concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that Billy Ray Irick’s conviction is free of constitutional error. Nonetheless, I write separately on this issue because I believe that the majority has applied the wrong standard of review to Irick’s Brady claim. In my view, that claim should be reviewed de novo. Even under the de novo standard, however, I reach the same conclusion as the majority on the Brady issue.
I cannot agree, however, that Irick’s death sentence passes similar constitutional muster. In particular, the prosecutor’s *328improper closing argument at the penalty phase of the case — urging the jury to sentence Irick to death in.order “to defend ourselves, ... our families, ... our homes, and our children” — went beyond the pale and “so infected the trial with unfairness” as to make the resulting sentence a denial of due process. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 778 (6th Cir.2006) (noting that where prosecutorial misconduct occurs during the sentencing phase of a capital case, the Darden inquiry becomes “whether the constitutional error influenced the jury’s decision between life and death”). I address below both the standard of review regarding the Brady issue and the merits of the prosecutor’s improper closing argument.
I. IRICK’S BRADY CLAIM
Only one piece of evidence that was excluded at Irick’s trial is relevant to this appeal: Kathy Jeffers’s statement that Irick was “drunk and talking crazy” on the night of the murder. Because I agree with the majority’s conclusion on this Brady claim, I concur in the result reached in Part III.A. of the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of AEDPA deference to Irick’s Brady claim.
The majority acknowledges that “the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals did not specifically address [Irick’s] claim that the prosecution suppressed Kathy’s statement to the police.” (Maj. Op. at 321) As the majority explains, Irick did not brief his Brady challenge to the exclusion of this particular piece of evidence to that court, but instead incorporated the argument by reference to his postconviction petition filed with the state trial court. (Id.) The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals did not even allude in its opinion to the existence of the argument.
Nevertheless, the majority applies “modified AEDPA review” because, in its view, “in rejecting Irick’s Brady challenges to the evidence it specifically addressed, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have also rejected his challenge to Kathy’s statement.” (Id.) The majority thus attempts to fit the present case — where a constitutional claim apparently fell through the cracks during the state-court postconviction proceedings— into this circuit’s line of “modified AEDPA deference” caselaw. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Coyle, 547 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir.2008) (“Where the state court disposes of a Federal constitutional claim with little-to-no articulated analysis of the constitutional issue, this circuit applies a modified form of AEDPA deference.”).
But the “modified AEDPA deference” line of cases, in my opinion, treads a precarious path in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005), and Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). In these two cases, the Supreme Court applied de novo review to the prejudice prong of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Court did so because the state courts in both Rompilla and Wiggins had held that counsel’s assistance was not ineffective, and therefore had not reached the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (“Because the state courts ... never reached the issue of prejudice, ... we. examine this element of the ... claim de novo....”); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (conducting a de novo review of the Strickland prejudice issue under the same circumstances). *329This circuit thus applies more deference to state courts in modified-deference cases like Hawkins, where the state court denied the constitutional claim without providing any indication that it had even considered the claim, than did the Supreme Court in Rompilla and Wiggins, where the state courts provided a thorough analysis. of at least the first prong of the relevant claim. The inconsistency in this approach strikes me as troublesome at best, and I conclude that applying de novo review to perfunctory state-court conclusions in cases like Hawkins would align more closely with the Supreme Court’s decisions.
Moreover, even if the modified-AEDPAdeference standard might be appropriate in some cases, this is not such a case. In Hawkins and other modified-AEDPA-deference cases, the state courts articulated a conclusion on the constitutional issue — albeit without undertaking rigorous analysis. See Hawkins, 547 F.3d at 547 (“[I]f appellant’s arguments are considered on the merits, appellant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing ineffective assistance under ... [Strickland].”) (quoting State v. Hawkins, 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227, 1234 (1993) (alteration in original)). Here, in contrast, the state court did not even mention the “drunk and talking crazy” statement that is the subject of the Brady claim now before us. Under' these circumstances, I conclude that the constitutional claim should receive de novo review. See, e.g., Dyer v. Bowlen, 465 F.3d 280, 284 (6th Cir.2006) (“When a state court fails to address the petitioner’s federal claim, we review the claim de novo.”); Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.2003) (“Where, as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply.”).
Application of de novo review, however, brings me to the same conclusion reached by the majority’s ‘.‘careful and independent review” of the record and applicable law. (Maj. Op. at 322) As the majority thoroughly explains, introduction of the “drunk and talking crazy” statement would not have undermined the intent element of Irick’s conviction. (Maj. Op. at 323) I thus part ways with my colleagues on this issue only in my belief that AEDPA deference does not apply to implied “conclusions” that the state court never made. Where we must assume that the state court rejected a particular claim because the state court is silent, I believe that we should review the claim without any deference, modified or otherwise. See Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d at 437.
II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT THE PENALTY PHASE
I turn now, to Irick’s claim that the prosecutor’s general-deterrence argument introduced fundamental unfairness into the penalty phase of the trial. The final three paragraphs of the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument at the penalty phase read as follows:
But what about other people? Because, with your verdict, you make a statement about things whether you realize it or not. You will make a statement about the value of Paula’s life. You will make a statement about what this man did and your willingness to tolerate it. You will make a statement to everybody else out there what is going to happen to people who do this sort of thing. Some of you may believe that punishment is a deterrence. Some of you may not. I don’t know. I personally believe that it is. I will tell you why, and this is not an original thought. But I have heard this comment made, and I guess it all de*330pends on how you are turned [sic] — how you look at the world.
