(dissenting) — The majority endeavors to use the trial judge's first-blush grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff as if that judgment were authority. The fact that, having granted the motion, the trial court reversed its initial decision and certified the question to this court reflects the court's concern about whether that initial decision was correct. The majority then proceeds to effectively repeal the product liability statute of limitations. This changes the statute from a defined, ascertainable time frame to an open-ended period that has no ultimate termination whatsoever.
*329RCW 7.72.060(3) states:
no claim under this chapter may be brought more than three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause.
The majority construes this language to mean that a cause of action does not accrue until the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, that his injury was caused by a defective product. Majority opinion, at 319. Thus, the majority would hold that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiffs had thrust upon them in 1984 the awareness that the crash may have been caused by a defect in the elevator control assembly. I disagree. A cause of action should accrue when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, a relationship or connection between his injury and the product. Therefore, in cases involving a sudden traumatic injury, the plaintiff is on notice of the possibility of a causal connection between his injury and the product and the statute of limitations begins to run as a matter of law when the injury occurred. I submit that in this case, the statute of limitations began to run when the crash occurred in 1974. I submit that the phrase "in the exercise of due diligence" places responsibility for discovering cause when there is injury and product involvement upon the injured party. The statute should begin to run at the time the plaintiff knows he is injured and knows or should have discovered what brought about the injury.
"A statute of limitation is defined as the action of the State in determining that, after the lapse of a specified time, a claim shall not be enforceable in a judicial proceeding." Watters v. Doud, 92 Wn.2d 317, 321, 596 P.2d 280 (1979). "A statute of limitations is designed to give an injured party a reasonable length of time in which to assert a claim, after which the statute seeks to achieve repose for *330the potential defendant." Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 501, 512 (1982).
Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wn.2d 72, 75-76, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) recently discussed the purposes behind statutes of limitations:
Statutes of limitation assist the courts in their pursuit of truth by barring stale claims. A number of evidentiary problems arise from stale claims. As time passes, evidence becomes less available . . . Physical evidence is . . . more likely to be lost when a claim is stale, either because it has been misplaced, or because its significance was not comprehended at the time of the alleged wrong. In addition, the evidence which is available becomes less trustworthy as witnesses' memories fade or are colored by intervening events and experiences. . . . Thus, stale claims present major evidentiary problems which can seriously undermine the courts' ability to determine the facts. By precluding stale claims, statutes of limitation increase the likelihood that courts will resolve factual issues fairly and accurately.
In addition, in relation to product liability claims, the physical evidence over the years will rust and corrode, parts will be taken or damaged and new technology will replace the old in the literature and in the memories of the experts. All of which should be apparent, as a matter of law, in the present action.1
In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259, 100 S. Ct. 352 (1979), the United States Supreme Court recognized that
*331[sjtatutes of limitations . . . represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that "the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."
Additionally, "statutes of limitations preserve certainty in the business operations of defendants, particularly when insurance is involved." Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Actions: The Discovery Rule of Franzen v. Deere & Co., 69 Iowa L. Rev. 1127, 1127 (1983-1984); see Comment, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 501, 513 (1982).
A statute of limitations normally begins to run at the time of the accident or injury. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660, 666, 453 P.2d 631 (1969). However, in some cases, the injury may not occur or become apparent until after the statute of limitations period has expired. In such cases courts have applied what has come to be known as the discovery rule. The discovery rule provides that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered the cause of action. U.S. Oil & Ref. Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96 Wn.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329 (1981).2 The rule "extends the limitation period beyond the time of harm in situations where the claimant would have no reason to know about the harm or the causal connection to a defective product (e.g., the case of long-term pharmaceutical harms)." Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 110 analysis.
The discovery rule reflects a judicial determination to balance the possibility of stale claims against the unfairness of precluding justified causes of action where a plaintiff is unable to ascertain within the statute of limitations period that a wrong has been committed. U.S. Oil, at 93. The rule *332generally has been applied in cases involving slowly developing diseases or injuries, such as asbestosis, DES, etc. Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Liability Cases, 13 Forum 279, 282 (1977).
When the plaintiff's injury has a latency period or becomes manifest only after repeated exposure to the product, as in cases involving asbestos, certain drugs, chemicals, and medical products, the plaintiff may not immediately know of the harm or its cause. Under these circumstances, application of the time of injury rule may harshly result in barring a plaintiff's claim before the plaintiff is even aware of having been injured. As a response, a discovery rule under which the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury, has been implemented . . .
