(concurring specially).
I concur in some phases of the majority opinion in this case because of my belief *699that, as to those, such opinion announces or follows properly cognizable principles of the law of Oklahoma.
I feel constrained to concur with respect to at least one other portion oí such opinion only because the law with reference to it was basically and in essence settled in a former decision of this court. See Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 348 P.2d 510, 518. In that case this court determined the validity of the very trust fund here involved, that revenues might be earmarked thereto, that they might be pledged, and further that the very Act here involved and its provisions authorizing financing and construction of the very Turnpikes here involved were constitutional and valid.
In paragraph 8 of the syllabus of the ■opinion in such former case, this court said, “The agreement or agreements for financing the two Turnpikes above referred to properly contain a provision that tolls shall continue to be charged on all Turnpikes until the bonds and the interest thereon, of all Turnpikes have been fully paid.”
I did not then agree with this announced principle. Nor do I now. Nor do I agree with the answer to question IV in the present majority opinion reiterating such principle. See Article X, section 23, Oklahoma Constitution, of provision in part that: “The State shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation or fund or pay any deficit, against the State, or any department, institution or agency thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to he paid * *
However, I feel bound by that principle inhering in a republican form of government, that when the Supreme Court has decided a particular matter finally, the decision is binding. See 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1821 a and b, pp. 181, 190.
By Article VII, section 3 of the Constitution, it is provided, in part, “* * * A majority of the members of the Supreme Court shall constitute a ■ quorum, and the concurrence of the majority of said court shall be necessary to decide any question. ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ If
The former decision settling this matter has long since become final. I therefore concur specially.