dissenting.
The plaintiff, twenty-years-old at the time of this accident, was serving as acting manager of the Beta house, in front of which the trampoline in question was located. He had been using trampolines since his junior year in high school, and continued to do so while he was enrolled at West Point. There he used the trampoline about every other day over a two month period and learned to execute the 1¾ front flip maneuver which led to his injuries.
The plaintiff started using the Beta trampoline in September 1977, and continued to use it throughout the fall, winter, and spring prior to June 19, 1978, the date of the accident. He testified that he jumped on the trampoline almost daily, that he used it more than anyone else at the fraternity house and that he had successfully executed the 1¾ front flip on 75 to 100 prior occasions.
Commencing in the evening before the accident and continuing until 2:00 a.m., the day of the accident, the plaintiff had been drinking beer, vodka, and scotch. He then slept until 2:00 p.m. that afternoon, jumped on the trampoline between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m., and again at 7:00 p.m. A party was in progress at the Beta house that evening. The plaintiff testified that he resumed jumping on the trampoline at 10:00 p.m. in the dark, and was injured when he failed properly to execute the 1¾ front flip. There is no indication that any defect in the trampoline itself caused the injury.
In Burchinal v. Gregory, 41 Colo. 490, 586 P.2d 1012 (1978), this court affirmed the entry of a summary judgment in favor of the owners of a trampoline in a suit brought on behalf of a fifteen-year-old boy who was jumping on the trampoline in the company of the defendants’ son. There we held that there was no duty to warn the plaintiff of dangers he already understood and appreciated. Citing Bookout v. Victor Comptometer Corp., 40 Colo.App. 417, 576 P.2d 197 (1978), we stated that: “[Wjhere the potential for danger is readily apparent, a warning of the obvious is not necessary.” Even more than in Burchinal, the plaintiff here was experienced in the use of trampolines. Consistent with Burchinal, it should be held as a matter of law that the university could not be liable for failure to warn of the obvious.
Nor should the university be charged with regulating or prohibiting every dangerous activity occurring on its campus. The result reached by the majority is to-make the university an insurer against every accident involving the trampoline that might occur. See Hennesy v. Tina Marie Homes, Inc., 153 Colo. 572, 388 P.2d 758 (1963); Burchinal v. Gregory, supra.
Moreover, even if the university owed a duty to the plaintiff, I would hold that on these facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was not at least as negligent as the defendant. Thus, the verdict should not stand. See Britton v. Hoyt, 63 Wisc.2d 688, 218 N.W.2d 274 (1974); Robertson v. Johnson, 291 Minn. 154, 190 N.W.2d 486 (1971).
For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would hold that the trial court erred in not entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the university.