concurring.
I disagree with the court’s analysis of Shepherd’s equal protection claim under Aaska’s constitution. In analyzing Shepherd’s claim, the court states that Aaska’s equal protection clause “requires equal treatment only for those who are similarly situated.” The court then concludes that “[Resident and nonresident recreational users of Aaska fish and game are not similarly situated.” In footnote 12, the court explains as follows: “Concluding that two classes are not similarly situated necessarily implies that the *46different legal treatment of the two classes is justified by the differences between the two classes.”1 Thus, the court disposes of Shepherd’s claim without applying the sliding scale test.2 In my view, we should apply the sliding scale test and determine “whether a legitimate reason for disparate treatment exists, and, given a legitimate reason, whether the enactment bears a fair and substantial relationship to that reason.”3 Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.2d 389, 396 (Alaska 1994).
We have previously disposed of claims under the Alaska equal protection clause after determining that two groups are not similarly situated without explicitly applying the sliding scale test.4 However, in my view, simply determining that residents and nonresidents are not similarly situated inadequately analyzes the issue in this case under our equal protection clause. Such a determination simply begs the question of whether the classification itself is reasonable and whether it justifies disparate treatment.
Professor Laurence Tribe notes that under federal equal protection jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has virtually always considered the reasonableness of legislative and administrative classifications. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-1, at 1438 (2d ed. 1988). To this effect, he states as follows:
The Court’s original conception of the “reasonableness” required, however, was very limited: no regulatory provision was repugnant to equal protection as long as it “place[d] under the same restrictions, and subjected] to like penalties and burdens, all who ... [were] embraced by its prohibi*47tions; thus recognizing and preserving the principle of equality among those engaged in the same [regulated activities.]” But this narrow view of nondiscriminatory application within the established class was soon discarded as empty of content, since persons or activities treated differently by government could for that very reason be deemed not “the same.” Unaccompanied by any independent measure of when persons or acts were inherently equivalent, the original test afforded virtually no scope for review. To provide content, equal protection came to be seen as requiring “some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,” with “rationality” tested by the classification’s ability to serve the purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule: “The courts must reach and determine the question whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its purpose.... ”
Id. at § 16-1, at 1439-40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 687, 8 S.Ct. 992, 997, 32 L.Ed. 253 (1888); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499-1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191, 85 S.Ct. 283, 288, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964)). Thus, under federal equal protection analysis, a court considers the reasonableness of legislative and administrative classifications even when the court determines that two groups are not similarly situated.5 The requirement that a court consider the reasonableness of classifications is even more compelling under Alaska’s equal protection clause which has been construed by this court to provide greater protection of individual rights than its federal counterpart. State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991).
Applying our sliding scale equal protection analysis to the facts appearing in this record, I conclude that there is no equal protection violation and therefore concur with the majority’s result. The individual interest impaired is the right of nonresidents to hunt moose in Alaska. This interest is subject to minimal scrutiny. The articulated purpose of the enactment is to conserve the State’s wildlife resources for Alaska residents to use as food. This purpose is supported by several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Alaska Const, art. VIII, §§ 2, 3 & 4. Finally, the State’s purpose must bear a fair and substantial relationship to the State’s means of furthering that purpose. Based on the relevant provisions of the Alaska Constitution, the distinction drawn between residents and nonresidents in AS 16.05.255(d) bears a fair and substantial relationship to the State’s purpose of conserving wildlife resources for Alaska residents to use as food. Thus, after engaging in the appropriate constitutional analysis, I conclude that AS 16.05.255(d) is valid under the equal protection clause of Alaska’s constitution.
. While I agree that there may be cases in which the classes at issue are so obviously different that the "implied analysis” suggested by the court is appropriate, I do not agree that it is appropriate for the classification in this case between residents and nonresidents.
I note that in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984), a case cited by the majority, we applied our sliding scale test to a classification contained in the Workers' Compensation Act which differentiated between residents and nonresidents for purposes of determining the amount of workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 269-74. This court concluded that the classification was unconstitutional. Id. at 274.
. In analyzing equal protection issues under the Alaska Constitution, this court applies a three-step sliding scale test:
First, it must be determined ... what weight should be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review ....
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes served by the challenged statute. Depending on the level of review determined, the state may be required to show only that its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum, or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was motivated by a compelling state interest.
Third, an evaluation of the state’s interest in the particular means employed to further its goals must be undertaken.... At the low end of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the higher end of the scale, the fit between the means and ends must be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.
State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 157 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269-70 (Alaska 1984)).
. The constitutional right to equal protection requires that state and local governments treat those who are similarly situated alike. Gonzales, 882 P.2d at 396. In considering equal protection cases a court must determine whether two groups of people who are treated differently are similarly situated and thus entitled to equal treatment. Id. To this effect, at the low end of the scale this court reviews legislatively created classifications "by asking whether a legitimate reason for disparate treatment exists, and, given a legitimate reason, whether the enactment bears a fair and substantial relationship to that reason.” Id.
. In Smith v. State, 872 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1994), this court disposed of an equal protection claim based upon its conclusion that discretionary and mandatory parolees are not similarly situated for purposes of receiving an in-person hearing to determine their eligibility for release. Id. at 1226-27. In Moore v. Beirne, 714 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1986), this court concluded that applicants for adult public assistance who have been found eligible to receive interim assistance and applicants who have been found to be disabled are not similarly situated for purposes of setting the amount of assistance. Id. at 1287. And in Ketchikan Gateway Borough, Alaska v. Breed, 639 P.2d 995 (Alaska 1981), this court determined that those who dock a light plane at a seaplane float and those who land at the Ketchikan International Airport are not similarly situated for purposes of requiring landing fees. Id. at 996.
. For example, in Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 588-93, 102 S.Ct. 2597, 2609-11, 73 L.Ed.2d 227 (1982), Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73, 101 S.Ct. 1200, 1205-06, 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (1981), and Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 301, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2302, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), the Supreme Court concluded that the classes at issue were not similarly situated but then went on to determine whether the classifications pass constitutional muster under the appropriate federal level of scrutiny.