concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that Tuyet Nguyen (“Nguyen”) adequately preserved in the district court her claim that the admission of the statement by Sess Merke to Agent Borden violated the Confrontation Clause. I also agree that the admission of Merke’s statement offended the Confrontation Clause. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For this reason, I dissent in part from the majority’s opinion and would affirm Nguyen’s convictions for conspiracy to transport stolen property, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and transportation of stolen property.1
I.
Confrontation Clause errors are subject to harmless error review. United States v. Schoneberg, 396 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.2005). “[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). To assess the harmlessness of an error, we inquire “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized,” we “might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Harmlessness is determined on the basis of the remaining evidence, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), and we consider a number of factors including “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431.
The majority initially asserts that “the most persuasive evidence that tied Tuyet Nguyen to the stolen probes, and the only testimony that showed her knowledge that the probes were stolen” was Merke’s statement, as related by Agent Borden, that Merke received money from the Nguyens in exchange for medical equipment.2 Maj. *679Op. at 675. The majority’s subsequent discussion is more nuanced and determines that, absent the hearsay testimony, the government has not proven that the jury would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Nguyen knew the probes were stolen.3 Id. at 675-76.
I respectfully disagree. Based on all of the remaining evidence in the record, I conclude that any reasonable jury would have connected Nguyen to the stolen probes and determined that Nguyen knew the probes were stolen, even without Merke’s hearsay statement. The record demonstrates that Merke stole the probes, sold and transferred them to Nguyen and her company, Columbia Medical Systems, Inc. (“CMS”), and that Nguyen then sold the probes in interstate commerce.
Evidence in the record indicates that Merke stole functional probes from Philips and sold them to CMS and Nguyen. Documentary evidence and the testimony of Evalyn Thomas, a Philips data entry clerk, establish that equipment, including forty-six ultrasound probes, “disappeared” and could not be accounted for while Merke was in charge of Philips’s Defective Materials storeroom and Finished Goods storeroom. See Maj. Op. at 671-72. Also, documentary evidence in the form of shipping-related documents indicates that Merke repeatedly shipped packages to CMS and/or Tuyet Nguyen. The record contains numerous shipping invoices, logs, and waybills that connect Merke to Nguyen and CMS.
Furthermore, the government presented evidence of CMS’s practice of using checks made payable to “Cash” to purchase probes and other ultrasound equipment, and testimony that this was an unusual practice in the industry given that it signaled potential illegal conduct. Of these checks payable to “Cash” on CMS’s account, 112 of them, totaling roughly $512,000, include a notation “Purchase probes (Merke)” or some similar descriptor. Tuyet Nguyen signed forty-nine of these 112 checks.4 This evidence overwhelmingly links Nguyen to the probes, and to Merke. The evidence of the checks payable to “Cash” and referencing both probes and Merke also directly contradicts Nguyen’s statement during a police interview that she had never purchased or taken delivery of any items, including probes, from Merke.
The government also produced evidence that CMS sold many more ultrasound *680probes than it recorded as purchased. For example, a comparison of CMS’s purchase and sales reports for specific, relevant equipment models indicates that for the year 1999, CMS purchased nine items and sold sixty items. For the year 2000, there were seven purchases and eighty-three sales. In 2001, there were four purchases and forty sales. In 2002, CMS purchased thirty-three items and sold fifty-four items. In 2003, there were no purchases, yet fifty-eight sales.5
In addition, the government produced evidence of the Nguyens’ other attempts to facilitate their criminal scheme. First, as the majority notes, Phu Nguyen, Tuyet Nguyen’s husband and business partner in CMS, solicited Robert Davies, a Philips employee, to steal ultrasound probes for CMS. See Maj. Op. at 671-72. Second, Tuyet Nguyen solicited Dave Westrich, her former colleague from Philips, to steal Philips’s proprietary software for her or CMS’s use.
Based on the entire record, I conclude that the Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court recognized in Santos, knowledge “must almost always” be proven by circumstantial evidence. 128 S.Ct. at 2029. It is unlikely that the government would have ever been able to get Nguyen to confess outright that she knew the probes were stolen. But such a confession was not required to convict Nguyen. The jury could, and I believe would, draw inferences from the evidence presented to establish the connection between Nguyen and the probes, and to establish Nguyen’s knowledge of the stolen nature of the probes that CMS had acquired and sold. Accordingly, I would find that the Confrontation Clause error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II.
