concurring fully in part, concurring specially in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in Divisions 1 and 4 of the majority opinion, I must respectfully dissent from Division 2 and specially concur in Division 3.
1. The law concerning hit and run cases involving a death is controlled by OCGA § 40-6-270, the hit and run statute, and OCGA § 40-6-393, the homicide by vehicle statute. OCGA § 40-6-270 provides, inter alia, for the felony of hit and run, where the defendant fails to stop at an accident which results in death. It does not matter under this Code section that the failure to render assistance did not contribute to the death. This failure is punishable by imprisonment for one to five years.
Where, however, the failure to render aid is a contributing cause of the death, such fact supports the crime of vehicular homicide through hit and run under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) and (b), which carries a penalty of three to fifteen years. OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) provides for the crime of homicide by vehicle in the first degree, where under subsection (a), the death of a person is caused by any of several violations listed thereafter in subsections (a) through (c), including (b) the violation of OCGA § 40-6-270. The violation under subsection (b) is the failure to stop and render aid. Therefore, in order to establish homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a), the failure to render aid must be a contributing cause of the death. This is true because OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) requires that (b), the act of hit and run, “causes the death of another person” in order to constitute homicide by vehicle under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) and (b). Subsec*50tion (b) is a subsection of (a), which cannot be ignored in interpreting the law.
Hit and run is a separate crime from homicide by vehicle and does not merge with the homicide by vehicle, which it would under the majority’s analysis. Klaub was convicted of hit and run as charged in Count 4 of the indictment and has not appealed this conviction.
Under the majority’s analysis, there would be no reason for the legislature to have included “such accident is the cause of death” under OCGA § 40-6-270 (b), as every such event would result in a charge of homicide by vehicle under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) and (b). They would have simply included hit and run as a separate section of OCGA § 40-6-393, not as a subsection of (a), which requires causation. OCGA §§ 40-6-270 (b) and 40-6-393 (a) and (b) would be the same crime under the majority’s analysis, and the homicide by vehicle and hit and run convictions would have merged. The rules of statutory construction require that statutes be interpreted in such a way as to give meaning to all portions thereof, where possible. See Joiner v. State, 239 Ga. App. 843, 845 (1) (b) (522 SE2d 25) (1999).
OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) provides five different ways in which one may commit vehicular homicide in the first degree, where the listed violation contributes to the death, including through the violation of: subsection (b) of OCGA § 40-6-270 (hit and run) and OCGA § 40-6-390 (reckless driving).
To complete this statutory scheme, OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) provides:
Any person who causes the death of another person, without an intention to do so, by violating any provision of this title other than subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-163 or subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-270 or Code Section 40-6-390 or 40-6-391 or subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-395 commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the second degree when such violation is the cause of said death and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in Code Section 17-10-3.
(Emphasis supplied.) This provision makes it clear that the division between first degree and second degree homicide is based on the statutory violation which is the contributing cause of the death, not merely the accident itself.
In each type of vehicular homicide in the first degree, a different act contributing to the ultimate homicide is being proscribed. In one type, the contributing cause of death is improperly driving around a school bus. In others, the contributing causes are driving recklessly, *51driving under the influence, and improperly fleeing police. And, in hit and run cases, the proscribed act is failing to stop and render assistance. Under all these scenarios, the contributing cause triggers vehicular homicide because the proscribed act causes the death. In just this way, a failure to stop and render assistance must be a contributory factor to the death of the victim for “hit and run vehicular homicide” to be a viable charge.
The majority appears to overlook this explicit legislative scheme, stating: “It is nonsensical to require that a driver’s action in leaving the scene cause the victim’s injury or death. If this were the rule, if a victim died immediately after impact, a hit and run driver could never be charged with first degree vehicular homicide through a violation of OCGA § 40-6-270 (b) because there would never be any evidence that the failure to stop and render aid caused the victim’s death.” As with any other infraction, the available evidence dictates the crime with which a defendant can be charged. If a victim dies immediately, the crime simply does not fit under the aegis of OCGA § 40-6-270 (b). If, however, a victim survives the initial crash, OCGA § 40-6-270 (b) may be applicable.
