concurring in part, dissenting in part and specially concurring.
It is obvious from the facts of this case that the defendant has been acquitted. Hence, jeopardy has attached. I agree with the dissenting opinions of Justices Huntley and Bistline on the issue of double jeopardy. In fact, the majority opinion of Justice Bakes agrees that jeopardy has indeed attached, but has remanded for the district court to come to that inescapable conclusion.
It is also clear that this is an appeal from an acquittal and not, as Justice Bakes suggests, an appeal from an order “granting a motion to suppress.” The state’s own argument and its Notice of Appeal indicate the state concedes its appeal is from an acquittal. The evidentiary ruling in this case led to the acquittal but “[t]hat judgment of acquittal, however erroneous, bars further prosecution on any aspect of the count and hence bars appellate review of the trial court’s error.” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2181, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). There are no grounds for appellate review of this criminal proceeding under I.A.R. 11(c).
However, under the Idaho Constitution, this Court has been granted special plenary powers to address issues of compelling importance to the administration of justice. ID. CONST. art. 5 § 9. In State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 642 P.2d 61 (1982), we stated with respect to such power, which is of necessity only sparingly invoked, that the case must “present a recurring question, the resolution of which would be of substantial importance in the administration of justice in this state.” Id. *889at 825, 642 P.2d at 62; see also State v. Lewis, 96 Idaho 743, 536 P.2d 738 (1975); State v. Tinno, 94 Idaho 759, 497 P.2d 1386 (1972). The present case, as the majority opinion suggests, raises an important issue with respect to the enforcement of I.C.R. 12; an issue capable of frequent recurrence at the trial level. As the majority opinion indicates, this rule was promulgated for a purpose and cannot be ignored by trial counsel for no reason at all.
It is clear from the record, and as illustrated by all the opinions in this case, there was a disturbingly substantial amount of error and parochial behavior on the part of defense counsel, and the prosecutor, which led the district judge to err. Such error cannot be lightly ignored by this Court. Fortunately for the defendant, she is spared the consequences of this error. Instead, the fair and orderly administration of justice in this state has been demeaned. It is a desire to promote and to preserve those principles of judicial administration that has prompted my fellow justices to speak today.
I, therefore, concur in the advisory majority opinion of Justice Bakes with respect to the enforcement of I.C.R. 12 and concur in the opinions of Justices Huntley and Bistline with respect to the application of double jeopardy.