dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I find no grounds for reversal for any of the reasons assigned by appellant. Although there are no Georgia cases addressing the issues raised, it is clear under the facts here and the law as established in other jurisdictions that the policy issued by appellant obligated it to pay $10,000 per person under the limits of liability provision and likewise imposed additional duty to pay interest accruing after judgment was entered on the entire amount in any suit it defended.
Insurance policy provisions for post judgment interest have, almost without exception throughout the country, held that the insurer is obligated to pay interest on the entire amount of the judgment, in spite of variations in the language. Other courts when confronted with language almost identical to that here have repeatedly held that the words “all interest accruing after the entry of judgment” requires payment of interest on the entire judgment irrespective of the policy limits. See, e.g., Di Benedetto v. Estate of Di Benedetto, 526 A2d 1161 (N.J. Super. L. 1986); Starke v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 P2d 3 (Colo. App. 1988); Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 527 NE2d 950 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1988); Mut. Of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 772 P2d 216 (Idaho 1989); Casey v. Calhoun, 531 NE2d 1348 (Ohio App. 1987); Petry v. Richard, 532 S2d 286 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1988).
The reasoning behind this policy is two-fold: “In the first place, the insurer’s language compels such a conclusion. The phrase referring to interest uses the term ‘judgment’ without qualification while in the same clause the phrase limiting the duration of the liability for interest refers to ‘such part of the judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company’s liability thereon.’ Obviously the insurer knew how to qualify the term ‘judgment’ to achieve the result that it urges. *275It did not do so. In addition, the realities of the relationship between the insurer and the insured argue against the insurer’s interpretation. Under the terms of the policy the insurer has complete control of any litigation from which it might incur liability. The insured cannot settle with the plaintiff without releasing the insurer from its obligation. Any delay that may cause the accumulation of interest is thus the responsibility of the insurer. And until it has discharged its obligations under the policy it should bear the entire expense of this delay.” Di Benedetto, supra at 1163.
I further concur with the trial judge’s ruling that Giles did not agree or otherwise waive her entitlement to post judgment interest, give a satisfaction of judgment, forbear from enforcement of the judgment, or accept any amount less than provided for by the policy. The letters to the three plaintiffs’ attorneys did not discuss supplemental payments in addition to the limits of liability, nor did they contain any offer, conditional or otherwise, to pay any sum to Giles. There was no evidence of any agreement or participation in any negotiations on her part. This is also true of Lane’s recitation in court, which made no mention of any of the matters to which appellant now claims Giles agreed by promise or estoppel.
Likewise, appellant’s obligations under the policy were not satisfied by its tender of the $10,000 policy liability limit following the return of the verdict, as that tender did not include its duty to pay the post judgment interest. “A valid tender must be in the amount due and a tender is invalid when it is for less than what is due. 15 S. Williston, Contracts, [§ 1814 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1972)]. Partial payment of the contractual obligation does not toll the further accrual of interest on the balance of the judgment. [Cit.]” Starke v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 4. Accord Petry v. Richard, supra. This is also true in regard to appellant’s deposit of only the liability limit in court. See Di Benedetto, supra. Thus appellant has never unconditionally offered, tendered or deposited in court the full amount due Giles under its insurance contract.
Therefore, not having satisfied any policy condition which would permit the limitation of its interest obligation, appellant should be required to pay the statutory interest that has accrued on the entire $1,495,000 judgment from the date of its entry. It follows that summary judgment was properly denied to appellant and granted to Giles.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.
*276Decided June 12, 1990 Rehearing denied July 10, 1990 — Cert, applied for. Goldner, Sommers & Scrudder, Philip M. Casto, Glenn S. Bass, Alfred A. Quillian, Jr., Linda E. Jacobsen, for appellant. Barnes, Browning, Tanksley & Casurella, Charles B. Tanksley, Carr & Kessler, James C. Carr, Jr., for appellees.