None of this means, however, that a hit and run driver who causes the immediate death of the victim cannot be charged with vehicular homicide, just as Klaub was charged in the case now before us.1 It is quite possible for a hit and run driver to be guilty of vehicular homicide in the first degree, even though the other driver dies immediately and an action for “hit and run vehicular homicide” is not viable. For example, an inebriated driver might hit another car, immediately kill the victim, and fail to stop at the accident. This, most certainly, would comprise vehicular homicide in the first degree pursuant to OCGA §§ 40-6-393 and 40-6-391 even though the driver could not be charged for “hit and run vehicular homicide.” In turn, this would not mean that the driver in this hypothetical would escape liability for hit and run, a separate offense altogether under OCGA § 40-6-270. Moreover, even if the driver were not inebriated in the hypothetical above, he might still be liable for vehicular homicide in the second degree.
Klaub argues that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal as to the charge of vehicular homicide through the violation of the hit and run statute, OCGA § 40-6-270. Specifically, Klaub argues that the State was required to prove that violation of the statute, i.e., failure to stop and render aid, was the proximate cause of the death of the victim; since expert testimony established *52that the victim died within a matter of minutes, Klaub’s failure to remain at the scene of the accident and render assistance was not the cause of the victim’s death. We agree.
“The term and concept of proximate cause [have] been applied in vehicular homicide cases in this state for many years. [Cits.]” Johnson v. State.2 “In vehicular homicide cases, the State must prove that the defendant’s conduct was the ‘legal’ or ‘proximate’ cause, as well as the cause in fact, of the death.” Miller v. State.3 See also Hood v. State4 (“[c]ausation is a required element of vehicular homicide. It must be shown that the defendant’s illegal act . . . was the cause of death”). Kurtz, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Georgia (4th ed. 1997), p. 538 (“It is clear that some relationship between the traffic violation and the death must be demonstrated.”).
Where a defendant is charged with vehicular homicide through violation of the hit and run statute, it is the failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 40-6-270 that is the illegal act causing death. OCGA § 40-6-270 (b) provides that a person who “knowingly fail[s] to stop and comply with the requirements of subsection (a) of this Code section” is guilty of a felony. Subsection (a) requires the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to a person, or damage to a vehicle, to stop the vehicle and (1) give his name, address, and registration number of the vehicle he is driving; (2) upon request and if it is available, exhibit his driver’s license to the person struck, or the driver or occupant of or person attending the vehicle with which he has collided; and (3) render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the accident. Failure to comply with these requirements constitutes the violation of OCGA § 40-6-270 which can form the basis for prosecution for vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6-393. See, e.g., Tidwell v. State5 (holding that an allegation that a driver left “the scene of [an] accident without fulfilling the requirements of OCGA § 40-6-270, to wit: remain on said scene to render aid to said . . . [victim] and remain for the purpose of identifying said accused’s name, address, motor vehicle registration and driver’s license,” resulted in victim’s death “adequately asserted proximate cause”).
As to proximate cause,
[a]n injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in *53bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable cause of the act or omission. It is not sufficient to show that the defendant only contributed to the cause of the injury.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pitts v. State.6
In light of these requirements, it is clear that in order to prove vehicular homicide through violation of OCGA § 40-6-270 (b), the State must prove that the defendant’s failure to remain at the scene of the accident and render aid played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the death of the victim. In other words, it is the defendant’s conduct in leaving the scene without rendering aid rather than the initial injury to the victim that must cause the victim’s death.7 In Collins v. State,8 the defendant was convicted of first degree homicide by vehicle after he struck the victim from behind and failed to stop to render aid. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. This Court agreed and reversed the conviction, stating: “The record contains no evidence which would have authorized the jury to conclude that the defendant’s failure to stop and render assistance caused the victim’s death. Such proof is clearly required to support a conviction under the statute.” Id.
