dissenting: I disagree with the majority. This issue pertains to procedural, not substantive, rights and thus should not be construed so strictly. I agree with the Court of Appeals that the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile offender proceedings brings this type action under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-460(dd).
There is nothing in the statute which indicates any exception was to be made for juveniles who abuse children. The majority states “the effect of the construction given K.S.A. 60-460(dd) by the Court of Appeals would be to make admissible the hearsay *460statements of one child against another.” This is correct. There is no difference between allowing hearsay statements of a child against an adult as opposed to a child against a child. The testimony by the accuser is no more unreliable by having the accused be a child, rather than an adult. The intent of the legislature in passing K.S.A. 60-460(dd) was to assist in the prosecution of abuse cases. The majority’s decision totally disregards this.
Finally, K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 38-1653 of the juvenile Offenders Code specifically states in actions under the code, “the rules .of evidence of the code of civil procedure shall apply.” Clearly, the hearsay exception in issue here is part of the rules of evidence which are to be applied in actions under the Juvenile Offenders Code.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals and the district court.