Appellant Robert J. Smith, Sr. and Douel Castain, Jr. were involved in an automobile collision in August 1977 in Savannah. Thereafter Smith sued Castain and obtained á judgment against Castain in the amount of $60,000 in Chatham Superior Court in October 1978. That judgment remains unsatisfied. Smith brought the present action against Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) seeking to recover the proceeds of a liability policy allegedly issued to Castain by GEICO. GEICO moved for summary judgment on the ground that Smith could not maintain an action directly against it. This motion was granted by the trial court. Held:
1. The trial court relied on the principle that an injured person not in privity of contract with the insurance company cannot reach the proceeds of the policy for payment of his claim by means of an action directly against the insurer. Lee v. Petty, 133 Ga. App. 201 (210 SE2d 383) (1974); Insured Lloyds v. Bobo, 116 Ga. App. 89 (156 SE2d 518) (1967); Perkins v. Publix Theatres Corp., 47 Ga. App. 641 (7) (171 SE 147) (1933); Siegel v. Assoc. Indem. Corp., 432 FSupp. 533 (N. D. Ga. 1977). While we agree with the general principle, we do not find that it is applicable in, the present case on the record *655before us.
The fact that Smith has obtained a judgment against the insured Castain takes this case out of the general rule set out above. Where a judgment has been obtained against the insured which fixes the liability of the insured, an action may be maintained directly against the insurer for the proceeds of the policy. See Arnold v. Walton, 205 Ga. 606, 613 (54 SE2d 424) (1949); Fisher v. American Cas. Co., 67 Ga. App. 784 (2) (21 SE2d 306), rev’d on other grounds, 195 Ga. 136 (23 SE2d 395) (1942); Hodges v. Ocean Accident &c. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431 (1) (18 SE2d 28) (1941). See also Public Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wheat, 100 Ga. App. 695 (1) (112 SE2d 194) (1959), wherein the general principle against direct action is set out, but the court affirmed a verdict in an action directly against the insurer where the plaintiff below had previously received a judgment against the insured. Therefore, the trial court erred in holding that such an action in the present case is not permitted.
We note that the record does not contain a copy of the policy in question. In his complaint, Smith contends that the policy has a provision which obligates the insurer to pay all sums which its insured becomes legally obligated to pay. GEICO denies that any insurance was in effect. The record reflects exhibits attached to a deposition which indicate issues of fact regarding whether insurance was in effect. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s reliance on Davis v. Nat. Indem. Co., 135 Ga. App. 793 (2) (219 SE2d 32) (1975), was misplaced.
2. However, the trial court correctly ruled that appellant Smith is not entitled to seek bad faith penalties against the insurer. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Harris, 133 Ga. App. 567 (3) (211 SE2d 783) (1974).
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.
McMurray, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.