In this case, the expert testimony of the forensic pathologist indicated that the victim died quickly, within ten minutes of being struck. The proximate cause of her death was the severe injury she sustained when she was struck by Klaub’s vehicle. The conclusion, based on the medical evidence, is inescapable that she would have died even if Klaub had remained on the scene and rendered assistance. It cannot be said that Klaub’s leaving the scene of the accident, which occurred after the victim was struck by the vehicle, actually caused or played a substantial part in bringing about the victim’s death.
The State argued at trial that Collins dealt only with the statute, current OCGA § 40-6-270 (a), as it existed at the time of that decision, and that it was only under the earlier form of the statute that the State was required to show that the failure to stop and render aid was the proximate cause of the death. The State maintained that the statute was amended to include new OCGA § 40-6-*54270 (b), which provides that a violation of the statute occurs “[if] such accident is the proximate cause of death.” The amended statute, concluded the State, thus removes the causation requirement that the failure to remain on the scene and render aid be the proximate cause of the death, the mere happening of the accident being a sufficient proximate cause of death.
Though the trial court was originally inclined to grant Klaub’s motion for directed verdict pursuant to the decision in Collins, it was persuaded by the State’s argument that OCGA § 40-6-270 (b) eliminated the requirement in Collins that the failure to render aid be the proximate cause of death.9 We are not so persuaded.
The State has not been relieved of its obligation to prove in vehicular homicide cases that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was an act or failure to act on the part of the defendant. Recent cases such as Miller v. State and Pitts v. State, both decided after the enactment of OCGA § 40-6-270 (b) and cited above, reiterate the established requirement that in order for a defendant to be convicted of vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6-393, which includes violations of OCGA § 40-6-270 (b), his conduct must have caused the death of the victim.
If in a given case the injury complained of did not flow naturally and directly from the wrongful act or omission attributed to the defendant, or could not reasonably have been expected to result therefrom, or would not have resulted therefrom but for interposition of some independent, unforeseen cause, the defendant’s such antecedent wrongful act or omission would not be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
Miller v. State, supra at 828. Here, the victim’s death did not naturally and directly flow from Klaub’s wrongful omission, i.e., leaving the scene of the accident, because it was her being struck by the car, not Klaub’s failing to stop, which caused her death.
It is argued that the illegal act “is the actual hit and run and not the failure to stop and render aid”; thus, a defendant could be *55charged with vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6-270 even if the victim dies immediately. This argument effectively removes the causation element from hit and run vehicular homicide cases and creates a presumption in favor of the State. Beyond that, it requires the performance of futile acts. Under such a reading of the statute, a driver would be required to supply to a deceased driver his name, address, and registration number, show the deceased his driver’s license, and render assistance to the deceased. “Although criminal statutes must be strictly construed, they must first be construed consistent with genuine legislative intent and in a manner which avoids absurd and contradictory results.” Reynolds v. State.10 The law does not require a futile or useless act. Nowlin v. Davis.11
It is, then, leaving the scene of the accident and failing to render aid which OCGA § 40-6-270 criminalizes as hit and run. Langlois v. Wolford.12 See also Dworkin v. State13 (“Subsections (b) and (c) (1) of [§ 40-6-270] proscribe as criminal conduct, ‘knowingly failing to stop and comply with the requirements of (the Code section).’ ”). Leaving the scene of the accident is the culpable act which provides the basis for a vehicular homicide conviction, and it is that act which must be proven to have caused the victim’s death. The accident cannot substitute for the culpable act of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury.
At trial, the State also brought the case of Scott v. State14 to the attention of the trial judge. In that case, it is said:
The evidence was also sufficient to support the jury’s finding that after this accident, “the proximate cause of (the victim’s) death,” Scott “knowingly fail(ed)” to “immediately stop (his) vehicle at the scene of the accident or . . . stop as close thereto as possible and forthwith return to the scene of the accident and . . . (r)ender to (the victim) reasonable assistance. . . .” OCGA § 40-6-270 (a) and (b).
