dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It has long been established that pleas obtained through “coercion, terror, inducements, and subtle or blatant threats” are involuntary and violative of due process. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The constitutional status of guilty pleas induced by offers of adverse or lenient treatment to a person other than the accused presents a serious problem. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 n. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). These pleas pose a greater danger of coercion than purely bilateral plea bargaining, U.S. v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1979), and present a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of risks a defendant must consider. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 364 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. at 668 n. 8. See also Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1470, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (the agents of the state may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overwhelming the will of the defendant).
While I realize that a criminal defendant has no right to a plea bargain, State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 617 P.2d 1141 (1980), this does not mean the rules of the plea bargaining process should be further expanded to enhance the prosecutor’s great discretionary power. Plea bargaining should not be reduced to a shameful imitation of a midday game show, where a deal is struck only when “the price is right” with no knowledge of what’s behind door number three.
In the present case the situation required the trial court to accept or reject in toto three plea agreements all contingent upon each other, two of which involved a husband and wife. These “package deals” make the job of the trial court geometrically more difficult than if it were simply reviewing three “non-package deals”. Not only must the trial court determine that Rule 17 is satisfied and that the voluntariness requirement of Boykin v. Alabama is met, but it must then review the pleas in relation to each other for fear that the entire package may unravel. I believe this practice places too much pressure on the trial court to accept a package deal because of the possibility of a domino effect. The criminal justice system in the United States under our constitution is distinguished from all others in the world in that in this country each accused is accorded individual attention and treatment at all stages of the criminal prosecution. At no time does he become an average person or a member of a group. He is to be treated at all times as that distinct human being that he is. If we tie people together in a plea bargain package, however attractive the wrapping or the ribbon, we detract from the individuality of the persons involved, and force the trial judge to determine whether the end justifies the means. In these days of overcrowded calendars, it is unrealistic to believe that a harried trial judge-would not be tempted to yield to a slightly unfair package in order to reduce his case load. This is simply not a desirable procedure and is designed solely to put undue leverage on the defendants and trial court.
The majority opinion illustrates that the trial court felt powerless in this situation, even after expressing concern that the sentences of two of the three defendants were possibly not justified. I agree with the majority of the court of appeals which would invalidate package deals. While such deals may not be so offensive to be declared unconstitutional per se, we should not be required to stretch our rules of criminal procedure to their absolute breaking point. As the majority points out at p. 21, “package deal plea agreements are fraught with danger”. If they are, why should we encourage parties to travel down this treacherous path and establish such an elaborate and subjective five factor test?
In State v. McInelly, 146 Ariz. 161, 704 P.2d 291 (App.1985), Division Two of the court of appeals upheld package deal pleas in an opinion totally bereft of any analysis or supporting authority. Division One in State v. Solano, 150 Ariz. 423, 724 P.2d *40442 (App.1985), analyzed these pleas on both public policy grounds and pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure. I would adopt that well-reasoned opinion. In particular, when large numbers of family members are involved in such pleas I seriously question whether an accurate assessment of voluntariness can be made and believe the pressure on the trial court to accept all of the contingent pleas will be overwhelming. To believe otherwise is to ignore human experience and the strength of family bonds. See People v. Smith, 37 Mich.App. 264, 194 N.W.2d 561 (1971) (“it does not follow that bargaining regarding the fate of a member of defendant’s family does not constitute coercion”). I would disallow the usé of package deals in all cases.