dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion in this case and would affirm the excellent opinion and correct judgment of the Court, of Appeals. The whole case is put into proper perspective by focusing on the question asked of the judge by the foreman of the jury: "Does the state have to prove mental competence at the time of the offense... or. does the defense have to prove he is mentally incompetent?”
The effect of the answer supplied by the majority opinion to this question is that the presumption of sanity can be relied upon by the state all the way to conviction unless the defendant proves he is insane. This places the burden of proof squarely on the defendant and destroys the constitutional obligation of the state to prove criminal intent, an essential element of the crime.
The majority says that "sanity has not been treated as a critical essential element of the offense...” I agree the majority has not treated it as such. However, I still await some persuasive logic and reasoning supporting the majority’s conclusion that criminal intent and insanity (inability to know right from wrong) can simultaneously occupy the same human mind.
I dissent. See Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 119 (200 SE2d 248), and Grace v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 669, 682 (217 SE2d 267) (1975).
I am authorized to state that Justice Gunter joins in this dissent.