dissenting:
Lawrence Robertson, Sharon Deatherage, Jeffrey Hecht, and David Jewell, d/b/a Scotties Guns and Militaría, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the validity of Denver Ordinance No. 669, codified at section 38-130 of the Denver Revised Municipal Code (ordinance). Subsequently, the attorney general intervened on behalf of the State of Colorado.1 The district court, in determining cross-motions for summary judgment, considered affidavits and other evidence and held the ordinance to be unconstitutional on a number of grounds. As a result of this ruling, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the City and County of Denver appealed.
On appeal, the issue of the validity of the ordinance centers on whether article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the Denver City Council from imposing limitations on the use, manufacture, and possession of the firearms described in the ordinance as assault weapons. I agree with the majority that the General Assembly may regulate the manufacture, possession, and use of firearms that by proper and adequate definition are assault weapons. However, I agree with the attorney general that the City and County of Denver does not have the authority to regulate all firearms identified as assault weapons because the regulation is a matter of statewide concern. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
The right to bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution does not have any bearing or relevancy in resolving the issues before us. The federal law interpreting the Second Amendment is not helpful because the wording of the Federal Constitution differs materially from the wording of the Colorado Constitution. Therefore, federal law on fundamental rights under the United States Constitution does not assist us in our interpretation of the nature of the rights afforded by article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution.
In my view, the appropriate analysis requires a court to determine if a statute or ordinance regulating firearms is a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power or is rationally related to some other governmental interest. In reviewing a statute or ordinance regulating firearms, a court must determine if it prohibits or abrogates legal activity or if it unduly infringes on an individual’s right to bear arms. Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying an analysis based upon federal law relating to fundamental rights and subjecting the ordinance to strict scrutiny review.
A
I agree with the majority that Colorado law is determinative on this issue. In People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 103, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975), we recognized that regulation of firearms involves conflicting rights — the state’s right pursuant to its police power to impose reasonable regulations for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens and the individual’s right to bear arms.
The appropriate inquiry when determining if an ordinance or statute regulating firearms is constitutional is whether the regulation is a “legitimate” exercise of the state’s police power. See People v. Garcia, 197 Colo. 550, 553, 595 P.2d 228, 230 (1979). An act is within the state’s police power if it is reasonably related to public health, welfare, or safety. People v. Pharr, 696 P.2d 235, 237 (Colo.1984). In Pharr, we recognized that when *348fundamental rights or suspect classifications are not involved, a statute will withstand constitutional challenge if it is rationally related to legitimate governmental interest. Id. Thus, the state may place reasonable limits on the right to bear arms granted by the Colorado Constitution. The trial court should have determined if the ordinance is reasonably related to public health, welfare, or safety or is rationally related to some other legitimate governmental interest.
Our prior cases provide substantial guidance in determining whether the ordinance in this ease is a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power. Blue establishes that any regulation of firearms must preserve the constitutional rights afforded by article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution:
To be sure, the state legislature cannot, in the name of the police power, enact laws which render nugatory our Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections.
Blue, 190 Colo, at 103, 544 P.2d at 391.
As a threshold matter, it is clear that the General Assembly does not have the power to disarm the citizenry, or a class of citizens of the State. People v. Nakamura, 99 Colo. 262, 265, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (1936) (“The police power of a state cannot transcend the fundamental law, and cannot be exercised in such a manner as to work a practical abrogation of its provisions.”). In Lakewood v. Pillow, 180 Colo. 20, 23, 501 P.2d 744, 745 (1972), we determined that a municipal ordinance that prohibited possession of a firearm outside of a residence was unconstitutional. We analyzed the ordinance by questioning whether it prohibited legal activity:
An analysis of the foregoing ordinance reveals that it is so general in its scope that it includes within its prohibitions the right to carry on certain businesses and to engage in certain activities which cannot under the police powers be reasonably classified as unlawful and thus, subject to criminal sanctions. As an example, we note that this ordinance would prohibit gunsmiths, pawnbrokers and sporting goods stores from carrying on a substantial part of their business. Also, the ordinance appears to prohibit individuals from transporting guns to and from such places of business. Furthermore, it makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm in a vehicle or in a place of business for the purpose of self-defense.
