Michael David Hestley appeals from his judgment of conviction of burglary, theft by taking, and entering an automobile; his co-defendant was acquitted of all charges in the joint trial. Appellant enumerates five errors. Held:
1. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress is without merit. The trial court entered detailed findings of fact and concluded that the initial investigative stop of appellant was lawful, and that a valid consent to search the vehicle was thereafter obtained. In considering the legality of a search, this court can consider all relevant evidence of record, including that adduced at both the trial and at the suppression hearing. Jones v. State, 187 Ga. App. 421, 422-423 (370 SE2d 784). Determinations of credibility and fact made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing are accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous. Baldwin v. State, 263 Ga. 524, 525 (435 SE2d 926). Although the officer who initially detained appellant’s vehicle did not testify, there exists enough *574evidence of record to establish that the findings made by the trial court were not clearly erroneous.
It had been reported to the sheriff’s office that an unidentified white van had been involved in some burglaries; the reporting witnesses believed the van might be a Chevrolet but they were not positive. It was also reported that the van was a panel van that did not have a lot of windows, and that it was not a luxury van. Further, photographs of appellant’s van, introduced in evidence, reveal that it was a white panel van without a lot of windows; the van was a Chevrolet. The detaining officer was aware that a “lookout” had been placed on the white van. On July 10, 1991, the Butts County Road Department had a crew working on county roads; they noticed a white van riding back and forth on Rising Star Church Road and Old Bethel Road. One of the family members of the superintendent of the road department had been the victim of a lawn mower theft and a white van had been seen leaving his residence. The road department crew became suspicious because the van “just kept riding back and forth like it was possibly casing the place out or something of that nature.” A member of the road department called the sheriff’s office and reported their suspicions. This report is tantamount to the report of a concerned citizen. A concerned citizen has always been given a preferred status regarding the testing of the credibility of his reported information. Cichetti v. State, 181 Ga. App. 272, 273 (1) (351 SE2d 707). After receiving this call, the detaining officer and the police chief started a search for the van. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., the detaining officer found and stopped the van at the intersection of Rising Star Church Road and Old Bethel Road. The detaining officer reported by radio to the police chief that he “was making a traffic stop on the white van that [the police] had been getting a lookout on at Rising Star Church Road at its intersection with Old Bethel.”
The evidence of record supports the conclusion of the trial court that reasonable suspicion existed for the stopping of the vehicle. Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319 (443 SE2d 474) clearly is distinguishable. In Vansant, according to the facts relied upon by the majority, the only relevant information known about the van was that it was white and driven by a white male; thereafter, a white van was stopped approximately one mile from the crime scene. In this case, a white panel van that “didn’t have a lot of windows,” and believed to be a Chevrolet, was reported as being involved in prior burglaries. A concerned citizen’s report was received to the effect that a white van was driving suspiciously back and forth on an identified road area as though casing out a residence. Shortly thereafter, appellant’s van, a white panel Chevrolet van, was found in the same general vicinity as that reported telephonically in the concerned citizen’s report. The detaining officer was aware of the lookout on the van and of the concerned citizen’s *575report. Information transmitted by the police to one another, by any acceptable means of communication, can provide sufficient grounds to create an articulable suspicion to justify an automobile stop. Walton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 490, 491 (2) (390 SE2d 896). We conclude there exists sufficient evidence of record to support a finding that the detaining officer had an articulable, reasonable suspicion for the stop (see generally State v. Fowler, 215 Ga. App. 524 (451 SE2d 124)); clearly this stop was neither arbitrary nor harassing. Compare Smith v. State, 182 Ga. App. 58 (354 SE2d 681) (physical precedent only) where the degree of suspicion was far less than shown in the case at bar.
Regarding appellant’s subsequent consent to search, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing mere submission to authority. Garcia v. State, 195 Ga. App. 635, 636 (1) (394 SE2d 542). Inherent in the trial court’s findings supporting denial of the suppression motion is the finding that appellant’s consent to search was made voluntarily. Id. at 637 (1). Voluntariness of consent must be determined from all the circumstances, and where a valid consent to search exists, the need either for probable cause or a search warrant is eliminated. Id. Appellant’s contention that consent was tainted by an illegal stop is without merit. As the initial stop was lawful, his subsequent consent was not tainted by any form of illegal arrest. Compare Mallarino v. State, 190 Ga. App. 398, 402 (2) (379 SE2d 210). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and that the resulting search and seizure were lawful.
2. Appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, testimony of a sheriffs department’s burglary investigator, as to whether, based on his training and experience, items are sometimes sold when they are stolen and whether the crime lab would process fingerprints taken from a burglary crime scene.
