(concurring) — I agree with the majority that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976) is not applicable, nor is the exclusion of certain hearsay testimony error, contrary to defendant's contentions. Of the 25 volumes of Washington Appellate Reports containing published opinions of the Court of Appeals, most contain at least one case citing the harmless error rule. All appear to have applied the rule, with some semantic variations, pursuant to the tests laid down in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967). While not all the cases cite Chapman or Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 89 S. Ct. 1726 (1969), I believe the import of all those cases is a recognition of the Chapman language, namely, that:
*818[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California, supra at 24.
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has made similar semantic modifications without necessarily modifying the import of the Chapman rule. State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 191, 607 P.2d 304 (1980), citing from State v. Burri, 87 Wn.2d 175, 550 P.2d 507 (1976). In State v. Fricks, 91 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979), the court, using even a lesser standard, held the error could not be held harmless; I see no difficulty in harmonizing the language of Fricks with Stephens and Burri. There is merit to the suggestion, however, that we do adopt specifically the language of Chapman and hold to it without each judicial writer making semantic innovations on the test.