dissenting from Part III, and SCHROEDER, J., joins in dissent.
I respectfully dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion. The alleged oral contract to refer patients from Haller to Miller violates both federal and state law and is unenforceable. Therefore, the district court should be instructed on remand to grant Haller’s motion for a directed verdict on this issue, in the event that the district court does not set aside its order granting a new trial.
The evidence shows that Miller agreed to voluntarily withdraw from the partnership. The written “Agreement for Voluntary Withdrawal of Partner” provided that in consideration of Miller’s agreement to withdraw, the remaining partners would forgive repayment of a loan and a promissory note, and waive enforcement of the noncompetition clause in the Partnership Agreement. Miller also claimed that an oral agreement provided that if he voluntarily withdrew from the partnership Haller would continue to refer surgical patients to Miller in the same pattern that had existed when Miller was in the partnership. In his testimony, Miller described this referral agreement as “the final determination of my value of the partnership.” Miller’s estimate of the value of surgical referrals which should have been made to him by Haller in 1989 and 1990 was in excess of $200,000.
This oral agreement violated 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), which makes the giving or receiving of remuneration, directly or indirectly, in exchange for referrals involving Medicare patients a felony. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “[i]f one purpose of the payment was to induce future referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated.” United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3rd Cir.1985). Here, the remuneration might be indirect, but it is remuneration nonetheless: Miller accepted a referral agreement, and other terms, in exchange for his voluntary termination of his partnership *353interest. Haller received the benefit of Miller’s voluntary withdrawal from the partnership in exchange for a continuing flow of referrals and other consideration. Because the referrals would have been made to satisfy the oral agreement, they would have been made in violation of the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
The potential violation of the federal statute would also have constituted a violation of state law. The grounds for medical discipline set forth in I.C. § 54-1814 include: “(21) Commission of any act constituting a felony ...” Violation of the Medieare/Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse statutes would constitute a felony and accordingly would have been prohibited under Idaho law.
Based upon the federal and state law cited above, and the clear public policy prohibiting financial influence upon the referral of Medicare patients, I would hold that the alleged oral contract which provided for Miller to receive referrals in exchange for his voluntary withdrawal from the partnership violated applicable state and federal law and public policy. The district court therefore should have granted Haller’s motion for a directed verdict because the oral contract was illegal.