dissenting.
I regret that I must dissent. I believe that even though parole has traditionally been an executive function, no constitutional doctrine prohibits the courts from exercising this responsibility. Indeed, parole, being quasi-judicial in nature, could be as much of a judicial function as probation is today. I find nothing in our constitution to prevent the legislature from conferring this responsibility upon the judiciary.
*4941. Does the Judiciary Have Statutory Authority to Grant Parole?
Statutes are presumed constitutional and the burden of proof is on the opponent of the statute to show it infringes upon a constitutional guarantee or violates a constitutional principle. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 580, 570 P.2d 744, 748 (1977); New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 370, 519 P.2d 169, 172 (1974). Courts should strive to uphold legislation whenever possible, but should not legislate a particular result by judicial construction. Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. 6, 9, 588 P.2d 299, 302 (1978). This court will not render a statute unconstitutional unless we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation is in conflict with the federal or state constitutions. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 438, 641 P.2d 1275, 1282 (1982).
The Arizona Constitution is silent as to the power of courts to impose parole. In fact, our constitution does not address parole at all, nor does it prohibit the legislature from conferring upon the courts the power to place a defendant on parole.
The majority concludes, however, that the statute violates the separation of powers provision of the Arizona Constitution which reads:
The powers of the government of the State of Arizona shall be divided into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and, except as provided in this Constitution, such departments shall be separate and distinct, and no one of such departments shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.
Ariz. Const, art 3. The majority’s reasons are twofold: 1) parole decisions have traditionally been a function of the executive branch, not the judiciary; and 2) the judiciary is unsuitable for parole related tasks.
By statute, the power to recommend parole is vested exclusively in the Board of Pardons and Paroles (Board), an executive branch agency:
The board of pardons and paroles shall have exclusive power to pass upon and recommend reprieves, commutations, paroles and pardons.
A.R.S. § 31-402(A). In addition, it is within the Board’s sole discretion to determine whether or not to release a prisoner who is parole eligible. A.R.S. § 31-412(A); Stewart v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 156 Ariz. 538, 540, 753 P.2d 1194, 1196 (App.1988) (“The legislature intended to give the Board ‘sole discretion’ to determine whether to grant or deny parole.”). Thus, the Board’s exclusive domain includes both the initial imposition of parole eligibility and the actual release of a prisoner onto parole.
I believe, however, that it is within the legislative domain to assign the power to impose parole. State v. Molina, 118 Ariz. 250, 251, 575 P.2d 1276, 1277 (App.1978). Under A.R.S. § 13-703(A), the legislature has granted the courts the power to sentence a defendant to a term of years without possibility of parole, mandating a twenty-five year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of first-degree murder when life imprisonment or death is imposed. A.R.S. § 13-703(A); see also State v. Williams, 115 Ariz. 288, 289, 564 P.2d 1255, 1256 (App.1977) (mandatory minimum prison sentences are valid and “an inherent part of [the legislature’s] power to prescribe punishment for the acts which it has prohibited as criminal”). There is little doubt that the legislature can require that the judiciary impose a mandatory prison term without the possibility of parole for 25 years. I believe that the legislature also may require the judiciary to impose lifetime parole as part of the original sentence. I see no reason why the legislature should be prohibited from requiring the courts to impose lifetime parole, when it can require the courts to sentence a defendant without possibility of parole.
The majority agrees that A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) mandates courts to impose lifetime parole as part of the defendant’s sentence, and does.not give the judiciary power to grant parole. The majority says that although this does not render the statute unconstitutional, it violates separation of powers because the judiciary is unsuitable for parole tasks and traditionally has *495not exercised parole functions. I disagree. The legislature may determine the penalties for crimes, and has done so here by mandating courts to impose parole as part of the sentence.
