concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s Division 1 and respectfully dissent as to the remainder of the opinion.
1. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b) provides that where a “defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences,” the jury may consider additional damages “solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant,” under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (c). Actions for “false imprisonment,” “false arrest,” “slander,” and “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” are all intentional torts which come under “willful misconduct,” “malice,” “wantonness,” or “entire want of care” and that authorize the jury to consider punitive damages.
Appellees chose to submit the case to the jury on the theories of false imprisonment and false arrest. “False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.” OCGA § 51-7-20. “ ‘The restraint constituting a false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures, or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if plaintiff does not submit, and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries.’ ” Sinclair Refining Co. v. Meek, 62 Ga. App. 850, 851, hn. 3 (10 SE2d 76) (1940). Since this is a default situation, then the elements of those theories of intentional tort have been satisfied from the detailed facts pled in the complaint, which constitute the aggravating circumstances and which authorize a jury to find aggravating circumstances and to award punitive damages as appropriate additional damages in this intentional tort action. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b); Stroud v. Elias, 247 Ga. 191, 193 (1) (275 SE2d 46) (1981).
“Wanton and wilful conduct differs from gross negligence. Wilful conduct is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury; wanton conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to justify the jury in finding a wantonness in spirit to actual intent.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 758 (5) (417 SE2d 705) (1992); see also Dyches v. McCorkle, 212 Ga. App. 209, 216 (2) (441 SE2d 518) (1994). The facts stated in the complaint and the failure of appellant to put up any evidence at trial as to punitive damages, either to mitigate the imposition of punitive damages or to refute that its conduct was wilful or wanton in order to mitigate the imposition of punitive damages under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) (2), created a jury question as to whether punitive damages should be awarded.
“False imprisonment is an intentional tort, not a tort of negligence.” Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 713 (2) (348 SE2d 50) *133(1986); see also Stewart v. Williams, 243 Ga. 580 (255 SE2d 699) (1979). The cause of action does not require as an essential element malice to constitute false arrest or false imprisonment. See Williams v. Smith, supra at 714. OCGA § 51-7-2 provides that malice, in false arrest or prosecution actions,' consists of “personal spite or in a general disregard of the right consideration of mankind, directed by chance against the individual injured.” See Barber v. H & H Muller Enterprises, 197 Ga. App. 126, 130 (2) (397 SE2d 563) (1990); Worn v. Warren, 191 Ga. App. 448, 449 (1) (382 SE2d 112) (1989); Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 824 (2) (282 SE2d 393) (1981). However, a jury may reasonably infer the presence of malice as an aggravating factor from the facts pled and admitted by the default, although the complaint never used the “magic” word malice, because malice was not a necessary element of the theory of recovery.
By the default judgment, appellant is barred from showing that there was probable cause for the detention and arrest, and the complaint shows a complete absence of probable cause. “Malice may be inferred if‘defendant’s acts were wanton or were done with a reckless disregard for or conscious indifference to the rights of the plaintiff.’ Bowen v. Waters, 170 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (316 SE2d 497) (1984).” Willis v. Brassell, 220 Ga. App. 348, 352 (3) (469 SE2d 733) (1996). Therefore, the jury may infer malice from the complete absence of probable cause. See generally inference of malice in malicious prosecution cases id. at 353; Fuller v. Jennings, 213 Ga. App. 773, 776 (1) (445 SE2d 796) (1994); Garmon v. Warehouse Groceries &c., 207 Ga. App. 89, 92 (2) (427 SE2d 308) (1993); McMillan v. Day Realty Assoc., 159 Ga. App. 366, 368 (2) (283 SE2d 298) (1981). Appellant’s silence as to the aggravating circumstances and failure to put up any defense evidence in mitigation of the punitive damages could be construed by the jury as an admission of plaintiffs’ assertions regarding punitive damages.
