(concurring) — I agree with the conclusion reached by my colleagues regarding the failure of the court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. I write separately for two reasons. First, to expand upon what I think the dispositive question is — whether Lawrence Denison has shown prejudice as a result of the delay in entering findings and conclusions. And, second, to elaborate on the difference between the juvenile court rule governing this question (JuCR 7.11(d)) and the rule at issue here (CrR 6.1(d)).
CrR 6.1(d) provides in part that "[i]n a case tried without a jury, the court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law”. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the appellate court to review the questions raised on appeal. State v. McGary, 37 Wn. App. 856, 861, 683 P.2d 1125, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1024 (1984). Unlike JuCR 7.11(d), which sets forth a 21-day time period, CrR 6.1 has no time frame.
*576State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 415 P.2d 503 (1966), relied upon by the majority, was decided prior to the April 18, 1973 adoption of CrR 6.1. That opinion did not address the issue of prejudice to the defendant.
More recent cases have involved juvenile cases in which the State has been allowed to submit findings of fact after the appellate process has begun. State v. Royal, 122 Wn.2d 413, 858 P.2d 259 (1993); State v. Pena, 65 Wn. App. 711, 829 P.2d 256 (1992) (findings entered 13 months after the notice of appeal filed and 8 months after opening brief filed).
In Royal, the notice of appeal was filed on October 18, 1990, but findings of fact were not entered until August 16, 1991. The defendant argued that he was prejudiced because the late filing caused unnecessary delay in the appellate process. Royal, 122 Wn.2d at 420. Noting that nothing in the appeal was dependent upon written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court ruled that the defendant had to show that the delayed filing caused prejudice. Royal, 122 Wn.2d at 423. Here, Mr. Denison challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the findings and conclusions are therefore relevant.
In Pena, this court discussed three juvenile decisions which addressed the issue, all of which involved prosecu-torial fault as the reason for the delay. State v. Charlie, 62 Wn. App. 729, 815 P.2d 819 (1991); State v. Bennett, 62 Wn. App. 702, 710, 814 P.2d 1171 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1017 (1992); State v. Witherspoon, 60 Wn. App. 569, 571-72, 805 P.2d 248 (1991). Rather than dismiss Mr. Pena’s conviction, this court announced that in the future, when the violation occurs, the State would face a motion to reverse on the merits and dismissal of the case upon the filing of a notice of appeal. Pena, 65 Wn. App. at 714-15.
Division Two in Witherspoon reversed and dismissed a juvenile conviction when faced with a defendant in custody and a total noncompliance with JuCR 7.11(d). Although recognizing that remand might be an appropriate remedy in certain circumstances, the court determined *577the defendant in Witherspoon would be prejudiced because (1) he was in custody, (2) the defendant would have to be afforded an opportunity to assign error to the findings, (3) the record may have to be supplemented, and (4) the court would be required to revisit the case to address all the assignments of error. Witherspoon, 60 Wn. App. at 572. Because this would all be done while the defendant continued his term of confinement, the court determined there was prejudice. The court in Witherspoon also recognized that the "practice of permitting findings to be entered after the appellant has framed the issues in his brief has an appearance of unfairness”. Witherspoon, 60 Wn. App. at 572.
Although the State’s failure to file findings in the instant case should not be condoned, the question is still whether Mr. Denison was necessarily prejudiced by the failure. The judgment and sentence entered on July 8, 1993, imposed a 30-month sentence. Mr. Denison’s brief indicates he effectively served his prison time within one year — by June 1994. Even if the findings had been entered and an appeal pursued, Mr. Denison would likely have served the (shortened) sentence. His liberty interests were not therefore implicated by the failure to enter the findings here.
Second, and perhaps more significant, is his "appearance of unfairness” argument — the taint associated with findings drafted after the issues on appeal have been framed. It appears well settled, at least in the juvenile realm, that findings may be entered following the start of the appellate process and that the delay in filing does not, in and of itself, establish prejudice. Royal, 122 Wn.2d at 423.
In McGary, findings of fact and conclusions of law had not been entered as required by former JuCR 7.11(c), now (d). In his opening brief, the defendant assigned error to the trial court’s failure to do so. The State moved to supplement the record and the motion was granted. Addressing the issue, Division One reiterated the rule that findings and conclusions may be entered while an appeal is pending. Noting its disapproval of the State’s procedure, *578the court recognized that the "practice of entering findings after the appellant has framed the issues in the opening brief has the appearance of unfairness and burdens the court with motions to supplement the record”. Mc-Gary, 37 Wn. App. at 861. The court, however, found no prejudice.
Recently in State v. Thompson, 73 Wn. App. 122, 130, 867 P.2d 691 (1994), the court held that prejudice was not established simply because findings were filed after the appellate process had begun, especially if the findings mirrored the trial court’s oral ruling. See also McGary, 37 Wn. App. at 861 (findings and conclusions may be submitted and entered even while an appeal is pending; because defendant had not established prejudice from the delayed findings, there was no error).
Mr. Denison acknowledges that the failure to file findings does not automatically result in a dismissal but argues that the trend is toward requiring dismissal on a showing of prejudice. He bases his claim of prejudice here on two grounds: (1) he has served his term and filing findings at this point would be of no aid to him; and (2) the practice of entering findings after he has framed the issues in his opening brief has the appearance of unfairness. I disagree on both counts.
Although findings at this point may be of "no aid” to him, it does not necessarily follow that the failure to file the findings caused him prejudice. On remand the prosecutor and the trial judge will no doubt be aware that one issue is sufficiency of the evidence. But there are procedural safeguards which assure accurate and unbiased findings; we still review to determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings. State v. Thetford, 109 Wn.2d 392, 396, 745 P.2d 496 (1987).
The trial court here filed an 11-page oral opinion detailing the basis for its decision. This will certainly serve as the basis for the findings. In addition, Mr. Denison moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence after the State rested. The State was, by that motion, put on notice, early on, of the potential challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
*579The filing of findings while an appeal is pending or after the issues have been framed does not in and of itself prejudice a defendant. And there has been no showing by Mr. Denison that he has been prejudiced here.
Review denied at 128 Wn.2d 1006 (1995).