooper v. Island Realty Co., 16 Haw. 92, 99 (1904); In re Pringle, 22 Haw. 557, 564 (1915). Therefore, I believe the more reasonable construction of HRS § 727-24 is that the requirement of a complaint by the principal or other person in charge is a condition on the police officer’s authority to arrest without a warrant for a violation of this particular statute.
The record indicates, and this court noticed, that *93the complaint came from an unknown person, not the principal or other person in charge. Not being predicated on the complaint of a principal or other person in charge, the police officer, therefore, did not have the necessary authority to arrest appellant Kimball and carry out a warrantless search of her person incident thereto. For this reason, I would reverse the conviction of the trial court.
I also believe that the appellant had proper authority to be on the premises. HRS § 298-23 states:
“Use of school facilities for recreational and community purposes. All public school buildings, facilities, and grounds shall be available for general recreational purposes and for public and community group meetings, whenever these activities do not interfere with the normal and usual activities of the school, and its pupils, concerned. Any law or portion of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the department of education and the departments and officials of the several counties entrusted with the control, supervision, and care of school buildings, facilities, or grounds shall issue such rules and regulations as are deemed necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.”
It is neither within the public’s everyday experience, nor within the legislative intent of HRS § 298-23 that all activities on school premises receive the prior approval2 of the Department of Education. When school is not in session, it is common to see children engaging in informal games on the school yard or using the playground equipment. Likewise, adults are often observed strolling through school grounds or merely resting on the premises. Certainly it was the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the provisions of HRS § 298-23 *94to allow activities as just mentioned when it does not interfere with “normal and usual activities of the school and its pupils.”3 This court’s interpretation of HRS § 298-23, however, has a contrary effect.
If all public school grounds are to be available for general recreational purpose, the public must be able to go upon the premises. Thus, I believe HRS § 298-23 authorizes presence on a public school’s premises unless it may interfere with normal and usual school activities.
The proviso that the department promulgate regulations to further the purpose of the statute relates to regulating public use of school premises that might interfere materially with normal school activities. The Department of Education has promulgated such rules. The department’s rules, however, do not in any way attempt to regulate non-disruptive informal use of school grounds. Rule 6 does not establish any requirements as to obtain*95ing authority to be on school grounds for informal uses such as appellant Kimball was engaged in. In fact, even if appellant Kimball desired to apply for the use of the Central Intermediate School ground, she could not have done so under Rule 6 as procedures for handling such applications are not established therein.4 To say that no person may use school grounds and facilities merely because the department’s regulations failed to establish procedures to obtain lawful authority to do so rubs the grain of policy contained in HRS § 298-23 in the wrong direction.
It is apparent that Rule 6 attempts to regulate use of school grounds, facilities and buildings which would *96tend to disrupt normal school activities. For example, Rule 6.8c establishes fees for use of auditoriums, cafetoriums, classrooms, fieldhouses, gymnasium, gymnatoriums, swimming pools and grounds for carnivals and fairs. Unregulated use of these facilities and of the grounds for carnivals and fairs would materially upset normal school activities and such regulations are therefore within the authority delegated by the legislature to the department to promulgate these rules. If the department had attempted to exclude all use except that provided by the rules, regardless of whether any of the uses interfered with normal school activities, it would clearly exceed the scope of authority delegated to it. Since merely sitting around under a tree on a public school ground, as the arresting officer testified appellant Kimball was doing at the time he approached them, falls within the general understanding of the term “recreation,” and since the activities of appellant Kimball in no way disrupted normal school activities, I would hold that the police officer had no probable cause to arrest defendant Kimball for idling on school premises without proper authority, and the subsequent search of her person and seizure of drugs was, therefore, invalid. I would reverse the circuit court’s conviction since the motion to suppress the evidence seized was improperly denied.
Finally even assuming, as we now must, that “proper authority” to be on public school premises can be granted presently only by the Department of Education, the record does not show that any evidence was produced that indicated the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that appellant Kimball was upon school premises without proper authority. The police officer testified that he asked appellant Kimball and her companions if they had any lawful reason for being on the school ground. They answered “no.” While such investigation would tend to support an officer’s reasonable belief that appellant Kimball was idling, loafing or loitering, it *97does not, it seems to me, indicate that she admitted to being on the premises without some proper authority.
