dissenting:
Because I believe Anderson failed to present clear and convincing evidence that The Chronicle acted with - actual malice, I respectfully dissent.
In defamation actions involving “public figures,” the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the statement was made with actual malice — that is, with either knowledge the statement is false or reckless disregard for its truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Elder v. Gaffney Ledger, 341 S.C. 108, 113, 533 S.E.2d 899, 901 (2000). Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2694, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). An appellate court must independently review the record to determine whether the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice. Elder, 341 S.C. at 113-14, 533 S.E.2d at 902; Miller v. City of West Columbia, 322 S.C. 224, 228, 471 S.E.2d 683, 685 (1996). In all cases, the court must determine whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding that plaintiff proved actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis added).
Actual malice is the subjective standard testing the publisher’s good faith belief in the truth of his or her statements. *491Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 324 S.C. 261, 478 S.E.2d 282 (1996). Therefore, in order to prevail, Anderson must present clear and convincing evidence establishing The Chronicle had no good faith belief in the truth of its statements, and thus acted with reckless disregard for the truth when publishing “Let the Liar Run.” “A ‘reckless disregard’ for the truth, however, requires more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct.” Elder, 341 S.C. at 114, 533 S.E.2d at 902. Instead, the plaintiff must present “sufficient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (emphasis in original). “There must be evidence the defendant had a ‘high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.’ ” Elder, 341 S.C. at 114, 533 S.E.2d at 902 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)) (emphasis in original). To prove such, Anderson must present evidence, from a subjective standpoint, which demonstrates what The Chronicle knew with regard to the alleged falsity of its statements. It is insufficient to show the defendant made an editorial choice or merely failed to investigate; there must be evidence at least that the defendant purposefully avoided the truth. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
I believe there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish The Chronicle acted with actual malice in publishing the editorial written by Kent. After Bray first interviewed Anderson, The Chronicle published an article stating Anderson was in the National Guard. When Anderson announced he would again run as a candidate, he spoke with Bray once more, and a second article was published in which The Chronicle referenced Anderson’s alleged service in the National Guard. Anderson never requested a retraction or correction of either publication. It was not until Boyette contacted Anderson about the GOP’s request for Anderson to withdraw from the race that Anderson denied having made such statements to Bray. Furthermore, The Chronicle reported Anderson’s version of why he was in North Carolina and that Anderson denied telling The Chronicle he served in the National Guard in its article discussing the GOP’s sentiments.
*492Prior to the publication of “Let the Liar Run,” The Chronicle’s Pat Willis contacted Anderson and informed him that she was working on an article and requested proof that he was a government-approved insurance adjuster and that he had worked in North Carolina in 1996. A reasonable jury might view this investigation as subjective evidence that The Chronicle did not believe Anderson was so licensed and that he had in fact allowed Bray to believe he was serving in the National Guard. Though Anderson was able to prove his status as a certified insurance adjuster, this fact does not establish that he accurately communicated to Bray his reason for being in North Carolina and that The Chronicle purposefully avoided the truth when publishing “Let the Liar Run.” Moreover, from the subjective point of view of The Chronicle, its position that Anderson had stated he was in the National Guard is strengthened by Anderson’s failure to object to The Chronicle’s two prior reports and Bray’s continued belief in his version of the interview with Anderson.
The majority places emphasis on the fact that The Chronicle was aware that Anderson disputed Bray’s assertion that Anderson stated he served in the National Guard. However, this evidence fails to demonstrate The Chronicle in fact knew the falsity of its editorial “Let the Liar Run.” Rather, this fact demonstrates only that The Chronicle knew of Anderson’s disagreement with Bray’s version of the interview — a fact The Chronicle had published as well. Moreover, evidence that Anderson disputed Bray’s version of their conversation says nothing about The Chronicle’s knowledge as to the truth of the matter, especially considering that Bray stood behind his recollection of the interview.
The only evidence presented at trial was Anderson’s own testimony about his conversations with reporters from The Chronicle. Because the test for actual malice is subjective as to the knowledge of the publisher, evidence of Anderson’s personal recollection of the interviews fails to shed light on what The Chronicle believed in good faith about the truth of the statements it published. Anderson presented no evidence regarding the standards and practices of the newspaper industry nor did he present any evidence that The Chronicle in fact knew Anderson did not tell Bray he had served in the National Guard. Furthermore, Anderson’s challenge to the publica*493tion came only after the Republican Party asked him to withdraw from the race. As a public figure, Anderson bore the burden of proof to establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Peeler, 324 S.C. at 266, 478 S.E.2d at 284. Because I believe the evidence presented by Anderson falls far short of establishing The Chronicle published “Let the Liar Run” with a high degree of knowledge as to its probable falsity, I would affirm the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the publisher.