dissenting:
I dissent to the majority opinion because I agree with the Colorado Real Estate Commission’s contention that the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact to support its conclusion of law that the Moel-lers delivered money to Simmons “in trust” and that Simmons’ receipt and use of this money was an “activity [that] required a broker’s license.” I would remand the case to the trial court for further findings of fact on the sole issue presented on appeal.
*704C.R.C.P. 52 states in part: “In all actions tried upon the facts ... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” The trial court’s written order notes that “monies were placed and delivered in trust to the Defendants and that said funds were converted or otherwise disposed of by Defendants contrary to the specific purpose for which the trust funds were deposited.” (District Court Order at 1) (emphasis added). Based on this statement, the trial court concluded that the “Defendants’ receipt of the trust monies in order to consummate real estate transaction with the applicants” was an activity which required a real estate broker’s license. This legal conclusion rests on the trial court’s unsupported holding that the Moellers’ loans to Simmons were “trust funds.”
A court’s findings and conclusions should be sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis for appellate review. Commercial Claims, Ltd. v. Clement Bros. Co., 709 P.2d 88 (Colo.App.1985). The test is whether the court’s findings provide a basis for the decision, and are supported by evidence. Hipps v. Hennig, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P.2d 700 (1968).
In this case, I do not believe that the trial court’s findings are adequate. As the majority notes, the sole issue is whether “Simmons, in his dealings with the Moellers, ‘performed acts for which a license is required’ ” under section 12-61-302(1). The written order summarily characterizes this transaction as resulting in a “trust,” but makes no attempt to explain what facts it relied upon to arrive at this characterization.1 The order also states that the defendants’ use of the funds was “contrary to the specific purpose” for which the funds had been deposited, but the court does not clarify the “specific purpose” of the Moellers’ agreement with Simmons, which is the heart of the issue. If the specific purpose agreed upon by the parties was to enter into an investment loan — arranging for a loan secured by a deed of trust on real property — then Moeller has not engaged in acts for which a license is required. See Bamford v. Cope, 31 Colo. App. 161, 499 P.2d 639 (1972). If the specific purpose was to engage in a real estate transaction, the court must specify whether Moeller was acting as a real estate broker or acting “as principal in acquiring or in negotiating to acquire any interest in real estate.” § 12-61-101(4), 5 C.R.S. (1985).
The documents signed by the Moellers bore the title: “Agreement for Investment Loans.” As the petitioners note in their Opening Brief, “the terms and language contained on the various Investment Agreements were not consistent with the Moellers’ understanding of the purpose of the funds given to Simmons by them.” Opening Brief at 18. Yet, in its ruling the trial court made no findings as to whether the Investment Agreements controlled, whether the parties intended these to be investment loans or real estate purchases, whether Simmons was acting as principal in acquiring or negotiating real estate interests, and how these transactions created a “trust.” For these reasons, I do not believe the trial court made sufficient findings under C.R.C.P. 52 and I would remand for findings on these questions. Further, there is no indication why the court of appeals’ reasoning in Bamford v. Cope, 31 Colo.App. 161, 499 P.2d 639 (1972), should not be applied in this case. In Bamford, the court of appeals rejected the defendant-broker’s argument that “arranging for a loan which is secured by a deed of trust on real property involves a transaction which is an exchange of ‘an interest’ in real estate,” construing the predecessor to section 12-61-101. Id. at 164, 499 P.2d at 641.
*705The trial court failed to find the facts specially as applied to its conclusion and order. I would remand to the trial court for further findings in support of its trust theory.
. The district court’s order is unclear in certain respects. The judge first held that "Simmons and/or Red Rooster Realty, Inc., did engage in activities for which a real estate license is required.” There is no indication what facts the court relies upon to support this conclusion. The next paragraph of the order states in part: "while the Court specifically may find grounds for recovery on the basis of a conversion of trust funds, the Court just as well could find in favor of the applicants on grounds of fraud, willful misrepresentation, and deceit.” I find it unclear exactly which statement was meant to be the court’s holding, because no findings of fact were set forth to support these conclusions.