Support for this position may be found in federal law under the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Act) which provides for a “special parole term” to be imposed after a defendant has served his entire initial sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c). The Act authorizes the district judge to impose a “special parole term” in addition to defendant’s ordinary parole. Although a split of authority exists, the majority of federal courts considering the constitutionality of a judicially imposed “special parole term” have found no separation of powers impediment to such a provision. United States v. Arellanes, 767 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.1985) (special parole term offends no constitutional guarantee); Yates v. United States, 753 F.2d 70, 71 (8th Cir.1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1022, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985); United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Walden, 578 F.2d 966, 972 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Jones, 540 F.2d 465, 468-69 (10th Cir.1976) (special parole provisions of federal narcotics statute are not unconstitutionally vague, nor invalid delegation of legislative power to the judiciary), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977). These courts uphold “special parole” on the theory that it is a statutory exception to so-called ordinary parole. But cf. United States v. Tebha, 578 F.Supp. 1398 (N.D.Cal.1984) (special parole term violates due process because it fails to give the parolee notice of the sanction imposed for parole violations and it violates the principle of separation of powers because a judge is given unrestricted power to determine the sanction for a parole violation).
I agree with the federal majority view on the constitutionality of a court imposed special parole term and believe that the lifetime parole provision of A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) offends no United States or Arizona constitutional provision.
2. Is There Power to Punish?
The majority concludes that A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it contains no specified penalty for violation of lifetime parole. Because a first-degree offender must serve his entire prison sentence before he may be paroled, there presumably is no way to punish him as there will be no unexpired portion of the sentence to use for reimprisonment for parole violations. Wagstaff, 161 Ariz. 66 at 70, 775 P.2d 1130 at 1134 (App.1988). I disagree. I believe that the enhancement statute, A.R.S. § 13-604.02 clearly sets out the punishment for defendants on parole, whether it be ordinary or lifetime parole. This statute provides enhancement for subsequent sentences, mandating harsher punishment for defendants who commit felonies while released on probation, parole, work furlough or any other release or escape from confinement for conviction of a felony offense. The intent of the legislature, therefore, was to require enhanced punishment for defendants who commit felonies while on parole. Because I believe defendants convicted of dangerous crimes against children in the first degree can be placed on lifetime parole, it follows that the enhancement statute applies to them. Admittedly, the statute does not enhance the original sentence if that sentence has been served. However, the statute states that the punishment mandated shall be “consecutive” to any other sentence from which a convict was released. In other words, if the original sentence has been served, a repeat offender will receive a sentence separate and distinct from his original sentence. The enhancement statute would not apply to a non-criminal violation of a condition of defendant’s parole, although, as the state suggests, a defendant might be held in contempt of court for such violations. This question need not be decided at this time because I believe that most violations will be criminal in nature and subject to enhancement as noted above.
3. Does the Statute Conflict with Other Statutes?
I also believe the legislature intended to make an exception to the parole board’s ' *496authority by enacting A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1). Admittedly, A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) conflicts with the previously enacted A.R.S. § 31-402(A), which gives the Board of Pardons and Paroles “exclusive power to pass upon and recommend ... paroles and pardons.” However, it appears that the legislature intended to make an exception to the parole board’s exclusive authority. This intent is manifested in the reservation “notwithstanding any other law.” A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1).
As a rule of construction, statutes relating to the same subject matter, or the same general purpose, should be construed together and harmonized where possible. State v. Sweet, 143 Ariz. 266, 270-71, 693 P.2d 921, 925-26 (1985); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.02, at 453 (4th Ed 1984). In accord with this principle is the presumption against the implied repeal of one statute by another. State v. Rice, 110 Ariz. 210, 213, 516 P.2d 1222, 1225 (1973); State ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 224, 227, 485 P.2d 549, 552 (1971).
If, however, two statutes are so in conflict that they cannot stand together or be harmonized, different rules of statutory construction apply. In that situation, the more recent statute controls over the older statute. As noted by Sutherland:
Statutes for the same subject, although in apparent conflict, are construed to be in harmony if reasonably possible. If there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statutes, the new provision will control as it is the later expression of the legislature.
Sutherland, supra, § 51.02, at 453-54. See Lemons v. Superior Court, 141 Ariz. 502, 505, 687 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1984); Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 654 P.2d 281 (1982) (most recent statutory provision held to control over conflicting older provision). I believe A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) prevails over the previous conflicting statute.
I would hold that the lifetime parole provision of A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Courts have the statutory authority to impose lifetime parole on prisoners because the legislature stated in A.R.S. § 13-604.01(1) that court imposed parole is an exception to any other law (“notwithstanding any other law”), and this would include the previously enacted statute A.R.S. § 31-402(A) (exclusive authority over parole shall be vested in the board of pardons and paroles). The sentence of the trial court should be affirmed and the opinion and decision of the court of appeals vacated.
MOELLER, J., concurs.