dissenting, with whom BROWN, Justice, joins.
I agree with the general law set forth in the majority opinion, but I do not believe that we have sufficient facts before us upon which to apply such law. Accordingly, the opinion in this case is an advisory one and, thus, is improper. The matter should be remanded to the district court for the purpose of an evidentiary hearing to establish the facts, if such exist, upon which a determination of a constitutional question will be dispositive.
Rule 52(c), W.R.C.P., provides:
“In all cases in which a district court reserves an important and difficult constitutional question arising in an action *363or proceeding pending before it, the district court, before sending the question to the Supreme Court for decision, shall (1) dispose of all necessary and controlling questions of fact and make special findings of fact thereon, and (2) state its conclusions of law on all points of common law and of construction, interpretation and meaning of statutes and of all instruments necessary for a complete decision of the case. No constitutional question shall be deemed to arise in an action unless, after all necessary special findings of fact and conclusions of law have been made by the district court, a decision on the constitutional question is necessary to the rendition of final judgment. The question reserved shall be specific, and shall identify the constitutional provision to be interpreted. The special findings of fact and conclusions of law required by this subdivision of this rule shall be deemed to be a final order from which either party may appeal, and such appeal may be considered by the Supreme Court simultaneously with the reserved question.”
Pursuant to this subsection, the district court must dispose of all necessary and controlling questions of fact and state its conclusions of law on all points of construction, interpretation and meaning of statutes. Griffith ex rel. Workmen’s Compensation Department v. Stephenson, Wyo., 494 P.2d 546 (1972); Harding v. State, Wyo., 478 P.2d 64 (1970).
The power of the Supreme Court to decide reserved constitutional questions does not authorize the court to render advisory opinions. State v. Rosachi, Wyo., 549 P.2d 318 (1976); Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo., 539 P.2d 361 (1975).
In this case, the certification from the district court contains a section captioned “Statement of Facts,” but it is no more than a recital of the previous procedure in the matter; i.e., plaintiff submitted his application for a guide license to the game warden; it was refused because plaintiff was not a resident of Wyoming as required by statute; the refusal of the game warden was appealed to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; the commission, after consultation with the Attorney General’s office, supported the decision of the game warden; an appeal of the administrative ruling to the district court resulted in af-firmance of the decision of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission; plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action; and the question before us was certified to this court. The trial court did not make any conclusions of law.
The record also contains findings by the trial court which recite:
“THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Stipulation of the parties to reserve a constitutional question to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 52(c) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does find as follows:
“1. The parties have stipulated to all necessary and controlling questions of fact;
“2. The only question of law necessary for a complete decision of the case is the constitutional question being reserved to the Wyoming Supreme Court;
“3. A decision on the constitutional question is necessary to the rendition of final judgment.”
However, the only stipulation in the record reads:
“The parties to this matter hereby stipulate that it is appropriate to reserve the constitutional question presented herein to the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming and, for that reason, that Petitioner’s Motion to that effect should be granted by the Court without further hearing.”
The complaint for the declaratory judgment also makes only a recital of previous procedures taken in the case. Through denials, the answer places in issue the refusal by the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission to accept plaintiff’s request for a guide license. The majority opinion reflects the undecided factual issue.
*364“Powell claims that the statutory scheme which requires a guide to be a resident of Wyoming for not less than one year restricts his fundamental constitutional right to pursue his chosen means of livelihood, establishes a discriminatory scheme which does not bear a close relation to a valid interest of the State, [1]and relies upon a durational residency requirement. Thus, Powell contends that the statute is fatally deficient.
“The State, on the other hand, maintains that ‘guiding’ is not a fundamental right, but is instead merely a recreational privilege and that restricting that privilege to residents is a valid exercise of the State’s police power. The State also urges that because protection of wildlife lies peculiarly within the ambit of the State’s police power, we must give the legislature great latitude in determining what means are appropriate for wildlife protection.” (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)
The factual condition behind these two contentions has not been resolved.
