(concurring):
I agree that requiring an individual charged with driving while intoxicated to submit to a breath test does not violate article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. I also, agree with Justice Howe that we should not reach out unnecessarily to overrule Hansen v. Owens, Utah, 619 P.2d 315 (1980). However, I conclude that as a practical matter, requiring a driver to submit to a breathalyzer under threat of losing his license for a year certainly amounts to using compulsion to secure the test, whatever the legislative rubric used to justify the compulsion.1 Having decided that the test was compelled, we must inevitably rule upon the continued vitality of Hansen because we must then determine whether defendant has been “compelled to give evidence against himself” in violation of his article I, section 12 right.
In my view, Hansen would require a ruling that the breathalyzer test results were unconstitutionally obtained. Upon examination, I find that the interpretation given article I, section 12 in Hansen is inconsistent with the historical meaning of the words used in our constitutional provision and that the affirmative act standard adopted by Hansen does not provide a practical framework for administering our privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, I reluctantly agree that Hansen must be overruled. Our privilege is testimonial only.
Although I find article I, section 12 to be inapplicable, the legality of compelling an individual to submit to tests or procedures that require a trespass upon or an invasion of the person, such as breath tests, blood tests, urine tests, fingernail scrapings, and hair samples, should be analyzed under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, which protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294-96, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2003-04, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973); People v. Butor, N.Y., 75 Misc.2d 558, 348 N.Y.S.2d 89, 94 (1973); McClain v. State, Ind., 410 N.E.2d 1297, 1300-01 (1980); cf. State v. Easthope, Utah, 668 P.2d 528, 531-32 (1983). However, because defend*1078ant did not raise this point, I do not address it here. Nor do I suggest that such an analysis would necessarily produce a different result.
. Our candid recognition of the practical choices that confront a driver who is asked to take the test in no way impugns the validity of the implied consent statute, which requires the driver to take such a test. U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1982 ed.).