concurring specially.
I concur because the policymaker, in this case the city through ordinance, has decreed the landlord’s duty to provide a handrail. The obvious purpose is to assure a measure of safety to persons traversing stairs, to prevent their injury from falling. Violation of the ordinance constitutes negligence per se. See Motes v. 6 ‘S’ Co., 186 Ga. App. 67 (366 SE2d 358) (1988). Thus defendant has not negated the first element of plaintiffs burden of proof, “fault on the part of the owner.” Gyles, Inc. v. Turner, 184 Ga. App. 376, 377 (361 SE2d 538) (1987). It is a jury question whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McGivern, 132 Ga. App. 297, 301 (2) (208 SE2d 258) (1974).
Enforcement of the ordinance is not limited to the imposition of fines or other sanctions by the governing authority which discovers the violation by way of its own investigation or monitoring or by way of citizen complaint. It is also enforceable by holding liable, to persons for whom the requirement exists, those whose failure to comply causes injury. See Huckabee v. Grace, 48 Ga. App. 621, 632 (173 SE 744) (1934); Jones v. Dixie Drive It Yourself System, 97 Ga. App. 669 (104 SE2d 497) (1958); Potts v. Fidelity Fruit &c. Co., 165 Ga. App. 546, 547 (301 SE2d 903) (1983).
Nor has defendant foreclosed the second element required to be proved by plaintiff, i.e., “ignorance of the danger on the part of the invitee.” (Punctuation omitted.) Gyles, Inc., supra.
Equal knowledge of the hazard did not exist as a matter of law. The landlord knew the handrail had been removed, but the guest was unaware of its absence until she began to fall. She testified that she grabbed for it, but nothing was there, and she went all the way to the bottom of the staircase. She explained that she did not realize there was no handrail as she ascended the stairs because one does not normally assure oneself that such is present before beginning a climb. It is true that the lack of a handrail was obvious to one who looked for it, as she admitted, but whether it was a lack of due care for her not to do so, is a jury question. This case differs from Motes, supra, in that plaintiff Motes “knew as she ascended and descended the steps that there was no handrail.” Id. at 67. Her knowledge of this condition “was equal to that of appellee” 6 ‘S’ Company. Id. at 68.
Sullivan v. Quisc, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 114 (427 SE2d 86) (1993), which cites Motes, is also an equal knowledge case. There was no conflicting evidence on this point of fact. Moreover, it did not involve the absence of a handrail. Instead, plaintiff fell on a sloped threshold which, even if it were regarded as a hazardous condition, was discoverable and avoidable by plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care, as a matter of law. Id. at 115. Plaintiff Sullivan simply did not observe the floor upon where she was placing her feet. Thus she had constructive *568equal knowledge.