dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent. The majority holds that “where an insured dies as the result of an intentional or expected act or event, but did not intend or expect death to result, the death is ‘accidental’ within the contemplation of that term, as utilized in a policy such as the one before us. [Citations omitted.]”
The double indemnity section of the policy applies if the death of the insured “resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means as evidenced by a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body. . . .” The policy does not cover or insure against “death resulting directly or indirectly from (1) suicide or intentional self-inflicted injury of any kind, whether the insured be sane or insane; ... (3) bodily or mental infirmity or illness or disease of any kind. . . .”
Respondent argues that death in the instant case did not occur through accidental means as required by the policy to trigger the double coverage. Appellant contends that Marc Catania did not intend to take his life, that death was an unexpected result of his self-ingestion of heroin and that no distinction should be made between “accidental means” and “accidental result.”
In Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 260 A.2d 338 (Md.App. 1970), involving a self-administered injection of heroin, the court held that the double indemnity clause for death resulting from violent, external, and accidental means excluded from coverage a situation where an individual dies as a result of a self-administered dose of heroin — an intentional illegal act involving serious foreseeable risk. On the basis of this record and in view of the fact that mere possession of heroin is a felony in this state (NRS 453.336), I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that no excess liability exists in this case. Here, it is undisputed that the decedent had been using *537various illegal drugs, including heroin, for a period of approximately three years preceding his death. His girlfriend stated that Marc enjoyed getting “high, whether on liquor, pills, or heroin, whatever it was.” Marc had passed out on numerous previous occasions, and rather recently had been hospitalized as a result of an overdose of heroin. During the last three weeks of his life, he had developed a ready supply of heroin, ingesting a quantity two to three times a day. On the date of his death, Thanksgiving Day, 1975, prior to dinner, Marc ingested heroin, various other controlled substances, including tuinol and quaaludes, and had been drinking alcohol. After dinner, Marc and several of his acquaintances, ingested more heroin, with Marc self-administering what he was warned and should have known was unquestionably an excessive quantity. Dr. Sheldon Green, a nationally board certified pathologist, determined the cause of death was acute narcotism, fatal reaction in an addict.
On this record, the decedent’s self-ingestion of drugs was tantamount to a suicide, and plainly was not within the reasonable expectations of the insured for coverage. See Whiteside v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 503 P.2d 1107 (Wash.App. 1972). With this intentional unlawful act, involving the well-known poisonous nature of heroin and devastating foreseeable danger, coupled with the overwhelming evidence that this is not the type of risk against which this accidental death provision provides coverage, neither public policy or this Court should reward such a flagrant violation of prevailing moral standards or criminal statutes. See General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Lankford, 249 P.2d 91 (Okla. 1952).
The majority improvidently establishes a dichotomy between “accidental means” and “accidental results.” Here there is no ambiguity in the policy. Compare, Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 93 Nev. 463, 567 P.2d 471 (1977); United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Dokter, 86 Nev. 917, 478 P.2d 583 (1970). The insurer, having used the terms “accidental means,” is entitled to rely on the policy provision excluding double indemnity benefits for death resulting from self-inflicted injury. Moreover, where as here, there is no accident in the means, there can be none in the result. See Murphy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1942); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Green, 46 P.2d 372 (Okla. 1935). Again, the lethal dosage was well in excess of the amount Marc was in the habit of ingesting, was not inadvertently introduced into his body, cf. Dezell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 75 S.W. 1102 (Mo. 1903), nor is there any “indication that some unforeseen-or unintended condition or combination of circumstances, external to the state of the victim’s body, contributed to the accidental result.” Landress v. *538Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 496-497 (1934). In any event, it is evident that the means used was not accidental, and “it is not enough that the result may be unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen.” Jackson v. National Life and Accidental Insurance Co., 202 S.E.2d 711 (Ga.App. 1973). In the context of this case, I would hold that as a matter of law, a distinction does exist between “accidental means” and “accidental results.” Since death was not caused by accidental means, I would affirm the summary judgment.