Because I would affirm the jury’s verdict in its entirety, I proceed to address Nguyen’s remaining substantive challenges on appeal.6 These challenges to her money laundering conspiracy conviction, which she did not raise in the district court, are subject to plain error review. “Under plain-error review, reversal is permitted only when there is (1) error that is (2) plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir.2009) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “An error is plain if it is ‘contrary to the law at the time of appeal United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997)). To be plain, the error must be “clear-cut” or “obvious.” See United States v. Zalapa, 509 F.3d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir.2007).
A.
On appeal, Nguyen contends that the district court improperly instructed the jury with respect to the charge of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A), 1956(a)(1)(B), and *6811956(h). She argues that although the district court’s instruction containing the elements of the money laundering conspiracy offense, Instruction 20, correctly stated that it is a specific intent crime, the district court committed reversible error by providing a subsequent instruction regarding knowledge, Instruction 25. Instruction 25 allegedly “eviscerated” the specific intent element stated in Instruction 20. Instruction 20 states, in relevant part, that the government must prove that:
(2) the defendant knew that the property represented the proceeds of interstate transportation of stolen property; and
(3) the defendant knew the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of interstate transportation of stolen medical devices, or the defendant acted with the intent to promote the carrying on of interstate transportation of stolen medical devices....
Instruction 25, however, states: “An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through ignorance, mistake, or accident. You may consider evidence of the defendant’s words, acts, or omissions, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the defendant acted knowingly.” Thus, Nguyen asserts that Instruction 25 negated the specific intent requirement by allowing the jury to determine that she acted “knowingly” through “ignorance, mistake or accident.”
Nguyen’s claim of error is based on our decision in United States v. Stein, where we held that a jury instruction on general knowledge that followed a correct money laundering instruction rendered the instructions, as a whole, erroneous because they effectively omitted an element of the offense. See 37 F.3d 1407, 1410 (9th. Cir.1994). However, unlike Instruction 25 in this case, the general knowledge instruction in Stein contained a second sentence, which rendered the Stein instructions problematic. There, the general knowledge instruction stated that “an act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and doesn’t act through ignorance, mistake or accident. The Government is not required to prove that the defendant lmeio his act or omissions ivere unlawful.” Id. at 1410 (emphasis added). The second sentence was the basis of the Stein court’s conclusion that the jury could have convicted Stein without finding he knew the predicate acts were unlawful. Id. Because Instruction 25 does not contain the language that provided the taint in Stein, there was no error. Moreover, even if there was some error, it was not plain error; any possible error was not “so clear-cut, so obvious, a competent district judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of objection.” Zalapa, 509 F.3d at 1064 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, I would find no instructional error.
B.
Nguyen belatedly challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting her conviction for conspiracy to launder money, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Santos, -U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) (plurality).7 Although the panel majority does not reach this issue, I con-*682elude that the error alleged by Nguyen was not plain error.
In Santos, the Court considered “whether the term ‘proceeds’ used in the federal money-laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), means ‘receipts’ or ‘profits.’ ” 128 S.Ct. at 2022. Santos involved the operation of a criminal lottery, and Santos was convicted of money laundering based on his payments of money to lottery winners and employees. See id. at 2022-23. Four Justices found that the term “proceeds” was ambiguous and, applying the rule of lenity, concluded that the term “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) universally means “profits,” and not “gross receipts.” See id. at 2023-25. Under the plurality’s view, “to establish the proceeds element under the ‘profits’ interpretation, the prosecution needs to show ... that a single instance of specified unlawful activity was profitable and gave rise to the money involved in a charged transaction.” Id. at 2029.
However, Justice Stevens, whose separate concurrence provided the fifth vote in Santos, took the narrower view that Congress could have intended the term “proceeds” to have different meanings in different contexts and, as a result, “proceeds” might mean “profits” in the illegal lottery context, but might not have that meaning in the context of another predicate crime. Id. at 2031-32 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]his Court need not pick a single definition of ‘proceeds’ applicable to every unlawful activity, no matter how incongruous some applications may be.”). Thus, Justice Stevens, agreeing with the analysis of four dissenting Justices, stated that “the legislative history of § 1956 makes it clear that Congress intended the term ‘proceeds’ to include gross revenues from the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving such sales.” Id. at 2032; see also id. at 2035 & n. 1 (Alito, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens and the plurality contest the stare decisis effect of his opinion, the plurality recognizes that Justice Stevens’s narrower concurrence limits the Court’s holding. Compare id. at 2031, with id. at 2034 n. 7.