In the caption of Ga. L. 1987, pp. 915, 916, the General Assembly set out the purpose “to provide trial procedures for pleadings, evidentiary standards, findings of fact, and judgments for awards of punitive damages.” In Ga. L. 1987, pp. 917, 918, § 5, OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) (1), “[a]n award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a complaint.” The act sets no pleading requirements other than “notice pleadings” for the complaint, i.e., pleadings which put the defendant on notice as to what damages will be sought. Punitive damages are not special damages within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9 (g); neither does it come within any of the other special pleading requirements. Instead, punitive damages are additional damages, which are limited by the provisions of OCGA § 51-12-5.1. The requirement that “[a]n award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a complaint” must be read in pari materia with *134the Civil Practice Act and, specifically, with OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (2) (B), which requires a claim for relief to contain “[a] demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled”; such demand is generally called the prayer or prayer for relief which comes at the end of the complaint, counter or cross-claim, and puts the court and parties on notice as to the relief sought. See Wagner v. Wagner, 238 Ga. 404, 405 (1) (233 SE2d 379) (1977); Cross v. Cross, 230 Ga. 91 (195 SE2d 439) (1973); Seibers v. Morris, 226 Ga. 813, 814-815 (3) (177 SE2d 705) (1970). The prayer for relief at the end of the claim in the complaint “constitutes no part of the pleader’s cause of action.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Empire Banking Co. v. Martin, 133 Ga. App. 115, 120 (210 SE2d 237) (1974). “Appellants specifically prayed for both punitive damages and attorney fees, and their complaint demanded judgment on both those claims”; this Court held that it was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the plaintiff to put up evidence as to such claims prayed for in the complaint. Floyd v. First Union Nat. Bank, 203 Ga. App. 788 (1) (417 SE2d 725) (1992). Thus, the language requiring punitive damages to be specifically prayed for in the complaint, as used under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) (1), means that a request for punitive damages must be set forth in the prayer for relief, with which requirement appellee fully complied.
In a default judgment, the aggravating factors under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b) have been deemed admitted; therefore, it is for the trier of fact, the jury in the case sub judice, to determine specifically if such damages are appropriate and to decide within the limits of the act how much to award. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) (2); see generally Hill v. Johnson, 210 Ga. App. 824, 825 (437 SE2d 801) (1993); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, 198 Ga. App. 653, 656-657 (3) (402 SE2d 753) (1991). After appellees presented evidence, appellant did not move for directed verdict or to strike the evidence based upon a failure to prove the aggravating circumstances by “clear and convincing evidence” under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). Thus, appellant waived such higher standard of proof. Hill v. Johnson, supra at 825; see also Shaw v. Ruiz, 207 Ga. App. 299, 300-301 (428 SE2d 98) (1993).
Unlike Clarke v. Cotton, 263 Ga. 861 (440 SE2d 165) (1994), a case upon which appellant relies, appellant failed to object and to request that the jury be charged that the burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence and that such standard be defined. Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), the “clear and convincing evidence” standard applies to proof that the “defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.”
“[W]e pointed out that, in Georgia, the purpose of punitive dam*135ages is to deter the repetition of reprehensible conduct by the defendant. OCGA § [51-12-5.1]. Because deterrence is based on factors other than the actual harm caused, we rejected the notion that punitive damages must necessarily bear some relationship to the actual damages awarded by the jury. . . . The purpose of punitive damages, after all, is to deter such conduct. . . . Society’s interest would seem better served by deterring objectionable conduct at the first opportunity so that the potentially greater injury which might otherwise be caused by such conduct might be avoided.” (Footnotes omitted.) Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga. 613, 614-615 (1) (409 SE2d 501) (1991); see generally Banks v. ICI Americas, 266 Ga. 607, 610 (469 SE2d 171) (1996); Mack Trucks v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 543 (2) (436 SE2d 635) (1993). Under OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (c), the statutory purpose is to “punish, penalize, or deter.” Banks v. ICI Americas, supra at 610; Stone Man v. Green, 263 Ga. 470, 472 (1) (435 SE2d 205) (1993).
“Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton. There is general agreement that, because it lacks this element, mere negligence is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as gross. Still less, of course, can such damages be charged against one who acts under an innocent mistake in engaging in conduct that nevertheless constitutes a tort.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Banks v. ICI Americas, supra at 610 (3), quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 121-122 (4) (365 SE2d 827) (1988).
When a party is in default on an intentional tort which falls within the ambit of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b), the elements of punitive damages that must be proven by “clear and convincing evidence” are deemed admitted. However, the trier of fact still must make a specific determination from such admitted facts and circumstances as to whether or not punitive damages are appropriate. See Hill v. Johnson, supra at 824-825; Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Brown, supra at 656-657. In the case sub judice, the jury, by their action in separately filling out the space on the verdict form for punitive damages and inserting a specific award for punitive damages, made a specific finding thereby that “an award of punitive damages shall be made”; the jury’s actions satisfied OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) (1). Appellant failed to object at any time to such procedure or verdict form and waived any issue as to a procedure created for the defendant’s protection. See Hill v. Johnson, supra at 825; Shaw v. Ruiz, supra at 300-301.
