concurring specially.
This case would not be such a problem if the complaint had been more clearly drafted. What plaintiff started out with in the first suit was in essence two counts. One set forth an equitable action for wrongful foreclosure, to set aside foreclosure sale, to cancel the warranty deed under power, and to restrain execution of a writ of possession. The other was for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which arose out of the wrongful foreclosure. Plaintiff alleged that the foreclosure was not only wrongful but that it was worse, in that defendants “exhibited a willful and wanton disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.” The primary injury claimed in this regard was that she suffered “severe mental strain,” and she sought damages “for the intentional infliction of mental pain and suffering.” OCGA § 51-12-6 damages flow from this.
Plaintiff was afforded the relief sought on her first count by way of summary judgment, but while the case was still pending on the second count, it was dismissed under USCR 20 (A). As the law permits, OCGA § 9-2-61 (a), plaintiff filed again what was in effect the second count. She did not refile the whole lawsuit but asserted only the intentional infliction cause of action; she explained in the new complaint that relief had been afforded for the wrongful foreclosure, which in effect had been the first count.
In order to recognize her pleading as setting forth a cause of action, it is necessary to focus on paragraph 7 and prayer (a). It is also necessary to translate her reference to “intentional infliction of mental pain and suffering” to mean “intentional infliction of emotional distress,” as it is the latter which is a tort in Georgia. See Greer v. Medders, 176 Ga. App. 408, 409 (336 SE2d 328) (1985), and the cases cited therein. Reading these two sections of her complaint together, we must abide by the precept that pleadings are to be construed liberally. OCGA § 9-11-8 (e) (1) and (f); Cotton v. Federal Land Bank, 246 Ga. 188, 191 (269 SE2d 422) (1980). She does cite a viable claim. That is, if defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her by foreclosing on the home with full knowledge that she was not in default in payments or fire insurance, she would be able to recover whatever damages she could prove within the legal confines of the tort.
East River Savings Bank v. Steele, 169 Ga. App. 9, 10 (311 SE2d 189) (1983), viewed “allegations concerning wrongful foreclosure of partnership assets as a basis for intentional infliction of emotional distress ... [as being] analogous to the filing of legal proceedings.” It then applied Ga. Power Co. v. Johnson, 155 Ga. App. 862, 863 (274 SE2d 17) (1980), for its holding that preparation and filing of legal pleadings (naming certain persons as possible property co-owners in a condemnation action when plaintiff was the sole owner) could not *461reasonably constitute the tort. This brought it to the holding that “[t]he alleged wrongful foreclosure was not, as a matter of law, an event so humiliating, insulting, or terrifying as to have come within the ambit of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
I agree with the special concurrence that the facts make this case distinguishable. What is more, it is the whole process, beginning with defendants’ declaring her in default and accelerating the loan on the home which apparently her permanently disabled son occupied, that plaintiff alleges constituted emotional distress. It was not merely the preparation and filing of legal pleadings against wrong parties so as to draw in question the extent of the wronged person’s title to property being condemned, as in Ga. Power Co., or attempts to foreclose on business property owned by a partnership including the wronged person, as in East River Savings Bank.
The court granted summary judgment to defendants, but the evidence in the record did not pierce at least one element of plaintiff’s claim so as to preclude her from going to trial. The law imposes a duty on persons not to intentionally inflict emotional distress on others. Breach of that duty occurs when a person’s actions are “so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.” Ga. Power Co., supra at 863. “Damages [for mental suffering] may be recovered in those cases where the plaintiff has suffered at the hands of the defendant a wanton, voluntary, or intentional wrong the natural result of which is the causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings.” Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 846 (3) (59 SE 189) (1907).
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based on a notice of cancellation of a standard fire policy on the property on or about December 10, 1986. They allege that the maintenance of fire insurance violated the “mortgage agreement” and allowed foreclosure. The statement is unsworn but the security deed requiring insurance is in the record. They state in their brief in support of summary judgment that plaintiff “was in default for a short period of time until he sought other insurance,” but the record in the first case shows that the new policy commenced October 1, 1984, at the end of the old policy. It is that insurance, not the 1986 insurance coming over two years after foreclosure, which is the basis for the action.
Default was declared and foreclosure instituted even before the old policy concluded and before the new insurance went into effect. Defendants acknowledge in a later brief that plaintiff maintained she did not allow fire insurance to lapse, that they were denied a writ of possession, and that the foreclosure was set aside and the recorded warranty deed under power of sale was cancelled.
These are the salient material facts. Defendants did not establish *462that they were entitled to summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56. For this reason, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.
Decided June 28, 1990 Rehearing denied July 17, 1990. James D. Burns, for appellant. J. L. Jordan, Ray Gary, for appellees.