Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority

WELCH, Justice

(dissenting to denial of rehearing).

I respectfully dissent to the complete denying of the petitions for rehearing. I am convinced that the answer to “The Third Question” as set out in the majority opinion is not wholly adequate. I agree with that answer as far as it goes in permitting maintenance and pledging of this segregated Trust Fund, but believe we should go further and fully answer this question in the affirmative.

That would more closely follow the legislative intent as clearly expressed in the Act, 69 O.S.Supp. 1959, §§ 680, 682 and 683, and would recognize that revenue produced by using motor fuel on the turnpike system and paying a specified tax per gallon on motor fuel there used may be treated as turnpike revenue, with specific legislative sanction, and thus may be fully pledged as set out in Sec. 683, supra.

Sections 680 and 683 are copied in full in the majority opinion, also in our opinion in Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, Okl., 348 P.2d 510, at pages 514 and 515, and we there stated the provisions of Section 682. In the body of the opinion in that decision, which was considering this identical Act, it was stated at page 515:

“When a motor vehicle travels over the turnpike, the Authority and every*703one else observes the complete propriety and legality of collecting a toll to apply to pay for the Turnpike. Since the same trip necessarily consumes gasoline on which the traveler pays a specific tax per gallon, the Authority urges there is equal propriety and legality in applying a legislatively stated portion of that motor fuel tax for possible permissive use to pay for the Turnpike.”

And at page 516:

“Furthermore, if any money is spent by Authority out of the trust fund created with or from motor fuel taxes, it will only be a temporary use or expenditure since provision is made for its repayment into the fund by Authority.
“Turnpikes are public highways. Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 203 Okl. 335, 221 P.2d 795. The above use of the stated portion of motor fuel tax funds is a use for a public purpose, and in fact is a public highway use.
“Upon public hearing and oral argument the protestant now admits that upon a more studied construction of the Act, this provision for the specific use of the stated portion of motor fuel tax does not amount to the creation of any debt against the State, or constitute any illegal use of such tax money. Nevertheless, it is this court’s duty to consider and to determine such questions.
“We deem further discussion unnecessary. It is plain from the provisions of the Act, and from what we have said above, that this apportionment of part of the tax from motor fuel consumed on the several turnpikes into a segregated trust fund, and the possible permissive use of such fund, and the possible making of expenditures therefrom does not constitute any illegal use of such tax money, nor does such provision create any debt against the State of Oklahoma. This conclusion seems to us to be in complete harmony with this court’s decisions in the several Turnpike cases heretofore decided and cited in an earlier paragraph of this opinion.”

And in paragraph three of the syllabus in that case we held as follows:

“The Legislature may apportion a specifically stated part or portion of the tax collected from motor fuel consumed on turnpikes of Oklahoma to a Trust Fund to be used as a guarantee for the payment of interest upon Turnpike Bonds subsequently issued for the construction of additional Turnpikes which are authorized by law, and the provisions in Sections 1, 3 and 4, in the 1959 Turnpike Act, House Bill 932 of the 1959 Legislature, 69 O.S.1959 Supp. Sections 680, 682 and 683 providing therefor are valid.”

It seems to me that the above determination in that case in January, 1960, would guide and require us to change the majority opinion in this case as here requested and urged by the Turnpike Authority.

The Turnpike Authority here urges that a full affirmative answer to this third question is legally justified as being well within the legislative power, and I believe it is so, and that the majority opinion should be expanded and liberalized' to that extent.

I am authorized to say that BLACKBIRD, V. C. J., and HALLEY and JOHNSON, JJ., concur in these dissenting views.