concurring and concurring specially.
I agree with both the reasoning employed and the result reached by the majority. I write separately merely to clarify my position. If, in addition to relying on the technical violation of OCGA § 40-5-24, Brooks and Flowers had pointed to evidence showing that Gray had been either speeding or driving recklessly, I believe a jury issue would exist.1 Here, however, Brooks and Flowers rely solely on the violation of OCGA § 40-5-24 in support of their claims for punitive damages. In other words, Brooks and Flowers seek to recover punitive damages simply because Gray violated an administrative rule rather than committed an act of negligence which evidenced “a pattern or policy of dangerous driving.”2 Thus, I concur.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Johnson and Judge Adams join in this special concurrence.
See Carter v. Spells, 229 Ga. App. 441, 445 (494 SE2d 279) (1997) (McMurray, P. J., dissenting); Bradford v. Xerox Corp., 216 Ga. App. 83, 84-85 (453 SE2d 98) (1995) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
(Punctuation omitted.) Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 405 (3) (548 SE2d 657) (2001).