concurring.
I agree that the Industrial Commission’s award and opinion must be reversed, but write separately because I would do so on different grounds.
As the majority notes, the two issues this appeal brought before us were (1) whether the Commission erred by emailing its opinion and award to plaintiffs attorney’s employee, rather than emailing it directly to plaintiff’s attorney or using some alternative reliable means of notification, and (2) whether the Commission erred in denying plaintiff’s motions for appropriate relief and reconsideration due to excusable neglect. The majority reverses this case on the basis of the second issue; I would not reach the second, but rather reverse on the basis that email was not a valid form of communicating the Industrial Commission’s ruling.
As the majority states, the Industrial Commission does have “the power to make rules consistent with the Workers’ Compensation Act in order to carry out the Act’s provisions.” Jackson v. Flambeau Airmold Corp., 165 N.C. App. 875, 878, 599 S.E.2d 919, 921 (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-80(a) (2007) (“[t]he Commission may make rules, not inconsistent with this Article, for carrying out the provisions of *733this Article”). Rule 803 of the Workers’ Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Industrial Commission governs the procedure for any such new rule making:
Prior to adopting, deleting, or amending any Workers’ Compensation Rule of the Industrial Commission which affects the substantive rights of parties, the Industrial Commission will give at least SO days’ notice of the proposed change in rules. Such notice will be given by publishing, in a newspaper or newspapers of general circulation in North Carolina, notice of such proposed change. Such notice will include an invitation to any interested party to submit in writing any objection, suggestion or other comment with respect to the proposed rule change or to appear before the Full Commission at a time and place designated in the notice for the purpose of being heard with respect to the proposed rule change.
Workers’ Comp. R. of N.C. Indus. Comm’n 803, 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 1063, 1092 (emphasis added). There is no question that such a process did not occur in this case. No formal rule was promulgated authorizing this previously unused method of communication; rather, this new method was employed with no prior notice to anyone, including the parties to whom it was sent. As such, no valid rule authorizing the use of email as a method of communication exists, and thus the Commission’s authority to create such rules is irrelevant.
It is worth noting too that, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86 (2007), which governs appeals from the Full Commission to this Court, allows thirty days from notice of the award and specifies that such notice must be “sent by registered mail or certified mail[.]” In contrast, per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-85 (2007), any appeal from the opinion and award of a deputy commissioner — as in this case — must be taken within fifteen days of the notice of the award. With the turnaround time between receipt and appeal halved, surely it is doubly important that the opinion and award from a deputy commissioner be communicated to the parties in the most reliable manner possible. The sudden use of a new method of communication — particularly one in which, as evidenced by this case, messages can so easily go astray — does not fit that description.
The majority states that, if emailing such opinions has become standard practice, “we strongly encourage the Commission to establish rules for the use of email[.]” Until such a rule is promulgated, however, the Full Commission may not simply select any method of *734communication available and use it to convey the time-sensitive information contained in its opinion and award.
Thus, I would reverse this case based on the fact that the Industrial Commission has not promulgated a rule authorizing the use of email as a method of notifying parties of opinions and awards; I would therefore not reach the issue of excusable neglect.