Based on the plurality’s opinion in Santos, Nguyen argues that the record does not support her conviction for conspiracy to launder money because it does not contain evidence demonstrating that she used profits to further or conceal the conspiracy.
Two aspects of the Santos decision indicate that any alleged error in this case is not'so clear-cut or obvious as to render it “plain error.” First, the multiple opinions in Santos do not conclusively define “proceeds.” Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion suggests that “proceeds” does not mean “profits” in the context of the sale of contraband and the operation of a criminal organization, which is at issue here. Moreover, his view is consistent with the views of four dissenting Justices. Thus, the district court’s definition of “proceeds,” if error, cannot be considered plain error. See United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 316 (5th Cir.2009) (“While Justice Stevens and the plurality disagreed over the precise precedential effect of his statement, the uncertainty renders any error here not ‘plain.’ ”); accord United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 785 (5th Cir.2008); see also Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.120 Financial Transaction to Promote Unlawful Activity, Comment (Mar. 2009) (“Whether the instruction must now be modified in all or some other cases to define ‘proceeds’ to mean ‘profits’ pursuant to Santos is unclear.”).
Second, neither the Santos plurality or Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion addressed the quantum of evidence required to support a conviction for the charge of *683conspiracy to launder money, which is at issue here, as opposed to a conviction for money laundering. See Santos, 128 S.Ct. at 2023 n. 1. The plurality specifically stated that it was not addressing the possibility that the convictions for conspiracy to launder money at issue there would stand in light of its holding regarding the meaning of “proceeds.” Id.
Accordingly, despite the Supreme Court’s opinion in Santos, the definition of proceeds under which Nguyen was convicted, if erroneous, was not plain error.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent in part. I would find that the violation of the Confrontation Clause was harmless error, and that Nguyen’s conviction for conspiracy to launder money did not involve plain error. Nguyen’s convictions should be affirmed in their entirety.
. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Nguyen’s conviction for felony misbranding of medical devices should not be disturbed. Maj. Op. 675-78.
. The panel majority and I have a difference of opinion regarding the persuasiveness of the evidence in the record. Although the majority finds Merke’s hearsay statement to be the most persuasive evidence in the record, other evidence in the record, including significant circumstantial evidence, establishes the harmlessness of the Confrontation Clause error. *679The government is not required to prove knowledge by direct evidence, and may rely on circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Santos,-U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2029, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) (plurality) (stating that knowledge "must almost always" be proven by circumstantial evidence); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) ("[W]e have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”); United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that the government need not prove defendant’s knowledge of the objective of a conspiracy with direct evidence, and that inferences based on circumstantial evidence would sustain the conspiracy conviction); cf. United States v. Santos, 527 F.3d 1003, 1009 (9th Cir.2008) ("The government is not required to produce direct evidence of the defendant’s intent; rather, it may provide circumstantial evidence from which the district court can draw reasonable inferences.").
. An element of the crime of interstate transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 is knowledge of the stolen nature of the transported goods.
. Altogether, the record contains evidence of over one million dollars worth of checks payable to "Cash” and cashier’s checks, all of which were drawn on CMS’s accounts and bore some notation related to the purchase of equipment.
. The illegality of the operation is supported by the testimony of FDA Agent Borden that, based on a comparison of physical evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant and documentary evidence from CMS, many Philips probes tied to CMS had false serial numbers.
. The majority opinion does not address these remaining issues, which relate to Nguyen’s conviction for conspiracy to launder money, because its reversal on the Confrontation Clause issue obviates the need to do so. Nonetheless, as the issues have been briefed and argued, an evaluation of their merits may assist the district court should the matter be retried.
. Nguyen waited until November 24, 2008, just prior to oral argument, to raise this argument. Although the Supreme Court decided Santos on June 2, 2008, Nguyen did not raise the Santos issue in her reply brief, which was filed on August 5, 2008. Nonetheless, no authority appears to preclude consideration of this issue in light of the intervening decision by the Supreme Court.