American Law of Products Liability § 47.21 (3d ed. 1987). The rule has also been applied in medical malpractice cases involving a foreign object left in the body. Comment, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-Injury Accrual Rule, 68 Va. L. Rev. 615, 624 (1982); see Ruth. In fact, the case rationale cited by the majority relies almost exclusively on Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wn.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979), Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983), White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wn.2d 344, 693 P.2d 687 (1985), and Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wn.2d 761, 733 P.2d 530 (1987), all cases involving concealed physical harm or slow to manifest itself drug or asbestos injury.
However, the need for a discovery rule does not exist in cases involving a sudden traumatic injury. In those cases, causes of action are apparent. American Law of Products Liability § 47.21; see Comment, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 501, 501 (1982). "By comparison with the chemical cases and their inherent baggage of injustice, courts find it easier to declare that the discovery rule does not protect the plaintiff whose injury *333was caused by a 'sudden traumatic event.1" M. Shapo, Products Liability § 30.05[3][b] (1987).
In United States v. Kubrick, supra, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a claim accrues under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the plaintiff knows both the existence and cause of his injury or at a later time when he also knows that the acts inflicting the injury may constitute medical malpractice. Kubrick, at 113. In holding that a claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers the existence and cause of his injury, the Court stated:
We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff's ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause should receive identical treatment. That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask.
Kubrick, at 122. Other courts have also recognized the distinction between gradually occurring and sudden and traumatic injuries. See Lofton v. General Motors Corp., 694 F.2d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1982); LePretre v. Petrie Bros., 113 Ill. App. 3d 484, 447 N.E.2d 551, 553 (1983); Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc., 106 Mich. App. 698, 308 N.W.2d 612, 613 (1981); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170, 173 (1977).
In Ruth v. Dight, supra, this court adopted the discovery rule in the context of a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff brought an action in 1967 asserting that the defendant doctor operated on her in 1944 and negligently left a surgical sponge in her abdomen. The existence of the sponge was not discovered until she had a second operation in 1966. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint after determining that the applicable 3-year statute of limitations set forth in RCW 4.16.080(2) had expired. After *334noting the difficulty of applying statutes of limitations in medical malpractice cases, the court held that
in those classes of cases where medical malpractice is asserted to have occurred through the negligent leaving of foreign substances or articles in a surgical wound and which remain in the body after the wound has been surgically closed, the statute of limitations (RCW 4.16-.080(2)), commences to run when the patient discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable care for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the presence of the foreign substance or article in his body.
(Italics mine.) Ruth, at 667-68.
In Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 92 Wn.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979) this court first applied the discovery rule in a product liability action. The plaintiff, who had been born prematurely, was placed in an incubator shortly after birth and given oxygen. Subsequently, she was diagnosed as suffering from retrolental fibroplasia (RLF), which left her blind. RLF can result from the administration of oxygen during the first few days of an infant's life. The plaintiff knew this from an early age. However, she did not discover that her blindness might have been caused by the wrongful conduct of the hospital and the incubator manufacturer until she was 21. Shortly thereafter she filed medical malpractice and product liability claims.
The trial court in Ohler granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants. However, this court concluded that the "trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that appellant's cause of action accrued when she 'discovered' the cause of her blindness ('too much oxygen'), even if no fault on the tort-feasor's part then was apparent." Ohler, at 510. Instead, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiff "discovered or reasonably should have discovered all the essential elements of her possible cause of action." Ohler, at 514.
This court again applied the discovery rule in a product liability action in Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 99 Wn.2d 550, 663 P.2d 473 (1983). In Sahlie, the plaintiff, who suffered from asbestosis, brought an action against *335several asbestos manufacturers. In 1970, the plaintiff discovered that he was suffering from asbestosis and that his condition was caused by exposure to asbestos. He did not learn until 1980, after consulting with an attorney, that he might have a claim against the asbestos manufacturers.
The court stated that under the rule set forth in Ohler, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers: (a) that the plaintiff suffered harm from a product which had a defective condition making it unreasonably dangerous, (b) that the defendant sold the product, and (c) that the product reached the plaintiff without change. Sahlie, at 553. The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until 1980, when he learned the essential elements in his cause of action from his lawyer. However, Sahlie recognized the change made in the statute by the tort reform act stating:
Much of the argument in the briefs of defendants is. directed toward persuading us to depart from our holding in Ohler. This we decline to do. The merits of the rule in Ohler were considered recently by the Legislature. See Senate Select Committee Report on Tort and Product Liability Reform, Senate Journal, 47th Legislature (1981), at 617, 633-34. The response of the Legislature was to modify the rule. RCW 7.72.060. This amendment, however, applies only to claims arising on or after July 26, 1981. RCW 4.22.920. The Legislature, therefore, while apparently disagreeing with the rule announced in Ohler, saw fit not to disturb that rule in respect of claims arising prior to July 26,1981. We perceive no compelling reasons for our accelerating the legislative modification of the rule in Ohler.
