(concurring in part; dissenting in part) — I agree that logger's liens and stumpage liens have priority over a security interest arising under the Uniform Commercial Code. However, I do not agree that entities, other than individuals who actually perform physical labor, may claim logger's liens under RCW 60.24.020, and I dissent to that section of the majority opinion.
The majority overrules Campbell v. Sterling Mfg. Co., 11 Wash. 204, 39 P. 451 (1895), in which this court held that a person who employs others to work on logs or other timber but does not perform the labor himself may not claim a lien under RCW 60.24.020. Unlike the majority, I believe that the rules of statutory construction, case law, and policy considerations militate against overruling this long-standing interpretation of the logger's lien statute.
*605Our courts have regularly held that statutes creating liens are in derogation of the common law, and thus must be strictly construed. E.g., Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 219-20, 500 P.2d 1244, 74 A.L.R.3d 378 (1972); De Gooyer v. Northwest Trust & State Bank, 130 Wash. 652, 653, 228 P. 835 (1924), adhered to on rehearing, 132 Wash. 699, 232 P. 695 (1925); deMers v. Oxford, 28 Wn. App. 770, 772, 626 P.2d 518 (1981). A lien statute will not be extended for the benefit of those who do not clearly come within its terms. Dean v. McFarland, supra; De Gooyer v. Northwest Trust & State Bank, supra; deMers v. Oxford, supra. The majority relies on the proposition that the lien statute is remedial and should be liberally construed in the interests of labor. This principle, however, is applied only after it has been determined that the claimant in question comes within the operation of the act. De Gooyer, at 653. Thus, the logger's lien statute must be construed strictly in deciding who may enjoy the status of a lienor, but once the right to claim a lien has been established, it must be liberally construed. Diamond Nat'l Corp. v. Lee, 333 F.2d 517, 526 (9th Cir. 1964); Boone v. P & B Logging Co., 88 Idaho 111, 115-16, 397 P.2d 31 (1964); Kidder v. Nekoma Lumber Co., 196 Or. 409, 413-14, 249 P.2d 754 (1952).
In the cases cited by the majority, the courts properly applied the rule of liberal construction because there was no question that the claimants were entitled to the status of lienors. See Proulx v. Stetson & Post Mill Co., 6 Wash. 478, 33 P. 1067 (1893) (involving which property was subject to claimants' liens); In re Little Elk Logging Co., 218 F. 142 (W.D. Wash. 1914) (concerning relative priority of lien claims). To the contrary, in the present case, the question is if certain entities are within the class of persons entitled to claim liens under the statute; thus, the principle of strict statutory construction applies.
In light of this rule, it was reasonable for the court in Campbell to interpret RCW 60.24.020 to provide for liens only for those who actually perform labor on the timber. See also Puget Sound Log Scaling & Grading Bur. v. Dan*606aher Lumber Co., 121 Wash. 309, 311, 209 P. 530 (1922) (logger's lien statute was designed to protect "laborers who gain their livelihood by manual toil, and who might be imperfectly qualified to protect themselves"); Garneau v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 8 Wash. 467, 470, 36 P. 463 (1894) (logger's lien statute insures that men who perform labor have a secure means of collecting wages).
The majority also asserts that subsequent decisions indicate that the viability of Campbell is questionable. No Washington case, however, has directly criticized the Campbell rule. In the Washington cases construing the logger's lien statute which the majority cites, the claimants participated directly in the labor on the timber and simply included in their claims the amounts owing to other laborers as well as themselves. DeLong v. Hi Carbon Coal Co., 155 Wash. 265, 283 P. 1079 (1930); Blumauer v. Clock, 24 Wash. 596, 64 P. 844 (1901). Thus, in allowing liens to such claimants, these cases were not inconsistent with Campbell's holding that a person who does not perform labor himself may not claim a lien. Moreover, in more recent cases from other jurisdictions with statutes the same as RCW 60.24.020, courts have explicitly recognized and followed Campbell. See Diamond Nat’l Corp. v. Lee, supra at 525-26 (applying Campbell in construing an Idaho log lien statute essentially similar to RCW 60.24.020); Feris v. Balcom, 249 Or. 343, 346, 432 P.2d 684 (1967) (citing Campbell for the proposition that Washington's logger's lien statute, which is similar to Oregon's, applies only to those who directly perform labor).
Given the existing case law, the parties had a sound basis for relying on the principle that our logger's lien statute protects only individuals who actually perform physical labor. By changing this long-standing rule, the majority opinion does injustice to those who were entitled to depend on the law as it existed when they financed the logging operations.
Furthermore, the majority makes a decision which will significantly affect the timber industry without having the *607information to assess its impact. This question is better left to the Legislature, which can thoroughly examine the potential effects of changing the rule. I agree with the following statement in a recent trial court decision holding a corporation may not claim a lien under RCW 60.24.020:
Whether a corporate employer or corporate log merchandiser, that is not "imperfectly qualified to protect itself" and all of whose "men who directly performed the labor" have received their pay checks, should be allowed lien rights to enforce payment of contract balances or log sale prices involves complex commercial policy decisions which the legislature, and not the court, is equipped to make.
Northwest Log, Inc. v. Mayr Bros. Logging Co., at 3, Grays Harbor County cause 84-2-00667-2.
I would adhere to the rule that RCW 60.24.020 was intended to benefit those who directly perform labor on logs. Therefore, I would hold that entities, other than individuals who actually perform physical labor, may not claim logger's liens pursuant to RCW 60.24.020.1 concur with the majority's discussion of the relative priority of logger's liens, stumpage liens, and a security interest arising under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Dolliver, C.J., and Callow, J., concur with Durham, J.