Someone said that the death penalty is, sort of, like a lighthouse. You don’t know how many ships have been saved by its beacon. You can’t count that. You only know the ones that disregarded its warning. Those, you count. Those are the Billy Ray Iricks.
I know this is a hard decision, ladies and gentlemen, but there comes a time in society when we have the right to defend ourselves. I suggest to you that it is more than a right to defend ourselves in this kind of situation where there is a child involved. We have a duty to defend ourselves, a duty to defend our families, and our homes, and our children. That is what this case is about. And our law is now being entrusted into your care. Thank you.
These final words from the prosecutor were improper for a number of reasons. To start with, they were deliberately made despite Irick’s preargument request that the court instruct the prosecutor not to make a general-deterrence argument. Moreover, the argument is misleading because general deterrence has nothing to do with the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor’s argument in the present case was improper for this reason, stating that “[unquestionably, any argument based on general deterrence to others has no application to either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Argument of this nature is inappropriate at a sentencing hearing.” State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988). In my view, the majority oversteps its role by second-guessing the Tennessee Supreme Court’s explicit conclusion on this question of state law. See Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir.2008) (“We must accept as valid a state court’s interpretation of the statutes and rules of practice of that state.”) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)).
The majority cites cases from three of our sister circuits to support its contention that appeals to general deterrence might be appropriate at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. Although federal cases are not relevant in light of Tennessee’s unambiguous conclusion that the prosecutor’s argument was improper, I note that, in this circuit, general-deterrence arguments are disfavored, especially where, as here, the argument is “calculated to inflame passion and prejudice.” See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1150-53, 1155 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s entreaty in closing argument to convict a defendant in order to “send a message and strike a blow to the drug problem” was “a single misstep so destructive to defendant’s right to a fair trial that it constitute^] reversible error.”); cf. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 539 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that a prosecutor’s comment that jurors “should impose the death penalty ... in order to fulfill their societal duty” was not improper because the prosecutor “d[id] not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers”).
Finally, the prosecutor expressed his personal belief in the effectiveness of general deterrence. But “prosecutors are prohibited from expressing their personal opinion as to ... the appropriateness of the death penalty.” Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 644 (6th Cir.2005). The reason for this rule is that “[j]urors are mindful that the prosecutor represents the State and are apt to afford undue respect to the prosecutor’s personal assessment.” Id.
Despite its clear holding that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded *331that the argument did not reach the level of reversible error for the following reasons: “The comments were moderate at most. The trial court correctly and positively instructed the jury in reference to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt. The evidence was devastating against him and was supplemented by his own confession.” Irick, 762 S.W.2d at 131.
This brief justification for finding the prosecutorial misconduct harmless is, in my opinion, so unpersuasive as to be unreasonable. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.”). First of all, the comments were not “moderate.” They were an extended emotional appeal for the jurors to protect themselves and the community at large from persons of Irick’s ilk, and they came at- the very end of the state’s argument, with no chance for rebuttal by the defense. Nor did the trial court’s jury instructions cure the taint, since they were devoid of any indication that the jurors should disregard the prosecutor’s improper appeal to an irrelevant consideration in their decision as to whether Irick should live or die. Finally, the fact that Irick did not challenge the overwhelming evidence of his guilt for the underlying crime has no bearing on the jury’s proper role in weighing the mitigating factors presented at the sentencing phase of his trial.
Iriek’s crime was indeed a heinous one that the jury could well find deserved the death penalty. But how confident can we be that, in the absence of the prosecutor’s improper appeal to general deterrence, not a single juror would have considered the mitigating circumstances presented — Irick’s lack of any prior felony conviction, his history of mental impairment, his close relationship with the victim’s family, and his remorse — and decided that life without parole was the appropriate punishment for Irick? As the Supreme Court said in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), if the court “cannot say that [the prosecutor’s comments] had no effect on the sentencing decision,” then the jury’s decision “does not meet the standard of reliability that the Eighth Amendment requires.”
There is no doubt in the present case that the prosecutor’s final words to the jury were, as acknowledged by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “inappropriate.” The sole question then is whether this inappropriate conduct “influenced the jury’s decision between life and death.” Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 778 (6th Cir.2006). The prosecutor in this case injected an improper consideration — the death penalty’s alleged effectiveness to deter other heinous murders of young children — into the balance between aggravating and mitigating factors. A juror could hardly be expected to ignore this powerful emotional appeal to an irrelevant factor, especially in the absence of an appropriate instruction from the court.
Because I believe that there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have reached a different outcome as to Irick’s sentence in the absence of the prosecutor’s misconduct, I conclude that the state court’s ruling to the contrary was an unreasonable application of federal law as declared by the Supreme Court. See Bell, 402 F.3d at 649 (“If a habeas court is in ‘grave doubt’ as to the harmlessness of an error, the habeas petitioner must prevail.”); Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261, 271 (6th Cir.2000) (“[A] petitioner need not prove by a preponderance of the evidence *332that the result would have been different, but merely that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.” (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 371, 120 S.Ct. 1495)). I would therefore grant Irick’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to his death sentence, conditioned on the state of Tennessee retrying the penalty phase of the case without the taint of the prosecutor’s general-deterrence argument.