Sahlie, at 554.
This court limited the application of the discovery rule in Reichelt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 107 Wn.2d 761, 733 P.2d 530 (1987). In Reichelt, the plaintiff, who suffered from asbestosis, brought product liability claims against asbestos manufacturers and distributors. The plaintiff was exposed to asbestos between 1953 and 1974, and was diagnosed as having asbestosis and pulmonary disease in 1980. Reichelt, *336at 763. The plaintiff was diagnosed as having mild asbestosis in 1971, and was informed that his condition was caused by exposure to asbestos products. He subsequently filed a workers compensation claim, and eventually quit his job in 1974. The plaintiff later took a job with the United States Department of Labor as an Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) investigator, where he received training in OSHA asbestos standards and learned in 1976 that asbestos was a hazardous material.
The court noted that "a cause of action in a negligence case accrues when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the essential elements of negligence, i.e., duty, breach, causation and damages." Reichelt, at 769. The court added, however, that this does not mean that the plaintiff must be aware of a legal cause of action. Reichelt, at 769. The court determined that the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known all the facts necessary to establish the elements of his negligence claim more than 3 years before he filed this action, and thus held that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Reichelt, at 768. I submit that in this case the plaintiffs, as in Reichelt, were on notice of all the facts necessary to, with due diligence, discover the cause of their injury.
RCW 4.16.350 which was the applicable statute before the court in Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., supra, and Sahlie v. Johns-Manville Corp., supra, concerns itself with civil actions for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care against persons or corporations based upon alleged professional negligence which:
shall be commenced within three years of the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or one year of the time the patient or his representative discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act or omission, whichever period expires later, except that in no event shall an action be commenced more than eight years after said act or omissionj.]
(Italics mine.) RCW 4.16.350(3).
*337The provisions of RCW 7.72.030(3) intentionally differ from RCW 4.16.350 in that the product liability statute of limitations runs from the date of discovery of the harm and its cause (this case) as opposed to discovery of all of the essential elements of the cause of action (as required by Ohler and Sahlie). The provisions of RCW 7.72.060 clearly seek a reasonable conclusion as to the time wherein an action may be brought: three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause" as opposed to the idea that the claimant knew each and every element of his cause of action.
RCW 7.72.060(3) adopts the discovery rule in the context of product liability actions, stating that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant "discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause." The majority adopts an expansive reading of this language, holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until claimant discovers, or should have discovered that the cause of his injury was an alleged defect in the product. Majority opinion, at 319. However, an analysis of the purposes behind the Washington product liability act (WPLA) and the legislative history behind the enactment of RCW 7.72.060(3) shows that this interpretation is erroneous.
The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Frank v. Fischer, 108 Wn.2d 468, 473-74, 739 P.2d 1145 (1987). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, such construction is unnecessary, and the words of the statute will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Clark v. Horse Racing Comm'n, 106 Wn.2d 84, 91, 720 P.2d 831 (1986); In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986). However, if the language of the statute is ambiguous, it may be necessary to resort to extrinsic aids in order to determine legislative intent. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 819, 822, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988).
*338In this case, the issue centers around the interpretation of the word "cause". As noted by the majority, "'Cause' is a word with multiple connotations. Interpretation is more difficult because 'cause' has legal meanings as well.” Majority opinion, at 326. Because of this ambiguity, it is appropriate, therefore, to turn to other sources besides the language of RCW 7.72.060(3) in order to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.
RCW 7.72.060(3) was enacted in 1981, as part of the Washington product liability act (WPLA). The WPLA is prefaced by a preamble, setting forth the purposes of the act. "Where the legislature prefaces an enactment with a statement of purpose . . ., that declaration, although without operative force in itself, nevertheless serves as an important guide in understanding the intended effect of operative sections." Hartman v. State Game Comm'n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 179, 532 P.2d 614 (1975). Thus, we may turn to the preamble as one means of ascertaining legislative intent.
The preamble states in part:
Of particular concern is the area of tort law known as product liability law. Sharply rising premiums for product liability insurance have increased the cost of consumer and industrial goods. These increases in premiums have resulted in disincentives to industrial innovation and the development of new products. High product liability premiums may encourage product sellers and manufacturers to go without liability insurance or pass the high cost of insurance on to the consuming public in general.
It is the intent of the legislature to treat the consuming public, the product seller, the product manufacturer, and the product liability insurer in a balanced fashion in order to deal with these problems.
