concurring specially.
Many of the facts of dissimilarity are irrelevant to the point which plaintiffs are trying to make. Their theory is that the paint which was used was the wrong paint or was applied improperly and that it was the cause of the falls on the step and on the porch. In order to make the fall of the one woman relevant to the fall of the other, plaintiffs would have to show that the paint (itself or its application) was the cause of the falls. Plaintiffs offer no such evidence. If they did, then the first fall (of Sparks) from such cause, if the owner learned of it prior to the second fall (of McCampbell), would be some evidence of the element of prior knowledge of a dangerous condition unknown to invitee McCampbell. But of course the later fall would not provide prior knowledge as related to the first fall. The second fall might, however, be supportive of evidence that the cause was the paint or its application and thus be relevant to the issue of causation.
The motion, therefore, was properly granted because the connecting evidentiary link is totally absent, plaintiffs offering no evidence whatsoever that (1) the paint itself (2) and/or coupled with its application (3) to step and porch surfaces similarly (4) whether wet or dry, caused the falls.
*601Task J. Van Dora, William S. Goodman, for appellee.