ALDRICH, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which MOORE, J., joined. SUTTON, J. (pp. 798-801), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
ANN ALDRICH, District Judge.The State of Michigan appeals a judgment granting Daniel Albert Newman’s *794application for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime, we affirm.
I. Background
A. The crime
In February of 1992, Henry Chappelear (“Chappelear”) was fatally shot during the robbery of his home. Chappelear, a known drug dealer, regularly stored marijuana in his freezer. On the day of the murder, one of Chappelear’s friends came to his house, noticed a porch lightbulb removed and smashed on the ground, and entered the house. Inside, the friend saw the open freezer door, discovered Chappe-lear’s dead body, and called the police. (J.A. 707.) Evidence recovered from the scene established that Chappelear was shot by a 12-gauge shotgun and a 9-millimeter handgun.
The day after the homicide, two men found a gym bag by the side of the road that contained a jean jacket, a 9-millime-ter handgun, a sawed-off shotgun with tape wrapped around the grip, a skimask-type hat, two walkie-talkies, and some gloves. (J.A. 131-37.) The bag and its contents were turned over to the police. Subsequent analysis of the items strongly suggested that they belonged to Newman and had been used in Chappelear’s murder.
B. Trial
Newman was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury for first-degree premeditated murder and felony firearm.
At trial, the prosecution sought to prove that Newman had planned to rob and kill Chappelear by introducing evidence that Newman had intended to rob drug dealers for drugs or money, that Chappelear was a known drug dealer who stored drugs in his freezer, that Newman may have ordered drugs from Chappelear in the past, and that Chappelear’s freezer was open and empty after the homicide. In addition, the prosecution attempted to establish a motive by offering testimony that Newman had previously seen Chappelear make a pass at his girlfriend.
The prosecution also introduced evidence supporting an inference that Newman had possessed the murder weapons. First, hairs found on the ski-mask were found to match all visual characteristics of Newman’s hair and the hair of one of his dogs. Second, evidence was introduced that a hacksaw had been seized from Newman’s home, and there were markings on the shotgun barrel and stock that were not inconsistent with markings that could have been created by a hacksaw. Third, twine found in the gym bag was similar to twine seized from Newman’s house. Fourth, debris found inside the gym bag and on the jean jacket chemically and visually matched a container of drywall seized from the car of Newman’s girlfriend. Fifth, a firearms expert testified that the spent cartridges and bullet recovered from Chappelear’s body matched the 9-millime-ter handgun found in the gym bag. Last, testimony established that the gun used in the homicide had been purchased by Newman in 1991, and that a friend of his had seen a similar gun in Newman’s home a couple of weeks prior to the homicide. However, the friend could not say for sure that the murder weapon was the same one that she had seen because it was dark and the gun was in a laundry bin.1
*795Although the prosecution offered ample evidence to support an inference that Newman had previously possessed at least one of the murder weapons, the prosecution did not offer any evidence that Newman had used or possessed the weapons on the day of the murder. There was no eyewitness testimony, nor were the police able to recover any latent fingerprints from the crime scene or the items in the gym bag.
Newman did not testify. Instead, he called several witnesses to establish an alibi. ■
Newman’s conviction for first-degree murder was subsequently vacated, and an order of second-degree murder was entered in its stead.
C. Direct appeal and post-conviction relief in state court
Newman appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. In an opinion dated July 2, 1999, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied his appeal because “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution ... a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt” all of the elements of the crimes. (J.A. 679.)
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the lack of eyewitnesses was not dis-positive, stating that the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to “support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that [Newman] either committed the murder himself or aided and abetted in its commission.” (J.A. 679.) Accordingly, the court affirmed Newman’s convictions and denied his motion for a rehearing.2
Newman was subsequently denied post-conviction relief in the state trial and appellate courts.
D. Application for a writ of habeas corpus
Having exhausted the remedies available to him in state court, Newman filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he participated in the murder, either directly or as an aider and abettor.3 Upon review, the district court found that the Michigan Court of Appeals had failed to consider three important pieces of evidence, that the prosecution had failed to establish a solid chain of inferences at trial, and that there was no evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime. Newman v. Metrish, 492 F.Supp.2d 721, 730-31 (E.D.Mich.2007). Accordingly, the district court determined that the Michigan Court of Appeals had not reasonably applied the standard articulated in Jackson v. Virginia, noting that although the facts relied on by the court of appeals “may have supported a ‘reasonable speculation’ that [Newman] participated in the murder,” they did “not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 729, 732. Thus, the district court unconditionally granted Newman’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a district court order granting an application for a writ of habeas corpus relief, we review legal conclusions de novo. Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 257 (6th Cir.2005). Although we generally review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, we review de novo “when the district court’s decision in *796a habeas case is based on a transcript from the petitioner’s state court trial, and the district court thus makes no credibility determination or other apparent finding of fact.” King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted).