The admitted facts of the complaint showed “[t]here was no *136harm with regard to punitive damages against [appellant] because the overwhelming [admissions in the default] showed a ‘conscious indifference to consequences’ on [its] part, more than meeting the clear and convincing standard of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b).” Clarke v. Cotton, supra at 862.
The provisions of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 set forth specific procedural requirements, i.e., that the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence; that there must be a specific finding by the trier of fact of aggravating circumstances such as to warrant the imposition of punitive damages; and that there must be a bifurcation of the trial, with the trier of fact making findings of liability and as to some damages, prior to hearing evidence in aggravation. Such procedures are for the protection of the defendant and can be waived. However, nowhere in the record, either prior to the jury receiving the case or after the verdict was received but before the jury was dispersed, did counsel for appellant make any objection or motion before the trial court raising the issue of failure to follow the procedures of OCGA § 51-12-5.1. This enumeration of error was not raised at the trial and passed upon by the trial court in order to preserve it for appellate review. Thus, such issue was raised for the first time on appeal and is not appropriate for appellate review by this Court. Such issue is waived by failure to timely object. See Hill v. Johnson, supra at 825.
2. Appellant submitted no written request to charge on OCGA § 51-12-5.1. The trial court gave appellees’ Request to Charge No. 5, which embodied OCGA § 51-12-5 and which deviated from the principles of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 in stating that punitive damages are both to compensate for wounded feelings, as well as to deter the wrongdoer. The rest of the charge included language present in both statutes.
“Assuming without deciding that it is always error for the trial court not to comply exactly with the requirements of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 in a default judgment action ([cit.]), we find the failure to do so in this case was harmless error.” Hill v. Johnson, supra at 825. Appellant failed to show that the charge was harmful or to properly except to the charge as given so that the trial court could timely correct any harmful error. See Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 703 (2) (252 SE2d 205) (1979); see also Smaha v. Moore, 193 Ga. App. 23 (387 SE2d 13) (1989); Stone v. Burell, 161 Ga. App. 369 (2) (288 SE2d 636) (1982). The jury returned compensatory damages of $4,000 for expenses of litigation, $82,000 for pain and suffering, and $7,500 for loss of consortium, which fully compensated appellees’ general and special damages; however, the jury returned more than one and one-half times that amount, $150,000, as additional damages to punish the appellant. There is nothing to indicate that the jury gave any of the punitive damages as compensation. Had the charge been given *137that punitive damages are to penalize, to punish, and to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the wrongful conduct in the future, the outcome would have been the same. Obviously the jury was outraged at the appellant’s conduct and lack of contrition.
Decided July 3, 1997 Sharon C. Barnes, for appellant. Paris & Peterson, Richard J. Paris, Jr., Stephen D. Peterson, for appellees.3. Appellant’s exception to Request to Charge No. 4 is based upon possible confusion to the jury with regard to pain and suffering and for loss of capacity to labor and earn money. However, the charge was a correct statement of the law. See Williams v. Vinson, 104 Ga. App. 886, 892-893 (6) (123 SE2d 281) (1961); Langran v. Hodges, 60 Ga. App. 567, 569-571 (3) (4 SE2d 489) (1939).
For reversal of a case based upon a jury charge or failure to charge, there must be a showing of harmful error, which causes such gross injustice that the question of whether the party has been deprived of a fair trial can fairly be raised. See Greenhill v. State, 199 Ga. App. 218, 222 (404 SE2d 577) (1991); Wisenbaker v. Warren, 196 Ga. App. 551, 555 (5) (396 SE2d 528) (1990); Hamrick v. Wood, 175 Ga. App. 67, 68 (2) (332 SE2d 367) (1985).
Moreover, appellant’s exception to the charge did not set forth harmful error so that the trial court could correct any alleged error. The exception was so vague, indefinite, and lacking in specificity that it failed to point out any alleged error. Therefore, the exception was deficient. See Smaha v. Moore, supra; Stone v. Burell, supra; McGaha v. Kwon, 161 Ga. App. 216 (288 SE2d 289) (1982); Jackson v. Meadows, 157 Ga. App. 569 (278 SE2d 8) (1981).