dissenting.
Because I conclude that the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority correctly notes, defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement whereby defendant would be sentenced to eighty to 105 months imprisonment in exchange for his plea of guilty to the charge of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to the agreed upon term because he failed to stipulate to the prior record level used by the trial court during sentencing. I disagree.
I recognize that “[t]here is no question that a worksheet, prepared and submitted by the State, purporting to list a defendant’s prior convictions is, without more, insufficient to satisfy the State’s burden in establishing proof of prior convictions.” State v. Eubanks, 151 N.C. App. 499, 505, 565 S.E.2d 738, 742 (2002). However, I also note that “[a] prior conviction shall be proved by... [stipulation of the parties ... [or] [a]ny other method found by the court to be reliable.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(f)(1), (4) (2003). In the instant case, when asked by the trial court whether there was “anything” he wanted to say “as to sentencing,” defendant’s counsel stated that defendant “is a single man and up until this particular case he had no felony convictions, as you can see from his *85worksheet.” (emphasis added). I conclude that this statement “may reasonably be construed as a stipulation by defendant that he had been convicted of the charges listed on the worksheet.” Eubanks, 151 N.C. App. at 506, 565 S.E.2d at 742.
Furthermore, I note that this Court has previously stated that “if during plea negotiations the defendant essentially stipulated to matters that moot the issues he could have raised under [N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444](a2), his appeal should be dismissed.” State v. Hamby, 129 N.C. App. 366, 369, 499 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1998). In Hamby, we held that by admitting “that her prior record level was II, that punishment for the offense could be either intermediate or active in the trial court’s discretion and that the trial court was authorized to sentence her to a maximum of forty-four months in prison,” the defendant “mooted the issues of whether her prior record level was correctly determined, whether the type of sentence disposition was authorized and whether the duration of her prison sentence was authorized.” Id. at 369-70, 499 S.E.2d at 197. In the instant case, while defendant did not explicitly admit to being a prior record level II offender in his guilty plea, the plea agreement nevertheless authorizes the State to impose upon him a punishment consistent with that of a prior record level II offender. Under the Structured Sentencing Act, an individual found guilty of a Class C felony with a prior record level II may be sentenced in the presumptive range to a term of eighty to 105 months imprisonment, the exact sentence imposed upon and consented to by defendant in his plea agreement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17 (2003).
Defendant does not challenge the existence of any of the prior convictions listed in the worksheet, choosing rather to challenge the sufficiency of the stipulation relied upon by the trial court at sentencing. Because I conclude that defendant stipulated to his prior record level, I would hold that the trial court did not err in sentencing defendant to eighty to 105 months imprisonment. Furthermore, because I have examined defendant’s other assignments of error and have determined that they are without merit, I would also hold that defendant received a trial free of prejudicial error.