Construed in light of HRS § 298-23, “without proper authority” as used in HRS § 727-24 must mean doing of acts which would tend to materially disrupt normal school activities. There is no evidence to indicate that appellant Kimball or her companions were, under the circumstances, doing anything that would lead a police officer to have probable cause to believe a material disruption of normal and usual school activities were being or about to be materially disrupted.
Even under this court’s interpretation of HRS § 727-24, therefore, the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest appellant Kimball. The fruits of the search and seizure conducted pursuant to an invalid arrest should not have been allowed into evidence.
I dissent.
The first sentence of HRS § 727-24 reads:
“Any person intruding, or loitering, or loafing, or idling, without proper authority upon the premises of any school, public or private, including any female boarding school, Kawailoa Girls’ Home and school dormitories, may be arrested by any police officer, without any warrant, and on the complaint of the principal or other person in charge of the school, or of any trustee of the same; . . . .”
Rule 6.2, Departmental Rules and Directives, Department of Education, State of Hawaii 1969, 7000 Series, requires a written request for permission to use school facilities. Rule 6.3 authorizes the District Superintendent to pass upon such application.
HRS § 298-23 was enacted as Joint Resolution 6 in 1953. The resolution reads as follows:
"J R. 6
Joint Resolution Providing for the Use of Public School Buildings, Facilities and Grounds for Community and Recreational Purposes.
WHEREAS, school buildings, facilities, and grounds are public property and it is good public policy in a democracy to maximize the beneficial use of such property by the widest possible public; and
WHEREAS, school buildings and grounds are not generally in use in the late afternoons, over weekends, and during the summer months; and
WHEREAS, there is a shortage in this Territory of public parks, playgrounds, and picnic areas, and also of suitable meeting places for precinct clubs, service clubs, and other community organizations; and
WHEREAS, schools have, in the American tradition, served not only as educational centers but also as social and community centers; now, therefore,
Be it Enacted by the Legislature of the Territory of Hawaii:
SECTION 1. All public school buildings, facilities, and grounds shall be available for general recreational purposes and for public and community group meetings, whenever these activities do not interfere with the normal and usual activities of the school, and its pupils, concerned. Any law or portion of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the department of public instruction and the departments and officials of the City and County and other counties of the Territory of Hawaii entrusted with the control, supervision and care of school buildings, facilities and grounds are hereby authorized and directed to issue such rules and regulations as are deemed necessary to carry out the purposes of this Joint Resolution.
SECTION 2. This Joint Resolution shall take effect upon its approval.”
Rule 6.8 established the procedures to obtain approval for use of school premises:
“6.8 Procedures for Approval, Fees and Service Charges
The following procedures are established to provide for uniform application of Rule 6, relating to the use of school buildings, facilities and grounds.
a. Category of Use
Type I. Public school PTA, school, department or other governmental agency sponsored or co-sponsored meetings, classes and other activities to serve the patrons of the school and the community.
Type II. Community associations or youth clubs sponsored by a nonprofit community organization to hold meetings, classes or other activities to which no admission charge is made, collection taken or donation received.
Type III. All other educational, recreational or service groups in which membership is open to the general public and conducting community affairs to which no admission charge is made, collection taken or donation received.
Type IF. All other educational, recreational or service groups in which membership is open to the general public and conducting community affairs to which admission charge is made, collection taken or donation accepted.
b. Approvals
Type I and II use. Application shall be filled out by applicant and processed by the principal.
Type III and IF use.
(1) Applicant fills out the Application for the Use of School Buildings and/or Grounds form and submits it to the principal.
(2) Principal makes his recommendation and forwards the form to the District Superintendent for final approval.
(3) District Superintendent or his designated representative approves or disapproves application and returns copies to principal and applicant.”
Plainly, appellant Kimball did not fall in any of the four categories.