The rulings here made are confined to the issues now existing between the parties to this proceeding. These parties as well as those holding similar deeds may from time to time have other controversies on facts and law, but until such contingency actually arises, no anticipatory decision will be made. Wright v. Heffernan, 205 Ga. 75 (52 S. E. 2d, 289); Darnell v. Tate, 206 Ga. 576 (58 S. E. 2d, 160).
When parties have reduced their contracts to writing, ordinarily the rights and duties of the parties must be found in the written instrument. This rule of law is so well settled that citation of authority is unnecessary. It would serve no useful purpose to here set forth the contents of the lengthy record in this case. Suffice it to say, there is nothing in the record to remove this case from the general rule of law above stated.
The first paragraph of the decree would seem to give to the defendants in error the perpetual right to' plant and cultivate shrubbery on their lots. The deed is not subject to this construction. The right to do so is stated in the deed, but the further condition appears therein that the plaintiff in error “shall have the right to enter the said lot and remove the said trees and shrubs or such parts thereof as they shall determine to be detrimental, unsightly or inconvenient.” And the deed expressly provides, “no workmen other than employees of the cemetery shall be admitted into the cemetery except for the purpose of setting stonework.” For the reasons above stated, paragraph two of the decree was not authorized.
The third paragraph of the decree attempts to add a completely new condition to the deed. The words “water faucets” nowhere appear in the contract between the parties, the deed, and the court was simply not authorized to write into the deed an entirely new condition.
The fourth paragraph of the decree violates the terms of the deed. The deed provides that grave markers “must not exceed *128six inches in height above the surface of the ground.” This language provides a maximum height, but no minimum is provided. If the management of the cemetery determines in good faith that the appearance of the cemetery will be improved by lowering all grave markers flush with the ground, they have that right.
The dances referred to in paragraph five of the decree were not public dances. The plaintiff in error disclaims any intention or desire to hold public dances on the cemetery property. It appears that on two occasions when employees of the cemetery held a banquet in the administration building located on the cemetery property, and on one occasion when florists of the City of Atlanta held a banquet at the same place, at the conclusion of the banquet there was some dancing by some of the guests. This occurred in a room in the administration building that had no windows and could not have been seen from the outside. We see no reason for an injunction against occurrences of this kind.
Paragraph six of the decree requires the plaintiff in error to maintain the cemetery in the exact condition as when the lots of the defendants in error were purchased, and further requires that, if the income from the trust fund provided under the terms of the deed is not sufficient to do so, the plaintiff in error shall “contribute to said trust fund a sum, the income from which will be sufficient to cover the cost of said care.” This requirement simply adds a provision to the contract between the parties, and this the courts are not authorized to do.
It is insisted that “perpetual maintenance” means that the plaintiff in error is under the duty to maintain the cemetery as insisted upon by the defendants in error, regardless of the cost. With this we can not agree. In the deed and in all the advertising matter introduced in evidence, when the language “perpetual maintenance” was used, it was expressly pointed out that this maintenance should be from the trust fund provided for under the terms of the contract between the parties.
The general effect of the decree in this case is to place upon the plaintiff in error a much larger obligation than the contract between the parties provides for, and very largely to strip the management of the cemetery of any discretion in its manage*129ment and operation. Courts, of course, can not place upon either party to a contract greater obligations than the contract itself does. In the very nature of things, the management of a cemetery must be allowed some discretion in its operation, and so long as this discretion is exercised in good faith, and does not violate any of the terms of the contract between the parties, courts have no right or authority to interfere. It follows from what has been said above, the decree in this case was error, and the injunction should not have been granted.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, P.J., and Head, J., who dissent.