(dissenting):
I do not adopt the majority opinion inasmuch as it reaches a conclusion to reverse the trial court by addressing an issue not raised below nor by this appeal. In any event, I do not subscribe to the view that the statute (U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-404), does not encompass as an offense the unlawful touching of the breasts as well as the anus or the genitals.
Said statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
A person commits forcible sexual abuse if . . .he touches the anus or any part of the genitals of another, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another, . . with intent ... to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person . . . . [Emphasis added.]
In light of the facts and circumstances of this case, wherein the appellant verbally expressed his desire to engage in a sexual act, I can only conclude that his fondling of the victim’s breasts constituted a graphic example of what was meant by the statutory language: “or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another.”
This Court has previously held that the term “indecent liberties” is sufficiently specific to apprise a person of the particular acts with which he is charged.1 In State v. Macmillan, the Court “thoroughly agree[d] with the Supreme Court of Minnesota”2 and adopted the following language:
the term “indecent liberties,” when used with reference to a woman, old or young, is self-defining .
For the Court to now tie the interpretation of a statute which contains this “self-defined” term to a precise specification of the age of the victim, is not only illogical, but is without support in the law.
Totally unrelated to the foregoing, appellant presents only two issues for our consideration, both of which are based upon a claimed insufficiency of the evidence. He first contends that there was no proof of intent to gratify his sexual desires by the unlawful touching of the victim’s breasts; secondly, he contends that since the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated, and since the crime was one “easy to accuse and difficult to defend against,” that her testimony was incredible.
First, addressing the issue of intent, it has long been the established rule that the necessary intent may be inferred from the attendant facts and circumstances.3 In State v. Peterson,4 the rule was very succinctly stated as follows:
With respect to the intent: It is true that the State was unable to prove directly what was in the defendant’s mind relative to doing harm to the victim; and that he in fact denied having any such intent. However, his version does not establish the fact, nor does it even necessarily raise sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction. If it were so, it would lie within the power of a defendant to defeat practically any conviction which depended upon his state of mind. As *1298against what he says, it is the jury’s privilege to weigh and consider all of the other facts and circumstances shown in evidence in determining what they will believe. This includes not only what was said and what was done, but also the drawing of reasonable inferences from the conduct shown .
This is in accord with the elementary rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. [Citations omitted.]
The finder of fact below was well within his prerogative to conclude that the obvious, natural and probable intent of the accused in putting his hands on the victim’s breasts was to arouse and gratify his sexual desire. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, such a conclusion was certainly reasonable, particularly in light of the fact that J.L.S. verbally expressed his desire to engage in a sexual act.
In regard to the remaining point raised, that of the sufficiency of the evidence generally, the standard of appellate review to be applied is that as was stated in State v. Romero:5
This court has long upheld the standard that on an appeal from conviction the court cannot weigh the evidence nor say what quantum is necessary to establish a fact beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the evidence given is substantial. Further, this court has maintained that its function is not to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given defendant’s testimony.
******
This Court has set the standard for determining sufficiency of evidence to require that it be so inconclusive or so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably believe defendant had committed a crime. Unless there is a clear showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld.
Specifically as to the credibility of the victim’s testimony, this Court recently addressed that issue in State v. Studham.6 In that case the testimony of a rape victim was challenged as being insufficient, standing alone, to warrant conviction. In declining to adopt that viewpoint, we had this to say:
Most crimes are committed in such secrecy as can be effected; and that is particularly so of this type of offense. Therefore, the question of guilt or innocence often depends upon the weighing of the credibility of the victim against that of the accused. Accordingly, the rule is that if there is nothing so inherently incredible about the victim’s story that reasonable minds would reject it, a conviction may rest upon her testimony alone.
Applying the foregoing rules of appellate review to the case at hand, it is to be seen that the record contains substantial believable evidence which supports the conclusion reached by the court below that appellant took indecent liberties with a female person in that “he had his hands all over . my breasts” after having made three separate threats that if “I wouldn’t give it to him he was going to take it.”
I would affirm the judgment of the juvenile court which found J.L.S. to be a delinquent child.
. State v. Macmillan, 46 Utah 19, 145 P. 833 (1915).
. State v. Kunz, 90 Minn. 526, 97 N.W. 131 (1903).
. State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216 (1976), which cites State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964); see also, State v. Jolley, Utah, 571 P.2d 582 (1977); State v. Vann, 11 Ariz. App. 180, 463 P.2d 75 (1970); People v. McGill, 190 Colo. 443, 548 P.2d 600 (1976).
. 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P.2d 696 (1969).
. Supra, footnote 1; also, that the same standard of review is applicable in cases appealed from the juvenile court, see State of Utah in Interest of K.K.H., Utah, 610 P.2d 849 (1980).
. Utah, 572 P.2d 700 (1979); see also, State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959).