Id. at 20, 501 P.2d at 745. We have stated that Pillow “involved a broad prohibition [that] unduly infringed on the personal liberty of bearing arms.” Blue, 190 Colo, at 104, 544 P.2d at 391. Blue addressed a statute that limited a felon’s right to possess, use, or carry a firearm. In reviewing the statute, we noted the statute was constitutional in part because it “does not abrogate an ex-felon’s right to legitimately use self-defense.” Id. at 103, 544 P.2d at 391 (emphasis added).
These cases establish that in the context of regulating firearms, “legitimacy” has a specific meaning: firearms regulation is not a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power if it prohibits or abrogates legal activity or unduly infringes on an individual’s right to bear arms. If this narrow definition of legitimacy is not recognized, almost any law regulating firearms could be justified as a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power in protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.
B
Historically, our General Assembly has regulated possession of firearms that are designed to inflict serious bodily injury or death in either warfare or in violation of the criminal laws.2 Section 18-12-102, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1993 Supp.), provides:
Possessing a dangerous or illegal weapon — affirmative defenses.
(1) As used in this section, the term “dangerous weapon” means a firearm silencer, machine gun, short shotgun, short rifle, or ballistic knife.
*349(2) As used in this section, the term “ille-. gal weapon” means a blackjack, gas gun, metallic knuckles, gravity knife, or switchblade knife.
(3) A person who knowingly possesses a dangerous weapon commits a class 5 felony. Each subsequent violation of this subsection (3) by the same person shall be a class 4 felony.
(4) A person who knowingly possesses an illegal weapon commits a class 1 misdemeanor.
(5) It shall be an affirmative defense to the charge of possessing a dangerous weapon, or to the charge of possessing an illegal weapon, that the person so accused was a peace officer or member of the armed forces to the Unites States or Colorado nation guard acting in the lawful discharge of his duties, or that said 'person has a valid permit and license for possession of such weapon.
(Emphasis added.) Section 18-12-101, 8B C.R.S. (1986), defines: “machine gun” as “any firearm, whatever its size and usual designation, that shoots automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger”; “short rifle” as “a rifle having a barrel less than sixteen inches long or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches”; and “short shotgun” as “a shotgun having a barrel or barrels less than eighteen inches long or an overall length of less than twenty-six inches.”
In my view, manufacture, possession, and use of firearms that by proper definition are assault weapons may also be regulated under the state’s police power.3 The General Assembly may regulate assault weapons if the regulation does not prohibit or abrogate legal activity or unduly infringe on an individual’s right to bear arms.
Ill
The majority notes: “This ease presents questions of whether an ordinance banning the manufacture, sale, or possession of ‘assault weapons’ within the City and County of Denver violates article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution....” Maj. op. at 3. Encompassed in this issue is whether the City and County of Denver has the authority to regulate firearms.4 Although the General Assembly has the power to regulate assault weapons, every hamlet and home-rule city does not have the same power. Local governments should not have a separate and different legislative .definition, penalty, and *350proscription against the manufacture, use, and possession of so-called assault weapons. In my view, local regulation of firearms is an undue infringement on the right to bear arms under the Colorado Constitution and is preempted by state law.
The City and County of Denver is a home-rule city created under article XX of the Colorado Constitution. As such, Denver may exercise only those powers granted by the state constitution. Article XX of the Colorado Constitution grants home-rule cites “the full right of self-government in both local and municipal matters.” Colo. Const, art. XX, § 6; see also City & County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist, 696 P.2d 730, 740 (Colo.1985); Four-County Capital Metro. Improvement Dist. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962).
If a matter is of statewide concern, a home-rule municipality is precluded from acting. City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990); see also Colorado River Dist., 696 P.2d at 740 (“In matters of purely statewide concern, and in the absence of a grant to the city of specific power by the constitution or by state statutes, the General Assembly is free to adopt legislation, and the city is without power to act at all.”).