As to the first question, the sole ground for objection at trial was that the answer called for a conclusion of the witness. Examining the content of the witness’ testimony in its entirety, it appears that the trial court tacitly accepted the witness as a qualified expert in the field of burglary investigation. The witness expressed his conclusion, as to whether stolen property is sometimes sold, based on his knowledge and experience. “The opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.” OCGA § 24-9-67; see generally Loper v. Drury, 211 Ga. App. 478, 481 (1) (b) (440 SE2d 32). The trial court did not err in overruling the objection on the limited grounds appellant asserted at trial. Further, as a general rule, an objection on a specific ground at trial *576waives, on appeal, any objection to that evidence on other grounds. Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 334 (2) (398 SE2d 395). Assuming arguendo, the investigator merely was testifying as a lay witness, he still could express his opinion so long as he testified to sufficient facts to form the basis thereof. O’Kelley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 503 (3) (333 SE2d 838). The record adequately reflects that the investigator’s opinion was based on his personal observations during burglary investigations and by reasons of his training and experience. Norman, supra.
As to the second question, the sole ground for objection asserted at trial was lack of relevancy. Accordingly, on appeal, all other grounds are waived. “Admissibility of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the discretion of the trial court.” Norman v. State, supra at 336 (4). “ ‘Unless the potential for prejudice in the admission of evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, the Georgia rule favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value. Evidence of doubtful relevancy or competency should be admitted and its weight left to the jurors. Where evidence is offered and objected to, if it is competent for any purpose, it is not erroneous to admit it.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.)” Id. In the absence of abuse of discretion, we will not reverse when a trial court overrules a relevancy objection and allows the admission of evidence. Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in this instance.
Assuming arguendo the trial court had erred in overruling both of appellant’s specific objections, we are satisfied that any such errors would have been harmless under the “high probability” test of Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 SE2d 869).
3. In his third enumeration of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the burglary investigator to testify on rebuttal over appellant’s objection thereto. Appellant, by way of his appellate brief and enumeration of error, cites this court to pages 79 and 80 of the trial transcript. The trial transcript at those pages shows that two objections were posed by the prosecuting attorney as to questions asked by appellant’s attorney and that the trial court sustained both objections. Whether the trial court erred in sustaining those objections is beyond the scope of appellant’s enumeration of error and fails to preserve these particular issues for appellate review. See Krebsbach v. State, 209 Ga. App. 474, 475 (2) (433 SE2d 649).
Appellant contends that rebuttal testimony is only appropriate to refute or explain testimony introduced by the defendant. Assuming arguendo that the admitted testimony constituted new evidence, nevertheless, “ ‘[r]eopening evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed when no abuse of discretion is shown.’ ” Brown v. State, 210 Ga. App. 59, 60 (2) (435 SE2d 274); *577accord Sharp v. State, 203 Ga. App. 475, 476 (2) (416 SE2d 901).
Appellant now asserts that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous in light of Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733 (209 SE2d 18), which in essence held an accused cannot be deemed to have waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination merely because he testified at a suppression hearing in an attempt to protect his Fourth Amendment rights, and thus concluded “ ‘that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.’ ” Id. at 734 (3). When the witness was called in rebuttal, appellant’s counsel initially stated: “Now, Your Honor, I object to this line of questioning. That motion has been determined by this court. It was not the subject of the defense that we put forth, and I don’t think it’s proper for the rebuttal to be — to embrace an area that we haven’t covered yet.” This colloquy is tantamount either to a general objection or to an objection that the proposed testimony was beyond the scope of legitimate rebuttal; under either interpretation, it did not constitute a specific objection to the infringement of appellant’s self-incrimination privilege and therefore did not preserve a Fifth Amendment appellate issue, based on our holding in Culpepper, supra. See Norman, supra at 334 (2). There being no constitutional issue raised below and ruled upon, such issue therefore is not preserved on appeal. Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 54 (2) (b) (389 SE2d 320); Whatley v. State, 196 Ga. App. 73, 75 (1) (395 SE2d 582). Appellant’s second objection merely was based on a claim that the testimony did not constitute a prior consistent statement made by appellant; it likewise failed to raise adequately and preserve for appellate review a claim of a violation of appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Meders, supra; Whatley, supra. Appellant’s third enumeration, as crafted, is without merit.
4. Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in its charge to the jury by stating that appellant had the burden to explain his possession of recently stolen property is without merit. The trial court charged that a finding of recent possession of stolen property by appellant “places upon him the duty of going forward with evidence to explain his possession, keeping in mind that the burden of proof never shifts in a criminal case and the ultimate burden of persuading the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt is always upon the State.” The possession of recently stolen goods, unaccounted for, raises an inference that the possessor is the one who stole the goods, and if the accused does not want this inference to arise in his case, he must account for that possession. A defendant may be convicted for theft with neither direct proof nor circumstantial evidence, aside from this inference, that he committed the theft. *578The reasonableness of the explanation is a jury question. Buchannon v. State, 199 Ga. App. 609, 610 (405 SE2d 583). Viewing the charge in its totality, we find no error.
5. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal, which was based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence. The correct standard of review of such a motion is the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560). Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 567 (1) (405 SE2d 716). Review of the transcript in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict reveals ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the offenses of which convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. The trial court did not err as enumerated. Watkins v. State, 212 Ga. App. 296, 298 (4) (441 SE2d 801).
Judgment affirmed.
Beasley, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, Johnson and Smith, JJ., concur. Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ., dissent.