concurring.
I agree that the court correctly dismissed the indictment brought against the Joneses for interference with official proceedings. AS 11.56.510(a)(1). The Joneses arranged for M.J. and T.J. to fly to Arizona with Patricia Jones in order to keep them from testifying against Michael Jones. A common sense interpretation of the statute would indicate that the Joneses did not use unlawful force on the children to prevent them from testifying. Further, we are aware of no similar statute being interpreted to declare this type of conduct unlawful. Instead, the problem that I have with the court’s decision is its treatment of AS 11.-81.430(a)(1), which authorizes the reasonable use of nondeadly force by parents and other persons exercising care and supervision over minor children.
“Force” is defined broadly in AS 11.81.-900(b)(22) to include any “restraint.” Thus, almost any action which a parent might take with a child could constitute “force,” and violate the criminal law, unless the parent’s action is permitted by AS 11.81.430(a)(1). Consequently, to avoid statutory vagueness and provide parents and other people who supervise children with sufficient freedom to act, AS 11.81.-430(a)(1) must be construed broadly.
The majority opinion could be interpreted to require a parent to prove in court that any restraint on a child must be “reasonably necessary and appropriate to promote the welfare of the child.” It seems to me that this phrase must be broadly interpreted to allow the proper supervision of children without interference from the state.
Here, the Joneses’ use of “force” consisted of flying T.J. and M.J. to Arizona. It seems clear to me that this use of force is authorized under AS 11.81.430(a)(1). Therefore, the Joneses should not be subject to someone else’s decision whether their actions were “reasonably necessary to promote the welfare of the [children].”
I can certainly disagree with Joneses’ actions in this case. At present, however, no statute makes their behavior illegal. I do not think that we should imply that their behavior might be made illegal because their actions might be construed as not “reasonably necessary to promote the welfare of the [children].” Parents must be given a great deal of deference in deciding *834what is best for their children, and statutes which might interfere with the parent-child relationship must be strictly construed. I do not think that the majority opinion makes this sufficiently clear.