dissenting.
In North Carolina, the “duty owed to trespassers is that they must not be wilfully or wantonly injured.” Hood v. Queen City Coach Co., 249 N.C. 534, 540, 107 S.E. 2d 154, 158 (1959); Bell v. Page, 271 N.C. 396, 156 S.E. 2d 711 (1967). The degree of “willfulness” or “wantonness” necessary to impose liability upon a landowner for injury to a trespasser has been defined as follows:
To constitute willful injury there must be actual knowledge, or that which the law deems to be the equivalent of actual knowledge, of the peril to be apprehended, coupled with a design, purpose, and intent to do wrong and inflict injury. A wanton act is one which is performed intentionally with a reckless indifference to injurious consequences probable to *149result therefrom. Ordinary negligence has as its basis that a person charged with negligent conduct should have known the probable consequences of his act. Wanton and willful negligence rests on the assumption that he knew the probable consequences, but was recklessly, wantonly or intentionally indifferent to the results. (Emphasis added.)
Wagoner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 238 N.C. 162, 168, 77 S.E. 2d 701, 706 (1953); Jarvis v. Sanders, 34 N.C. App. 283, 237 S.E.. 2d 865 (1977); Haddock v. Lassiter, 8 N.C. App. 243, 174 S.E. 2d 50 (1970).
Since there is plenary evidence that the defendants intentionally stretched the cable across the roadway, I focus on the questions whether there is any evidence to support a finding that the defendants “knew the probable consequences” of their act and whether they were “recklessly, wantonly or intentionally indifferent to the results.”
While the defendants testified that they had no actual knowledge that the minor plaintiff had ever ridden his motorbike on their private drive, there is ample evidence in the record tending to show that automobiles, motorcycles, and even horses, were ridden by trespassers on the roadway in question on numerous occasions over a period of many months after the defendants purchased the property, and while the defendants were working on the house located on the property. Although there is evidence in the record that the 3/8 inch aluminum cable was easily visible at a distance of 180 feet, there is also evidence tending to show that the cable blended in with the surroundings and was barely visible even to a person who knew it was there.
This evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, gives rise to the following inferences: (1) that the defendants knew that trespassers were riding motorcycles or trail bikes over their private driveway; (2) that the 3/8 inch aluminum cable was difficult to see, even if one knew it was there; and (3) that the cable stretched across the driveway at a height of 3V2 to 4 feet would be dangerous to persons riding motorcycles or trail bikes. These inferences would permit the jury to find that the defendants knew the probable consequences of their act, and that they were recklessly, wantonly, and *150heedlessly indifferent to the results in creating the condition that proximately caused the minor plaintiff’s injuries.
The defendants argue that the trial judge should have granted their motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the minor plaintiff was con-tributorily negligent as a matter of law. However, the rule in North Carolina is that when willful or wanton conduct for which defendant is responsible is a proximate cause of the injuries complained of, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff will not bar recovery. Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E. 2d 345 (1971); Pearce v. Barham, 271 N.C. 285, 156 S.E. 2d 290 (1967); Jarvis v. Sanders, supra. The case of Pafford v. Jones Construction Co., 217 N.C. 730, 9 S.E. 2d 408 (1940), cited by the defendants, is not authority to the contrary.
For the reasons stated above, I vote to affirm.