(dissenting) — While I have no quarrel with the majority's conclusion that it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude opinion evidence on the fallibility of eyewitness identification or its treatment of the severance issue, I would have reversed on all counts because an essential element of the offense of robbery was not included in the charging document. It makes little sense to acknowledge that absence of a statutory element of the offense in the charging document requires dismissal of charges but that elimination of an essential element as determined by the common law does not. My view of this issue has been adequately expressed in my dissent in State v. Strong, 56 Wn. App. 715, 720, 785 P.2d 464, review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1022 (1990), and need not be repeated here.
Reconsideration denied October 25, 1990.
Review by Supreme Court pending March 15,1991.