We cannot say that this decision authorizes the abandonment of the established requirement that the State prove that a defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of death in a case charging vehicular homicide under OCGA § 40-6-393. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal as to the charge of homicide by vehicle in the first degree through violation of OCGA § 40-6-270.
*56Decided April 12, 2002 Anthony C. Procacci, John R. Mayer, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Rhonda B. Rusnak, Amira S. AbuBakr, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.2. In his third enumeration of error, Klaub asserts that the trial court erred in failing to strike a juror for cause. Although I do not feel the trial court’s ruling was reversible error under the facts of this case, I write separately to voice my concerns.
“The test for disqualification for favor or partiality under OCGA § 15-12-164 (a) is whether a potential juror’s mind is not ‘perfectly impartial between the state and the accused.’” Cannon v. State15 “When ruling on a potential juror’s qualifications, the trial court must make a factual determination based on all the circumstances known to the court, including, but not limited to, the juror’s own opinion of his impartiality.” Lively v. State.16
In this case, the juror’s responses to voir dire raised grave concerns about her ability to be impartial. The trial court made no inquiry into the juror’s belief that she might not be fair and impartial and refused to strike the juror for cause.
Trial courts should be guided in these cases by the concerns raised in Walls v. Kim17 Whether a case is civil or criminal, any indication by a juror of an inability to be impartial should be investigated by the trial court. The juror should be excused for cause if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias, favor, or an inability to be impartial for the reasons stated in Walls, supra.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this opinion.
We note, however, that Klaub’s conviction for vehicular homicide due to reckless driving must be reversed for lack of sufficient evidence.
Johnson v. State, 170 Ga. App. 433, 434 (317 SE2d 213) (1984).
Miller v. State, 236 Ga. App. 825, 828 (2) (513 SE2d 27) (1999).
Hood v. State, 193 Ga. App. 701 (389 SE2d 264) (1989).
Tidwell v. State, 216 Ga. App. 8, 10 (453 SE2d 64) (1995).
Pitts v. State, 253 Ga. App. 373, 374-375 (559 SE2d 106) (2002).
As the California Court of Appeals has succinctly expressed it, “[a]lthough a violation of [the statute] is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ ” People v. Corners, 176 Cal. App.3d 139, 148 (1985).
Collins v. State, 172 Ga. App. 100,101 (1) (321 SE2d 823) (1984).
The trial court was evidently persuaded to adopt the State’s interpretation of the hit and run statute, at least in part, by the fact that OCGA § 40-6-393 refers to a violation of subsection (b) rather than subsection (a) of OCGA § 40-6-270. We agree with Klaub that subsection (b) is referenced because it is the subsection which involves death and would thus provide a basis for vehicular homicide, while subsection (c) concerns “an injury other than a serious injury,” which would not support a conviction for vehicular homicide. Subsection (a) involves all situations in which a driver would be required to stop, provide information, and render assistance, including situations which involve only damage to a vehicle, and would not be a proper basis for vehicular homicide.
Reynolds v. State, 209 Ga. App. 628, 630 (1) (434 SE2d 166) (1993).
Nowlin v. Davis, 245 Ga. App. 821, 822 (538 SE2d 900) (2000).
Langlois v. Wolford, 246 Ga. App. 209, 210 (539 SE2d 565) (2000).
Dworkin v. State, 210 Ga. App. 461, 463 (436 SE2d 665) (1993).
Scott v. State, 230 Ga. App. 522, 525 (496 SE2d 494) (1998).
Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 778 (1) (552 SE2d 922) (2001).
Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510, 511 (1) (421 SE2d 528) (1992).
Walls v. Kim, 250 Ga. App. 259 (549 SE2d 797) (2001).