The plaintiff Ebba Murk was injured on premises belonging to the defendant Congregation Bikur Cholim, where she had been employed by the Aronsens to *786work as a banquet waitress. At the close of all of the evidence, her suit against Congregation Bikur Cholim was dismissed and a judgment against the defendants Aronsen was directed in her favor. She assigns error to the action of the court in dismissing her case against the owner of the premises.
The evidence disclosed that Congregation Bikur Cholim, hereafter referred to as the respondent, had employed the Aronsens, doing business as the Aronsen Catering Service, to prepare and serve a banquet at the respondent’s synagogue. The respondent was to furnish the kitchen and equipment, and the Aronsens were to purchase, prepare and serve the food. They were given possession of the kitchen for this purpose and were not to be under the control of the respondent. They hired their own employees, among whom was Ebba Murk, to assist in the preparation and serving of the dinner. It was also understood that they were to clean the kitchen. The respondent did not supervise nor interfere in any way with the performance of this contract by the Aronsens.
While preparing chicken at the kitchen stove, Louis Aronsen spilled cooking grease on the floor. The condition of the floor was called to his attention by at least two employees, but nothing was done about it. After Ebba Murk had finished her duties as waitress, she ate her dinner and then prepared to leave. The employees understood they were to use the back door; this necessitated their passing the cooking stove. Ebba Murk’s duties had kept her in other parts of the kitchen, and she had not seen the grease upon the floor. While walking past the stove, she slipped, fell, and suffered the injuries for which she brought this action.
It is clear from the evidence that the Aronsens were independent contractors and not employees of the respondent. The plaintiffs do not dispute this fact, but they contend that because Mrs. Murk was on the premises for a business purpose, she was a business invitee to whom the respondent owed a nondelegable duty to provide a safe place to work. No authorities are cited which sustain this position.
The general rule is that the servants of an inde*787pendent contractor must look to him, and not to the person with whom he has contracted, for injuries which they receive through his fault or negligence. Gambella v. John A. Johnson & Sons, 285 App. Div. 580, 140 N. Y. S. (2d) 208 (1955); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Bell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. (2d) 970 (1943); Campbell v. Jones, 60 Wash. 265, 110 Pac. 1083, 20 A. L. R. 671 (1910); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith’s Admr., 134 Ky. 47, 119 S. W. 241 (1909); Cole v. Louisiana Gas Co., 121 La. 771, 46 So. 801 (1908); Annotation, 44 A. L. R. 932.
It is well settled that the principal employer owes to the servants of contractors and subcontractors, employed to perform work on his premises, the duty of not endangering them by his own negligence or affirmative act, but there is no principle under which there rests upon him any obligation to protect them from the negligence of their masters or of their fellow servants. Douglass v. Peck & Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 95 Atl. 22 (1915); Callan v. Pugh, 54 App. Div. 545, 66 N. Y. Supp. 1118 (1900); Burke v. Ireland, 26 App. Div. 487, 50 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1898); 35 Am. Jur. 588, § 159; Annotation, 44 A. L. R. 932.
Mrs. Murk was not an employee of the respondent nor was she the kind of business invitee to whom an owner owes a nondelegable duty to provide a safe place to work. The kitchen was not an inherently dangerous place; and her injuries were not caused by a hidden danger of which the respondent was aware and of which the Aronsens were ignorant. Neither is this a case involving a statute or ordinance which places a nondelegable duty on an owner or general contractor. Were any of these facts present, a different question would be involved. Under the applicable rules which we have stated, the respondent cannot be held liable for Mrs. Murk’s injuries.
Ebba Murk’s accident occurred as a result of the negligence of her employers, at a place which was under their control according to their contract with the respondent and where her employment required her to be at the time of the accident. The respondent was in no way responsible for this negligence, had no reason to be aware of the con*788dition of the floor, and owed to Mrs. Murk no duty to remedy it or give her warning. The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against the respondent was therefore properly sustained.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mallery, Hill, Weaver, and Ott, JJ., concur.