concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached in Judge Phillips’ opinion, however, I do not agree with the reasoning set forth therein. G.S. 50-20(b)(l) in pertinent part provides:
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) “Marital property” means all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of the separation of the parties. . . .
The record reveals that the parties separated in August 1981 and that the personal injury recovery, at issue in this action, was not received by the plaintiff until sometime during 1982. Thus, the recovery was not “marital property” within the meaning of the statute. For that reason I vote to affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Although it is not necessary that we decide the question in this case, I do not believe that G.S. 52-4 is controlling on this issue. G.S. 52-4 states: “The earnings of a married person by virtue of any contract for his or her personal services and any damages for personal injury or other tort sustained by either . . . shall be his or her sole and separate property.” G.S. 50-20 and 21, The Equitable Distribution Act, classifies as marital property, for the purpose of equitable distribution, all real and personal prop*662erty acquired by the spouse during the marriage unless such property is exempted by G.S. 50-20(b)(2). Personal injury recoveries are not among the enumerated exemptions set forth in G.S. 50-20(b)(2). The statutes, thus, appear to be in conflict. When two acts of the legislature deal with the same subject, the provisions are to be reconciled if this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation, but if they are necessarily repugnant, the last one enacted shall prevail. Highway Commission v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E. 2d 22 (1967); Nytco Leasing v. Southeast Motels, 40 N.C. App. 120, 252 S.E. 2d 826 (1979). G.S. 52-4 was enacted in 1913 and G.S. 50-20 was enacted in 1981. Thus, the language of G.S. 50-20 should prevail in deciding this question.
Judge COZORT concurs in the opinion of Judge ARNOLD concurring in the result.