There is no finding by the trial court that guiding is plaintiff’s “chosen means of livelihood.” Plaintiff’s application for a guide license (attached to the complaint) reflects that he will guide for Bolten Ranch Outfitters and that he has “4 years hunting experience on private ranches in Wyoming, where I will be working.” The obvious fact questions then are whether the “working” is other than “guiding,” and, if not, what the “means of livelihood” is during the time other than that in the short hunting season each year.
Included in the correspondence presented during the review of the administrative action was a letter from plaintiff’s attorney to the senior assistant attorney general in which it was represented that plaintiff was “involved in the ‘blue print’ business” in Idaho Falls, Idaho. It also stated that he
“ * * * spends a considerable amount of his time (upwards of six months each year) in the State of Wyoming actively involved in hunting and fishing activities which he pursues for compensation. * * ”
The question is not whether plaintiff has been violating the law for the past activities pursued for compensation, but whether plaintiff desires the guide license as a means of livelihood. The “business of guiding for any consideration or compensation” as recited in the statute does not mean that one receiving a guide license is using it to provide his livelihood. He may never actually use it, or he may use it primarily as a recreational activity which provides a little “pocket money.” Many people use an avocation as a recreational activity. If plaintiff is doing so here, he is not concerned with a fundamental right and lacks the required standing to test the constitutionality of the statute. We should have the facts in this respect before addressing the issue certified to us. Perhaps such facts would make proper the result reached by the majority opinion. Justice White wrote in an opinion concurring in the result in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 1281, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985):
“Respondent Piper lives only 400 yards from the New Hampshire border. She has passed the New Hampshire bar and intends to practice law in New Hampshire. Indeed, insofar as this record reveals, the only law office she will maintain is in New Hampshire. But because she will commute from Vermont rather than reside in New Hampshire, she will not be allowed to practice in the latter state.
“I have no doubt that the New Hampshire residency requirement is invalid as applied to respondent Piper. Except for the fact that she will commute from Vermont, she would be indistinguishable from other New Hampshire lawyers. There is every reason to believe that she will be as able as other New Hampshire lawyers to maintain professional competence, to stay abreast of local rules and procedures, to be available for sudden hearings, and to satisfy any require*365ments of a member of the New Hampshire bar to perform pro bono and volunteer work. It does not appear that her nonresidency presents a special threat to any of the state’s interests that is not shared by lawyers living in New Hampshire. Hence, I conclude that the Privileges and Immunities Clause forbids her exclusion from the New Hampshire bar. “The foregoing is enough to dispose of this case. I do not, and the Court itself need not, reach out to decide the facial validity of the New Hampshire residency requirement. I would postpone to another day such questions as whether a state may constitutionally condition membership in the New Hampshire bar upon maintaining an office for the practice of law in the state of New Hampshire.
“I concur in the judgment invalidating the New Hampshire residency requirement as applied to respondent Piper.” (Emphasis added.)
We do not pass on constitutional questions until matters of fact or of statutory construction which may dispose of the case have been decided by the trial court. Boode v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, Wyo., 458 P.2d 653 (1969); McFarland v. City of Cheyenne, 48 Wyo. 86, 42 P.2d 413 (1935); In re Gillette Daily Journal, 44 Wyo. 226, 11 P.2d 265 (1932), as supplemented by 45 Wyo. 173, 17 P.2d 665 (1933).
Finally, I direct attention to the nature of this action, which is one for a declaratory judgment. This fact does not circumvent the proscription against advisory opinions or the requirement of justiciable controversy. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 624 P.2d 240 (1981); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, Wyo., 577 P.2d 1386 (1978); Police Protective Association of Casper v. City of Cas-per, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1146 (1978).
I would return this case to the district court for reception of evidence and findings thereon relative to the need on the part of plaintiff tor a guide license to enable him to exercise his fundamental right to earn a livelihood rather than a desire on his part to use it primarily to further his recreational activity. I would refuse to answer the certified question in a vacuum. After the facts have been determined by the trial court, the question can properly be certified.
. The majority opinion refers to defendants as the "State.”