(dissenting) :
I dissent, concluding there is no change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a custody change.
The party seeking a change in custody assumes the burden of proof and must show new facts and circumstances which substantially affect the interests and welfare of the child. Powell v. Powell, 256 S. C. 111, 181 S. E. (2d) 13 (1971); Green v. Loveday, S. C., 242 S. E. (2d) 441 (1978). Although the mother has remarried and moved to a nice home in Rock Hill, Mr. Funderburk has also remarried and lives in a nice home in Spartanburg. Most importantly, all indications are that Jason is happy and content in his present environment.
This case is closely analogous to Jones v. Ard, 265 S. C. 423, 219 S. E. (2d) 358 (1975), where the natural mother sought to have custody of a five year old boy transferred from the father to her. Both parties had remarried and were fit and proper persons to have custody of the child. In Jones v. Ard, as here, the testimony indicated the child was happy *279with his father and stepmother and living in a stable home. Accordingly, we stated:
“Not every change of conditions warrants a change of custody. . . . [A] party seeking to upset custody of a child and bring about a change of custody must prove a change of conditions which substantially affect the interest and welfare of the child . . .” 265 S. C. at 425-26, 219 S. E. (2d) at 359.
As the factors listed by appellant to support her assertion of a material change in circumstances are equally present in the father’s favor, I believe the trial court, which viewed the witnesses and heard their testimony, properly concluded custody should remain with respondent. The disruptive effect which a change in custody has upon a child is not justified where, as here, the child is happy and well adjusted in this present home. I would affirm.
Littlejohn, J., concurs.