The basis of the prohibition on local action in matters affecting the entire state is that uniformity of regulation is advantageous:
The central inquiry implicit in the concept of pre-emption is whether there should be statewide uniformity in the regulation of specific conduct. If there is no need for statewide uniformity, there is no need for state law to preempt local power to regulate .... This is the core of the preemption question — to consider, on the one hand, the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of a specific type of conduct, and, on the other hand, the need of local governments to be able to respond to local, as distinguished from statewide, problems.
Daniel R. Mandelker & Dawn C. Netsch, State and Local Government in a Federal System 237 (1977); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Local Government Law 120 (1982) (stating that-the critical inquiry in the context of state preemption of local law is: “[I]s this an area where it is desirable to have a single, all-encompassing scheme of regulation, so that local laws — not just local laws that conflict with the state’s, but any local laws — would unduly complicate the picture?”); Charles S. Rhyne, The Law of Local Government Operations § 19.11 (recognizing that preemption rooted in the necessity of statewide uniformity of regulation).
The determination of whether a matter is of statewide concern is not subject to a strict legal standard; instead, we have made such determinations on an ad hoc basis, taking into account the facts of each case. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 673 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo.1983). In City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990), we stated:
Although we have found it useful to employ the “local,” “mixed,” and “state-wide” categories in resolving conflicts between local and state legislation, these legal categories should not be mistaken for mutually exclusive or factually prefect description of the relevant interests of the state and local governments. Those affairs which are municipal, mixed or of statewide concern often imperceptibly merge.
The best determinate of what is a statewide concern is our prior decisions.
We have held that regulation is solely a matter of statewide concern in a broad range of factual circumstances. See City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm’n, 749 P.2d 412 (Colo.1988) (unemployment compensation); Century Elec. Serv. & Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 Colo. 181, 564 P.2d 953 (1977) (licensure of electricians); City & County of Denver v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 181 Colo. 38, 507 P.2d 871 (1973) (rates of privately owned public utilities inside a municipality); City & County of Denver v. Thomas, 176 Colo. 483, 491 P.2d 573 (1971) (workmen’s compensation); Public Utilities Comm’n v. Durango, 171 Colo. 553, 469 P.2d 131 (1970) (rates of municipally-owned public utility outside municipality); Kelly v. City of Fort Collins, 163 Colo. 520, 431 P.2d 785 (1967) (liquor regulation); Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958) (income tax); City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 *351P.2d 614 (1958) (driving under the influence); Ray v. City & County of Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942) (regulation of small loans); Hilts v. Markey, 52 Colo. 382, 122 P. 394 (1912) (powers of county officers).
The regulation of firearms is a subject for state, not local, regulation. See Doe v. City & County of San Francisco, 136 Cal.App.3d 509, 186 Cal.Rptr. 380, 385 (1982) (holding that where state law does not require a permit for a firearm, the state law preempts local ordinance requiring registration of existing handguns and prohibiting new handguns); Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 475 A.2d 257, 261 (1984) (holding that the local ordinance was preempted because, “by placing these restriction on the sale of handguns, the ordinance effectively prohibits what the state statues clearly permit”); Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, 302 Md. 540, 489 A.2d 1114,1114 (1985) (holding that state law preempted a local ordinance that restricted ammunition sales); Duff v. Township of Northampton, 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 277, 532 A.2d 500, 506 (1987) (holding that a state law permitting firearm discharge preempted an ordinance restricting discharge), ajfd, 520 Pa. 79, 550 A.2d 1319 (1988); Schneck v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa.Cmwlth. 96, 383 A.2d 227, 229-30 (1978) (deciding ordinance requiring police permit for firearm purchase was preempted because state law did not require a permit); Cherry v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash.2d 794, 808 P.2d 746, 748 (1991) (recognizing that state legislature intended to preempt city, town and county firearms laws).
A patchwork of conflicting municipal regulations will not serve the interests of the state, and local attempts to regulate firearms, in my opinion, are prohibited by article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution. Owners of firearms who desire to hunt, target shoot, or pursue other lawful recreational activity in different parts of the state could be subject to a wide range of criminal penalties in different cities or towns if the definition of an assault weapon is not uniform and subject to clear definition.