Newman’s application is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his application for a writ of habeas corpus:
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added).
At issue here is whether the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals involved such an “unreasonable application” of federal law. A district court may not issue a writ upon concluding only that the state court applied the law erroneously or incorrectly. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). “Rather, that application must also be unreasonable,” meaning that the state court “unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 411, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
III. Discussion
At issue here is whether the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law as set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Under Jackson, habeas relief is warranted “if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781. In considering whether there was sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of the crime, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781.
The Jackson standard is as easy to articulate as it is difficult to apply. Where there is only circumstantial evidence available, as in the instant case, this ineffable standard is especially challenging, and even more so when that evidence supports a host of permissible inferences.
As a starting point, we note that “[c]ir-cumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a conviction, and it is not necessary for the evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d 987, 992 (6th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). In Johnson, we found Johnson’s conviction to be fully supported by circumstantial evidence where (1) he had been angry with the victim and was the last known person to see her alive, (2) her body was found near an off-road trail that Johnson had discovered recently, and was near a piece of carpet from Johnson’s car, (3) Johnson exhibited a series of erratic and suspicious behaviors after the victim disappeared, and (4) Johnson confessed to the murder several times. Id. at 991-92.
Although circumstantial evidence alone can support a conviction, there are times that it amounts to only a reasonable speculation and not to sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Parker v. Renico, 506 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir.2007) (evidence that Parker was in a car containing guns with men who planned a murder was too speculative to support a finding that Parker constructively possessed the firearm); Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir.2006) (finding evidence that Brown was present at the scene and had some acquaintance with the perpetrator insufficient to support a *797conviction of armed robbery and car-jacking under an aiding and abetting theory); Fuller v. Anderson, 662 F.2d 420, 423-24 (6th Cir.1981) (verdict for felony murder not supported by evidence showing only that Fuller was present at the scene of the arson where evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuller consciously acted to aid in the arson); Hopson v. Foltz, No. 86-1155, 1987 WL 37432, at *2, 1987 U.S.App.11 N.Y.3d Reported below, LEXIS 6596, at *5 (6th Cir. May 20, 1987) (evidence insufficient to support conviction of second-degree murder on theory of aiding and abetting where there was no proof “that Hopson acted in pre-concert with [the shooter] to commit the murder or that he said or did anything to support, encourage, or incite the commission of the crime.”).
Here, if we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there remains reasonable doubt because we are limited by what inferences reason will allow us to draw. We can infer only that Newman intended to rob a drug dealer and knew that Chappelear was a drug dealer, that a gun previously owned by Newman was used to kill Chappelear, and that a similar looking gun was seen in Newman’s home approximately two weeks before the murder. However, the witness who saw the gun said she could not say for sure that it was the same one used in the homicide because the gun was in a laundry bin and it was dark. Further, even assuming that Newman’s gun was indeed the one used in the homicide, there was no evidence of what happened to it between that date and the date of the homicide, and we need not speculate as to what might have happened.4 Although the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, it must be enough for any rational trier of fact to have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although there is a wealth of information showing that Newman owned the gun, conspicuously absent is any evidence placing Newman at the scene of the crime. There was neither eyewitness testimony, nor were any fingerprints recovered. Without additional evidence placing him at the scene of the crime, there is only a reasonable speculation that Newman himself was present.
IV. Conclusion
There is no bright line test to determine when facts amount to only a reasonable speculation and not to sufficient evidence. However, where the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution creates only a reasonable speculation that a defendant was present at the crime, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the Jackson standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law and the decision of the district court *798granting a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
. Although the strength of some of this evidence was called into question by other testimony, at this stage of review, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Accordingly, such testimony is not discussed here.
. Newman raised other arguments before the Michigan Court of Appeals which are not at issue here.
. Newman’s application raised other grounds for relief that are not at issue here.
. For example, if the witness had observed the gun in Newman’s house only a day before the homicide and had been more certain that it was indeed the same gun as that used in the homicide, there would be a stronger inference that Newman was present. With these hypothetical facts, Newman’s petition would more closely resemble those made in cases where circumstantial evidence did satisfy the Jackson standard. See, e.g., Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788-89 (6th Cir.2003) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge brought by a defendant whose murder conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony placing him near the scene of the crime on the morning of the murder); Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460, 488-89 (6th Cir.2006) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge by a defendant whose murder conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including evidence that the defendant spoke with the victim about painting her window sills, one of which was used to stab her in the neck approximately eight hours later).