It is the intent of the legislature that the right of the consumer to recover for injuries sustained as a result of an unsafe product not be unduly impaired. It is further the intent of the legislature that retail businesses located primarily in the state of Washington be protected from the substantially increasing product liability insurance *339costs and unwarranted exposure to product liability litigation.
Laws of 1981, ch. 27, § 1.
The majority has also relied on language from the preamble to the WPLA to support its position. See majority opinion, at 321. However, the majority overemphasizes the Legislature's intent to protect the consumer. As can be seen from the language quoted above, the Legislature also intended to protect retailers and manufacturers; to reach a fair balance between opposing interests.
The court may also look to legislative history as a means of ascertaining legislative intent. Bellevue Fire Fighters, Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wn.2d 748, 751, 675 P.2d 592 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985). As part of its committee report included in the Senate Journal, the Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform described the intended purpose of the new statute of limitations provision:
This discovery rule is intended to modify the discovery rule pronounced inn [sic] Ohler v. Tacoma General Hospital , 92 Wn. 2d 507 (1979), which stated that the date of discovery meant the discovery of all of the essential elements of the cause of action, including duty, breach, causation, and damages. The concern about the Ohler formulation is that in practical terms it could mean that the statute of limitations would not begin running until the claimant consulted with an attorney since concepts of duty, breach and causation are uniquely legal concepts which a layperson would not ordinarily be expected to appreciate.
Senate Journal, 47th Legislature (1981), at 633-34. Additionally, as part of its findings, the committee stated that it
carefully selected language relating to the statute of limitation in order to modify the discovery rule announced in Ohler . . . Because the discovery of all the essential elements of the cause of action is, practically speaking, beyond the understanding of the average layperson until he chooses to seek legal counsel, the Ohler rule unjustifiably extends the period during which an action may be brought. In utilizing the language "time of discovery of *340the harm and its cause," the Committee intends to recreate a more reasonable and meaningful statute of limitations as to product liability claims.
Senate Journal, at 626.
It is clear from the legislative history that the Legislature intended to modify the discovery rule as set forth in Ohler. It is also clear that the Legislature intended to apply the statute of limitations more strictly in a product liability action by restricting the application of the discovery rule. Thus, the word "cause" in RCW 7.72.060(3) should be interpreted with this intent in mind. It is also necessary to consider the policies behind statutes of limitations in general and the discovery rule in particular.
The better approach is to hold that the statute of limitations period set forth in RCW 7.72.060(3) runs when the claimant discovers a connection between his injury and the product. This rule incorporates a discovery element — the limitations period does not begin to run until the claimant knows or should know that there is a relationship between his injury and the product. Such an interpretation complies with the language of RCW 7.72.060(3) providing for application of a discovery rule in product liability actions. It also satisfies the legislative intent to reduce the scope of the discovery rule as applied in Ohler and its progeny. Furthermore, the rule fulfills the purposes behind statutes of limitations by providing a definite point beyond which stale claims may not be brought. Finally, such an interpretation of RCW 7.72.060(3) achieves the objectives of the discovery rule by requiring claimants to exercise due diligence to discover a causal connection between their injury and a particular product in order to bring an action beyond the normal statute of limitations period.
Here the plaintiffs knew they were harmed and on notice that their injury came about because the plane crashed. The Legislature could have set a 1-year, a 2-year or a 6-year statute of limitations, but instead set 3 years as a reasonable outside limit for an injured party to establish what went wrong, if anything, with the product that brought *341about the injury. There was no unknown harm or silent killer. The plaintiffs were not deluded, except by circumstance and their own lack of due diligence. The statute began to run as a matter of law when the airplane crashed. I would inform the District Court that under RCW 7.72-.060(3) there is no factual inquiry that need be made.
Goodloe and Durham, JJ., concur with Callow, J.
The majority asserts that the rationale of Tyson v. Tyson, is undercut by the enactment of Laws of 1988, ch. 144. The Legislature did not undercut the rationale of Tyson. It expressed a legislative intent that in childhood sexual abuse claims a 3-year statute of limitations would run from the time the victim "reasonably should have discovered that the injury . . . was caused by said act ..." The legislative enactment of Laws of 1988, ch. 144, using the words "reasonably should have discovered" in contrast to the wording of RCW 7.72.060(3) "in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered" emphasizes the placement of a "due diligence" standard on one injured by a product, a responsibility not placed on a victim of child abuse. Laws of 1988, ch. 144 enlightens us rather on the real purpose of RCW 7.72.060(3) which is a commonsense balance ending stale product liability claims.
U.S. Oil involved, as do the other "discovery" cases, a situation where the plaintiff did not know it had been harmed and was entitled to discover the fact of harm. No such absence of awareness exists for the user of a product who suffers a traumatic impact.