Glusman v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina

Justice Higgins

dissenting.

I am unable to agree with that part of the Court’s judgment which vacates the order entered in the Superior Court by Judge •Braswell.

After reciting the agreed facts, Judge Braswell concluded:

(1) “Now, Therefore, It Is Ordered, Adjudged And Decreed, that the tuition regulations which provide that .the residence status .of any student is forever to be determined as of the time'of his first enrollment in an institution of higher education in North Carolina, and that residence status may not thereafter be changed if he continues re-enrollment without first having dropped out of school for at least a six-months period, is declared unconstitutional.
(2) “The cases of Kenneth Glusman, petitioner, and Anthony B. Lamb, petitioner, are each, hereby remanded to the Residence Status Committee of the .University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill ; which Committee shall conduct a hearing,-afternotice,' and it shall make a determination of *230residence of each petitioner during the period involved in each, petition; and it shall make such ruling and order as the true facts warrant.
(3) “In its determination of residence status of each petitioner the respondent shall not apply its regulations so as to discriminate against a male student who, being married, has since his first enrollment established a bona fide residence in North Carolina, and whose wife would be qualified to be enrolled as an in-state resident by virtue of the husband being then a legal resident of the State of North Cárolina.”

The clear purport of Judge Braswell’s order is that the Residence Status Committee of the University shall conduct a hearing and determine the bona fide residence status of each of the. plaintiffs uninhibited by the former rule that residence status is forever determined by the time of the first enrollment.

No. (3) above quoted should be treated as surplusage. It may be presumed from (1) and (2) that the Committee will not discriminate against either of the plaintiffs on account of his marital status.

For the reasons assigned in my dissenting opinion in Glusman v. Trustees and Lamb v. Trustees, 281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E. 2d 213, it is my view that Judge Braswell gave the proper direction for determining the rights of Glusman and Lamb under the facts agreed.