concurring in the judgment.
I join the court in affirming the conviction, but I am not persuaded that Wussler should be overruled.
I acknowledge that there is “a wide divergence of opinion” on this issue. State v. Daulton, 518 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D.1994); see also-day M. Zitter, Annotation, When Should Jury Deliberations Proceed from Charged Offense to Lesser-included Offense, 26 A.L.R. 5th 603 (1995). But of the courts that have addressed the issue, a majority has approved of the Wussler “acquittal-first” approach.
At least four alternatives exist. Twelve states and one federal circuit use the “acquittal-first” instruction. See People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15, 17-18 (Colo.1981); State v. Sawyer, 227 Conn. 566, 630 A.2d 1064, 1075 (1993) ; State v. Townsend, 124 Idaho 881, 865 P.2d 972, 979 (1993); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 607-08 (Miss.1995); State v. Van Dyken, 242 Mont. 415, 791 P.2d 1350, 1361, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920, 111 S.Ct. 297, 112 L.Ed.2d 251 (1990); State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654, 656-59 (1994); State v. Taylor, 677 A.2d 1093, 1097 (N.H. 1996); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-87, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98 (1987); State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C.App. 392, 238 S.E.2d 659, 665, review denied, 294 N.C. 187, 241 S.E.2d 516 (1977); State v. Daulton, 518 N.W.2d 719, 721-22 (N.D.1994); Commonwealth v. Hart, 388 Pa.Super. 484, 565 A.2d 1212, 1216 (1989), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 642, 581 A.2d 569 (1990); State v. McPherson, 882 S.W.2d 365, 375-76 (Tenn. Crim.App.1994); United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 64 (1st Cir.1982).
Two states use a modified “acquittal-first” instruction, which allows the jury to consider the lesser included offense before acquitting *441on the greater charge, but still requires the jury to unanimously acquit on the greater charge before returning a verdict on the lesser offense. See Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1060-64 (Alaska App.), aff'd, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 679, 93 L.Ed.2d 729 (1986); People v. Kurtzman, 46 Cal.3d 322, 250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 248-53, 758 P.2d 572, 576-80 (1988).
Ten states use the “reasonable efforts” instruction. See Cantrell v. State, 266 Ga. 700, 469 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1996); State v. Ferreira, 8 Haw.App. 1, 791 P.2d 407, 408-09, cert. denied, 71 Haw. 668, 833 P.2d 901 (1990); State v. Korbel, 231 Kan. 657, 647 P.2d 1301, 1305 (1982); People v. Handley, 415 Mich. 356, 329 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982); State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo.1994), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 757, 130 L.Ed.2d 656 (1995); State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 819 P.2d 673, 680 (1991); State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, 292-93 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 826, 110 S.Ct. 89, 107 L.Ed.2d 54 (1989); State v. Allen, 301 Or. 35, 717 P.2d 1178, 1180-81 (1986); State v. Labanowski, 117 Wash.2d 405, 816 P.2d 26, 31-36 (1991); State v. Truax, 151 Wis.2d 354, 444 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Ct.App.), rev. denied, 151 Wis.2d 354, 446 N.W.2d 286 (1989).
Three federal circuits, the District of Columbia, and Vermont use the “optional approach,” which allows the defendant to choose between the “acquittal-first” and “reasonable efforts” instructions. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir.)(formulating the optional approach), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S.Ct. 1647, 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978); Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.1984); Jones v. United States, 620 A.2d 249, 252 (D.C.1993); State v. Powell, 158 Vt. 280, 608 A2d 45, 47 (1992).
The court now chooses to abandon the “acquittal-first” instruction. But its arguments — the reduced risk of a coerced verdict and a hung jury — were advanced and rejects ed in Wussler. See Wussler, 139 Ariz. at 433, 679 P.2d at 79 (Feldman, J., specially concurring). And tliere is no new evidence of juror coercion or an increased number of mistrials since Wussler to support change now. Nor am I aware of any other “increased experience” or “further development” in this area. Ante, at 444 (Moeller, J., specially concurring).
In contrast, the “acquittal-first” instruction has its advantages. From the defendant’s standpoint, it may prevent any conviction at all. From the state’s standpoint, it tends to avoid a compromise verdict, which deprives the state of a re-trial on the greater charge. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir.1978). Judge Friendly’s insight in Tsanas is as true today as it was in 1978: the advantages and disadvantages of the instructions are mirror images of each other. Id.
We ought not fear overruling a case when it is wrongly decided. Thus, if the court’s approach were plainly superior to that of Wussler, I would not hesitate to get on board. See, e.g., State v. DePiano, 187 Ariz. 27, 926 P.2d 494 (1996). But neither approach is plainly superior to the other. Under these circumstances, certainty and stability in the law tip the balance in favor of preserving Wussler.
ROBERT J. CORCORAN, J. (Retired), did not participate in the determination of this matter.