Defendant, Lee Rudy Lucero, appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual assault on a child. We affirm.
The prosecution’s case was premised on the testimony of defendant’s twelve-year-old daughter accusing him of having had sexual contact with her. By cross-examination of various witnesses for the People, defendant introduced evidence challenging the daughter’s credibility.
Defendant testified that he had not had sexual contact with his daughter, that he was impotent and thus unable to perform the act charged. And, he testified that his daughter’s accusations were lies.
I
After the child and her mother testified, the People presented testimony from a social worker and the child’s assistant principal concerning the personalities of the family members. The People then offered a psychologist employed by the Colorado Springs Police Department’s Youth & Victims Service Division as “an expert in the field of psychology as it relates to incest victims and families and sexual abuse of children.” Defendant accepted the witness as an expert in this field without objection. The witness offered no opinion whether the Luceros were a typical incest family or whether the child was credible.
Defendant contends, however, that it was error to allow the witness to testify to what she perceived to be the “typical incest family” because she had not interviewed any member of defendant’s family, and, therefore, the testimony was not relevant. We disagree.
In People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367 (Colo.App.1986), regarding similar testimony from the same expert, we held:
“Here, the police psychologist was qualified without objection as an expert in the field of incest victim psychology. She rendered no opinion whether the stepdaughter was truthful in her report of the assaults, or whether the stepdaughter was a victim of child incest. Under these circumstances, we conclude that her testimony was admissible in the discretion of the trial court, and that its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”
That analysis is applicable here.
II
After the People rested, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon defendant’s claim that the child’s testimony failed to establish the time of the *1376claimed sexual abuse with adequate specificity. Although the trial court did not rule on this question when it was raised, it allowed the People to reopen for purposes of calling a police officer to testify to statements given to him by the child. Without objection, the police officer related statements given to him by the child which contained specific references to time, place, and acts. The People then rested, and the trial court denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, apparently concluding that the evidence came in as prior consistent statements admissible because of the lack of consistency in the child’s testimony.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in admitting this hearsay statement because it first failed to ascertain whether the testimony was being proffered pursuant to § 13-25-129, C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) and for failing to comply with the procedural protections of that statute. Since this contention is raised for the first time on this appeal, it must be treated under the standard of plain error.
Section 13-25-129, C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) provides:
“An out-of-court statement made by a child ... describing any act of sexual contact ... not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule which provides an exception to the objection of hearsay, is admissible in evidence in any criminal ... proceeding in which the child is a victim of an unlawful sexual offense....”
If the hearsay statement is admitted pursuant to § 13-25-129, C.R.S. (1985 Cum. Supp.), a court must instruct the jury as required by § 13-25-129(2), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.). People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1985). However, failure to object to proffered evidence at trial constitutes a waiver of the objection, and such objection may not thereafter be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the error, if any, was waived by defendant’s failure to raise a timely and specific objection and does not rise to the level of plain error. CRE 103(a)(1); see People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983).
III
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to require the child to submit to examination by a defense psychiatrist.
Defendant argues that the examination sought was important in determining the competency of the child. During the motion hearing on this issue, defendant made an offer of proof that the child was currently residing at the State Hospital and had been found incompetent to testify in a related case under the Colorado Children’s Code. The trial court reviewed records from the State Hospital and from the related case and, based thereon, denied defendant’s motion for psychiatric examination. These records were not made part of the record on appeal.
The psychiatric examination of an alleged victim should only be ordered when there is a compelling reason to do so, and whether to order such an examination is within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Estorga, 200 Colo. 78, 612 P.2d 520 (1980).
When deciding such a motion, the court must balance the possible emotional trauma, embarrassment, or intimidation to the alleged victim against the likelihood of the examination producing material, as distinguished from speculative, evidence. People v. King, 41 Colo.App. 177, 581 P.2d 739 (1978). The fact that an alleged victim is under the care of a psychologist is merely one factor to consider and does not, by itself, negate the alleged victim’s competency to testify. People v. Piro, 671 P.2d 1341 (Colo.App.1983).
Here, since the trial court, in exercising its discretion, did in fact balance valid conflicting interests in making its determination, we hold that it did not abuse its discretion.
IV
Defendant’s final contention is that the trial court erred in failing to give sua sponte a limiting instruction concerning the *1377admission of evidence of other similar transactions. We disagree.
Pursuant to Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959), the better practice is to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction whether requested or not. People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973). However, failure to give sua sponte a limiting instruction is not plain error. People v. White, 680 P.2d 1318 (Colo.App.1984).
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BERMAN, J., concurs. PIERCE, J., dissents.