In my view, if preemption is not applied, and every home-rule city or town is permitted to regulate assault weapons, a network of conflicting ordinances will be created that have no uniformity and will invite further litigation on the scope of the right to bear arms. The variation in the definitions, proscriptions, and penalties for the possession, use, or manufacture of assault weapons would be an undue infringement on the rights of the citizens of Colorado and therefore would be an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power.
IV
I agree with the majority that the right to bear arms under article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution is subject to regulation. Although I agree with the general analysis applied by the majority, the majority concludes that if an ordinance regulating firearms is governed by a reasonable state interest, the ordinance is constitutional. • This standard is overly broad and should be limited to preserve the constitutional rights set forth in article II, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution. The validity of a firearms regulation as a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power is determined by whether the regulation prohibits or abrogates legal activity, or unduly infringes on an individual’s right to bear arms. In my view, the trial court erred in applying federal law to conclude that a fundamental right was at issue which required strict scrutiny review. Instead, the trial court should have applied the standards that are derived from our prior cases.
Although I agree with the majority that the state has the authority to regulate firearms that by proper and adequate definition are assault weapons, the City and County of Denver does not have this power. In my view, the ordinance violates article II, section 13, and article XX of the Colorado Constitution. Therefore I would affirm the ruling of the trial court finding the ordinance unconstitutional. Accordingly I dissent.
. For simplicity, the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenor are referred to collectively as “plaintiffs."
. In addition, the General Assembly has passed legislation that: provides affirmative defenses to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon, § 18-12-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986); creates a mechanism for a citizen to obtain a permit to carry a concealed weapon, § 18-12-105.1, 8B C.R.S. (1986); allows a resident to purchase a firearm out of state, § 12-27-102, 5A C.R.S. (1991); and regulates the sale of firearms, §§ 12-26-101 to -104, 5A C.R.S. (1991).
. The General Assembly has specifically addressed the issue of "assault weapons." In the 1989 session, the General Assembly refused to enact legislation criminalizing the possession of assault weapons by law-abiding persons. Hearings on S.B. 248 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 57th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.Sess. (audio tape, April 26, 1989, at 2:39-3:44). The General Assembly has addressed assault weapons by enacting § 16-11-309(8), 8A C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), which provides:
(a) In any case in which the accused is charged with a crime of violence as defined in this section and the indictment or information specifies the use of a "dangerous weapon” as defined in section 18-12-101 and 18-12-102, C.R.S., or the use of a semiautomatic assault weapon as defined in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), upon conviction of said crime of violence, the judge shall impose an additional sentence of five years for use of such weapon. The sentence of five years shall be in addition to the mandatory sentence imposed for the substantive offense and shall be served consecutively to any other sentence and shall not be subject to suspension or probation.
(b) For purposes of this subsection (8), “semiautomatic assault weapon” means any semiautomatic center fire firearm that is equipped with a detachable magazine with a capacity of twenty or more rounds of ammunition.
. Although the issue of preemption is raised in the plaintiffs’ answer brief and was addressed by the district court in its order granting the motion for summaiy judgment, the plaintiffs did not file a cross-appeal. In my view, the issue should be addressed. We have discretionary authority under C.A.R. 1(d) to notice errors not properly preserved or raised, especially when they are of constitutional importance. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 319 n. 10 (Colo.1993) (reviewing First Amendment issue not properly preserved in the trial court); Schuster v. Zwicker, 659 P.2d 687, 690 (Colo.1983) (recognizing discretionary authority to correct a fundamental error); Patterson v. Cronin, 650 P.2d 531, 535 n. 9 (Colo.1982) (noting that the court was not precluded from addressing a due process argument although it was not ruled on by the court below because it was raised in the pleadings); Robinson v. People, 173 Colo. 113, 116, 476 P.2d 262, 263 (1970) (addressing a question not raised in the trial court because the issue was of constitutional proportions).